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ABSTRACT 
 
Private international law has traditionally been perceived as a field of law concerned 
with resolving individual private disputes and achieving private justice and fairness in 
individual cases.  This dissertation challenges this view by examining the systemic 
function of European private international law of employment, one of allocating and 
protecting regulatory (i.e. legislative and adjudicatory) authority of states in the field of 
labour law, thus maintaining and managing the diversity of European national labour 
law systems and safeguarding the objectives of uniform and harmonised EU 
employment legislation.  This dissertation also explores the changes that the 
‘Europeanization’ of private international law of employment has brought about in the 
traditional rules and perception in this field of law in England.  In addition to 
introducing special rules of jurisdiction in employment matters that had not existed 
before, the European private international law instruments have largely merged the 
traditionally perceived contractual, statutory and tortious claims into one type of claim 
for choice-of-law purposes, thereby also abolishing concurrent causes of action.  The 
conceptualisation of this field of law in terms of its regulatory function reveals 
something about the nature of private international law as a whole.  The fact that 
European private international law of employment performs a regulatory function is a 
piece of evidence for the proposition that the division between the ‘private’ and the 
‘public’, traditionally perceived as embedded in the foundations of the discipline and 
even expressed in its very name, has faded away. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
International employment contracts, i.e. individual employment contracts that are 
connected to more than one country, are a common occurrence.  People migrate from 
one country to another in search of employment.  Workers commute to a place of work 
in a neighbouring country.  Employers send their employees, either temporarily or 
permanently, to a foreign branch, subsidiary, affiliate or place of work.  Companies seek 
out workers across borders.  Employees are ‘hired out’ to foreign companies.  There are 
workers whose occupations are ‘international’ by their very nature: commercial 
representatives covering territories of several countries, international transport workers, 
workers on offshore installations etc. 
The diversity of factual patterns under which international employment relations 
arise suggests how widespread a social phenomenon they are, constantly growing in 
number and significance.  This is a consequence of globalisation and the resulting 
internationalisation of the production of goods and supply of services, rise of 
transnational corporations, and increased international mobility of workers.  Looking 
particularly at the European Union (‘EU’), the freedom of movement of workers, 
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services
1
 ensure there are no legal 
obstacles within the EU to the creation of factual patterns referred to above.  Indeed, the 
growing number and significance of international employment relations is reflected in 
the recent surge in the number of judgments concerning such relations rendered by the 
Court of Justice of the EU (‘CJEU’) and the courts of the United Kingdom. 
                                                 
1
 Arts.45, 49 and 56, respectively, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (consolidated version) 
[2010] OJ C83/47 (‘TFEU’) (ex Arts.39, 43, 49, respectively, of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (consolidated version) [2006] OJ C321E/1 (‘TEC’)). 
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 A truly international legal regulation of international employment relations does 
not exist.  International organisations such as the United Nations, International Labour 
Organisation (‘ILO’) and Council of Europe have not achieved and cannot be expected 
to achieve in the foreseeable future a worldwide unification of labour laws.  The EU has 
some competence in the social sphere.
2
  But apart from the areas of free movement of 
workers and equality, EU employment legislation is contained in directives which do 
not lead to real uniformity of the Member States’ labour laws, since national 
implementations of those directives often differ.  National regulation of international 
employment relations therefore remains of primary importance both at the international 
and EU level.  National labour law systems remain widely divergent in their respective 
regulatory objectives, regulatory techniques and content.  These typically reflect the 
unique social, political and economic textures of a particular country. 
 Owing to the lack of uniformity, private international law (‘PIL’) assumes a 
central role.  It goes without saying that the outcome of a particular employment dispute 
may depend on the applicable law, competent court, and the possibility of recognition 
and enforcement of judgments abroad.  Legal uncertainty arising from divergent 
national regulation of those matters could create obstacles to the fundamental economic 
Treaty freedoms.  PIL rules concerning employment have therefore been unified in the 
EU and are contained in the following instruments: 
 Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘Brussels I’),3 superseding the 
1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters (‘Brussels Convention’);4  closely related 
                                                 
2
 Title X TFEU, in particular Art.153 (ex Art.137 TEC). 
3
 [2001] OJ L12/1. 
4
 [1972] OJ L299/32, implemented in the UK by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (‘CJJA 
1982’). 
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are the 2007 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘2007 Lugano 
Convention’),5 superseding the 1988 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and 
the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘1988 
Lugano Convention’);6 
 Regulation 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (‘Rome 
I’),7 superseding the 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (‘Rome Convention’);8 
 Regulation 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations 
(‘Rome II’);9 
 Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of 
the provision of services (‘Posted Workers Directive’ or ‘PWD’).10 
European PIL of employment pursues the objective of protection of employees 
as weaker contractual parties.  Recital 13 Brussels I states: ‘In relation to...employment, 
the weaker party should be protected by rules...more favourable to his interests than the 
general rules provide for.’  In essentially identical words, Recital 23 Rome I also 
endorses the objective of employee protection.  Somewhat differently, Recital 5 PWD 
speaks of ‘a climate of fair competition and measures guaranteeing respect for the rights 
of workers’.  At least regarding Brussels I and Rome I, the goal seems clear.  The 
special PIL rules concerning employment should grant protection to the employee and 
be more favourable to his interests than the general rules.  Such view of the objective of 
employee protection, focused on the protection and benefit that individual employees 
should receive, is shared by the CJEU.  The Court has consistently held that jurisdiction 
                                                 
5
 [2009] OJ L147/1, implemented in the UK by CJJA 1982. 
6
 [1988] OJ L319/9, implemented in the UK by CJJA 1982. 
7
 [2008] OJ L177/6. 
8
 [1980] OJ L266/1, implemented in the UK by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. 
9
 [2007] OJ L199/40. 
10
 [1997] OJ L18/1. 
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should be given to the courts for the place of work ‘as that is the place where it is least 
expensive for the employee to commence or defend court proceedings’.11  Furthermore, 
in explaining the meaning of the objective of employee protection, the Court has often 
cited with approval
12
 the following part of the Giuliano/Lagarde Report accompanying 
the Rome Convention: 
‘the question was one of finding a more appropriate arrangement for matters in 
which the interests of one of the contracting parties are not the same as those of 
the other, and at the same time to secure thereby more adequate protection for 
the party who from the socio-economic point of view is regarded as the weaker 
in the contractual relationship.’13 
It therefore seems to be clear that the interests of employees in minimising their 
litigation costs and maximising their welfare hold sway over the competing interests of 
employers.  Employers engaged in international employment would arguably achieve 
the greatest business efficiency if all disputes with their employees were resolved in 
their own courts and by application of their own laws.  But European PIL does not 
permit this.  To protect individual employees, Brussels I and Rome I restrict party 
autonomy and mandate the jurisdiction of the courts and application of the law 
considered most favourable for the employee. 
 Such an individualistic view of the objective of employee protection fits in well 
with the traditional conception of PIL as a field of law concerned with resolving 
individual private disputes and achieving private justice and fairness in individual cases.  
Thus, in the introductory pages of their treatises, the authors of Dicey, Morris and 
Collins on the Conflict of Laws and Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International 
                                                 
11
 Most recently in Case C-437/00 Pugliese [2003] ECR I-3573, [18]. 
12
 Most recently in Case C-29/10 Koelzsch [2011] ECR 00000, [40]. 
13
 [1980] OJ C282/1, 25. 
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Law find justification for PIL in that it implements ‘the reasonable and legitimate 
expectations of the parties to a transaction or an occurrence’,14 in the need to avoid 
‘great injustice and inconvenience’ that would arise if English courts refused to apply 
foreign law and recognise and enforce foreign judgments in appropriate cases,
15
 and in 
the ‘desire to do justice’ to the parties.16  The statements of purpose found in the 
Recitals to Brussels I and Rome I and in the CJEU case-law disclose the intention to 
achieve justice and fairness in individual international employment cases by favouring 
the interests of employees over those of employers.  Many authors writing about 
European PIL of employment talk about employee protection in similar terms. 
 But such a bipolar view oversimplifies the structure and nature of the interests 
involved in international employment relations.  By focusing on the relative positions of 
the parties to such relations, this view does not seem sufficiently to take into account the 
public interests involved.  Furthermore, by focusing exclusively on the protection of 
employees as weaker parties, this view fails to consider other objectives that the modern 
employment regulation pursues such as greater economic efficiency and 
competitiveness of businesses.  On the one hand, countries have an interest in 
safeguarding their existing regulatory objectives, regulatory techniques, and levels of 
terms and conditions of employment.  States are thus often interested in applying their 
labour legislation to everyone carrying out work within their territory.  On the other 
hand, the fact that the regulation of employment primarily takes place at national level 
in today’s globalised world means that employment legislation is one of the factors on 
the basis of which countries compete for attracting investments and thereby achieving 
greater prosperity of their citizens.  States are thus often interested in the application of 
their employment legislation to economic operators established within their territory, 
                                                 
14
 L. Collins (gen ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (London, 14
th
 ed, 2006), [1-005]. 
15
 ibid [1-006]-[1.007]. 
16
 J.J. Fawcett and J.M. Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (Oxford, 14
th
 
ed, 2008) 5. 
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even in some situations where they operate abroad and employ workers abroad to that 
end.  Not infrequently, the interests of countries clash, which is particularly visible in 
the EU where a significant gap exists between the level of wages and other terms and 
conditions of employment among Member States, and where both the freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide services are guaranteed. 
 What does the objective of employee protection really entail in European PIL?  
Should the private interests of the parties to international employment relations be the 
exclusive or even prevalent concern?  What role should the public interests involved 
have in the process of making and interpreting the special PIL rules concerning 
employment?  These questions define the first theme of this dissertation.  The argument 
advanced here is that the individualistic view of the objective of employee protection, 
seemingly adopted by the drafters of the European PIL instruments and the CJEU, gives 
an incomplete picture of European PIL of employment.  The goal of this field of law 
should not be to favour the interests of employees unreservedly over those of 
employers, but to adequately allocate and safeguard regulatory (i.e. legislative and 
adjudicatory) authority of states in the field of labour law, primarily in the EU context.  
Differences among the Member States’ labour laws are not accidental.  They reflect a 
conscious decision to refrain from complete unification of labour law in Europe, thereby 
respecting national peculiarities.  A mechanism is needed to maintain and manage the 
diversity of the national labour law systems existing in the EU and at the same time to 
safeguard the objectives of uniform and harmonised EU employment legislation.  
European PIL of employment is that mechanism.  The argument advanced here is not 
new.  Other authors have pointed to the regulatory function of PIL.
17
  This dissertation 
                                                 
17
 U. Liukkunen, ‘Managing Legal Diversity in the EU: The Case of Subject-Specific Conflicts Rules’ 
(2012) 4 European Review of Private Law 1045; R. Michaels, ‘New European Choice-of-Law 
Revolution’ (2007-2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1607; A. Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private 
International Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the International Constitutional Ordering of 
Private Law (Cambridge, 2009); H. Muir Watt, ‘Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: 
7 
 
attempts to contribute to this debate by focusing on the conceptualisation of one 
particular area of PIL, that of employment, in terms of its regulatory function.  This, in 
turn, is expected to reveal something about the nature of the discipline as a whole.  If 
European PIL of employment indeed performs a regulatory function, then that is 
another piece of evidence supporting the proposition that the division between the 
‘private’ and the ‘public’, traditionally perceived as embedded in the foundations of the 
discipline and even expressed in its very name, is fading away. 
 The purpose of this dissertation is not to be primarily an exploration of PIL 
theory.  There is a second theme concerning the content of European PIL of 
employment.  This dissertation therefore builds upon the path-breaking work by 
MERRETT.
18
  If European PIL of employment has a regulatory function, how well is it 
performing this task?  To answer this question, a detailed descriptive and normative 
analysis of the concrete European PIL rules concerning employment is required.  The 
insights obtained by exploring the first theme provide the necessary theoretical 
framework.  It is shown that the rules concerning employment of the European PIL 
instruments listed above have certain shortcomings that could be remedied in the future.  
The rules of Brussels I, Rome I and Rome II seem to require some, largely technical, 
changes.  But the interaction between those instruments and the fundamental economic 
Treaty freedoms, largely regulated by PWD, is a reason for concern.  As things stand, 
service providers from Member States with relatively low levels of terms and conditions 
of employment that post workers to affluent Member States for the purpose of providing 
services there remain by and large subject to labour legislation of their home countries.  
They must comply only with a limited range and type of the host Member State 
                                                                                                                                               
A Matter of Political Economy’ (2002-2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 383; H. Muir Watt, 
‘European Integration, Legal Diversity and the Conflict of Laws’ (2004-2005) 9 Edinburgh Law Review 
6; R. Wai, ‘Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private 
International Law in an Era of Globalisation’ (2002) 40 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 209. 
18
 L. Merrett, Employment Contracts in Private International Law (Oxford, 2011). 
8 
 
employment standards, and are thus capable of undercutting local competitors.  Whether 
such downward pressures on the host Member State labour law systems are acceptable 
goes to the core of the question of what social model is best for Europe.  Being a cause 
of the problem of posting of workers in Europe, can European PIL of employment be a 
part of the solution? 
 The ‘Europeanization’ of PIL of employment necessarily leads to significant 
changes in the traditional rules and perceptions in this field of law in individual Member 
States.  Whereas European PIL of employment is concerned with maintaining and 
managing the diversity of European national labour law systems and safeguarding the 
objectives of uniform and harmonised EU employment legislation, many national PIL 
regimes traditionally dealt solely with protecting their own regulatory objectives, 
regulatory techniques and levels of employment standards.  But Member States cannot 
pursue purely domestic interests anymore.  They must cooperate to achieve the supra-
national objectives of European PIL of employment.  The extent of the impact of the 
European regime on English conflict of laws of employment forms the third theme of 
this dissertation, thus drawing upon the work by MERRETT and other English scholars.  
Although the focus here is on the law of England and Wales, the discussion and the 
conclusions reached are also potentially relevant for the laws of Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. 
European PIL of employment does not share the logic of the traditional English 
approach to choice of law and conflict of jurisdictions in employment matters.  Brussels 
I, with its special jurisdictional rules concerning employment, is an obvious example of 
the changes brought about in English conflict of laws.  Rome I and Rome II seem to 
have an even greater, but much subtler, impact.  Whereas in English conflict of laws all 
employment claims fall into three basic categories for choice-of-law purposes, namely 
9 
 
contractual, statutory and tortious claims, the two Regulations recognise only two 
categories: claims based on breach of a contractual obligation, triggering the application 
of Rome I, and claims based on breach of a non-contractual obligation, triggering the 
application of Rome II.  The conceptual differences between English conflict of laws 
and European PIL in this area raise complex difficulties.  A central question is, for 
example, how traditionally perceived statutory claims, which in English conflict of laws 
are understood as not being subject to choice-of-law rules but as defining their own 
scope of application, fit within the ‘European’ approach?  Given that the two 
Regulations cover all obligations, it seems that the choice-of-law process must have 
some impact on resolving the question of whether an employee engaged in international 
employment can claim under a statute forming part of English law.  Furthermore, the 
notions of contractual and non-contractual obligations for the purposes of the two 
Regulations do not necessarily correspond to the traditional English concepts of contract 
and tort.  Some of the traditionally perceived tortious claims might have to be classified 
as contractual for the purposes of Rome I.  The same goes for some of the traditionally 
perceived contractual claims.  Depending on the extent of the changes, i.e. on whether 
EU law still allows English courts to pursue the traditional approach or whether it 
mandates a radically different approach that largely merges contractual, statutory and 
tortious claims into one type of claim for choice-of-law purposes, one could talk either 
of an evolution or tectonic shift in English conflict of laws in this field.  Although the 
focus here is on European PIL of employment, the broadest implication of this 
dissertation is that Rome I and Rome II may have profound impact on the traditional 
approach to conflict of laws issues in England in all fields of law where the problems of 
the territorial scope of statutes and concurrence of contractual and other causes of action 
arise. 
10 
 
The title of this dissertation, The International Employment Contract: Ideal, 
Reality and Regulatory Function of European Private International Law of 
Employment, attempts to capture the three themes examined here.  Chapter II starts by 
exploring the ideal of this field of law, namely the objective of employee protection, 
from the standpoint of PIL theory.  It is argued that the individualistic view of this 
objective is too narrow a view, and that PIL of employment plays an important 
regulatory task.  Chapters III, IV and V analyse in detail the rules of Brussels I and 
Rome I.  Chapter III deals with the personal scope of the special rules concerning 
employment of the two Regulations.  It is shown that the wide and inclusive scope of 
those rules can be perceived as an attempt both to provide PIL protection to all workers 
in a genuine need of protection and to allocate and protect regulatory authority of states 
that have intermediate legal categories of dependent self-employed workers or ascribe 
employer responsibilities to multiple employing entities.  The rules concerning 
employment of Brussels I and Rome I are described and critically analysed in Chapters 
IV and V, respectively.  The shortcomings of those rules are exposed and certain 
amendments are proposed.  Chapters VI and VII focus on the third theme of this 
dissertation.  Chapter VI examines the impact of Rome I on statutory employment 
claims brought before English courts, whereas Chapter VII explores the joint effect of 
Rome I and Rome II on claims traditionally perceived as being of a tortious nature.  It is 
argued that the two Regulations have introduced profound changes in the traditional 
rules and perceptions in English conflict of laws of employment by largely merging 
contractual, statutory and tortious claims into one type of claim for choice-of-law 
purposes and, furthermore, abolishing concurrent causes of action in choice of law.  The 
interaction between European PIL of employment and the fundamental economic Treaty 
freedoms is dealt with in Chapter VIII.  It is shown that European PIL is a cause of the 
11 
 
problem of posting of workers in Europe, and, as things stand, is incapable of assisting 
in the resolution of the problem.  Chapter IX concludes. 
12 
 
II EMPLOYEE PROTECTION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
 
‘Seeing that Mr. Sayers put his faith in 
the company, I trust that the company 
will play fair by him and grant him just 
compensation for his injuries.’ 
LORD DENNING MR
1
 
 
When LORD DENNING made this statement, English conflict of laws did not regard 
employees as a category requiring any special treatment.
2
  Conflicts rules applied 
equally to commercial and employment matters.  If any protection was to be given to 
employees, it was in the realm of substantive law: either by means of employment law 
provisions of the applicable law or domestic overriding employment statutes.  Sayers
3
 
exposed the inadequacy of that approach.  Here, neither the governing law (Dutch) nor 
the lex fori (English) provided protection to the claimant employee.  The case fell 
outside the territorial scope of their employment statutes, since the work was performed 
in Nigeria.  Nigerian law was disregarded for not being sufficiently closely connected.  
Mr Sayers therefore found himself in a legal vacuum, without statutory protection to 
which he would have been entitled had he worked in England or the Netherlands, 
presumably also had Nigerian law been found applicable.  All he could do was ‘put his 
faith in the company’ and ‘trust that the company [would] play fair by him’.  Sayers is 
                                                 
1
 Sayers v International Drilling Co NV [1971] 1 WLR 1176 (CA), 1182 (Sayers). 
2
 See J.H.C. Morris (ed), Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (London, 8
th
 ed, 1967). 
3
 (n1). 
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also illustrative of how classical PIL operated before the advent of the European regime.  
Since neither England nor the Netherlands had an interest in protecting their own 
regulatory objectives and employment standards, their employment statutes did not 
apply.  Nigerian law, which presumably had an interest, was disregarded on a rather 
technical point.  The allocation and protection of regulatory authority was not a concern 
for classical PIL. 
Inspired by the idea of employee protection, many PIL instruments nowadays 
contain special rules concerning employment, such as Arts.18-21 Brussels I and Art.8 
Rome I.  As mentioned, the Recitals of the two instruments clarify that those rules 
pursue the objective of protection of employees as weaker contractual parties,
4
 which 
has been confirmed by the CJEU.
5
  This chapter examines what this objective entails in 
PIL.  It explores the role that the public interests involved have in the process of making 
of the PIL rules concerning employment in order to assess the validity of the 
individualistic view of this objective, seemingly adopted by the drafters of the European 
PIL instruments and the CJEU.  The reasons for protecting employees in PIL are 
presented first.  An account of employees who merit such protection follows.  Next, 
various ways are analysed in which the objective of employee protection shapes choice-
of-law and jurisdictional rules.  The examination undertaken here is conducted from a 
comparative perspective and primarily from the standpoint of PIL theory.  The purpose 
is to provide a theoretical background for the assessment of the solutions of EU law in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
                                                 
4
 Brussels I, Recital 13; Rome I, Recital 23. 
5
 Case 133/81 Ivenel [1982] ECR 1891, [14], [16], [19]; Case C-125/92 Mulox [1993] ECR I-4075, [18]-
[19]; Case C-383/95 Rutten [1997] ECR I-57, [17], [20], [22]; Case C-37/00 Weber [2002] ECR I-2013, 
[40], [49]; Case C-437/00 Pugliese [2003] ECR I-3573, [18], [22]; Case C-462/06 GlaxoSmithKline 
[2008] ECR I-3965, [17]; Case C-29/10 Koelzsch [2011] ECR 00000, [40]-[42], [46]; Case C-384/10 
Voogsgeerd [2011] ECR 00000, [35]; Case C-154/11 Mahamdia [2012] ECR 00000, [44], [46], [64]. 
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1. Reasons for protecting employees in private international law 
Not so long ago, a salient feature of PIL was its neutrality.
6
  Compared to other 
branches of the law, the impact of social facts and policies on the development and 
operation of classical PIL was minimal.  Choice-of-law rules decided which national 
law was to apply in a particular case, and for this purpose used abstract legal categories 
(e.g. contract) and connecting factors (e.g. party autonomy, place of contracting, place 
of performance).  The idea behind this jurisdiction-selecting approach, advanced by 
VON SAVIGNY, was to find a legal system in which the legal relation had its seat or 
centre of gravity.
7
  The search for such legal system was perceived as the specific 
‘conflicts justice’, distinguished from the ‘material justice’ of substantive law.8  
Protection of employees was a matter primarily left to the substantive rules of the 
applicable law.  According to RABEL: 
‘To care for social prosperity is the responsibility of the municipal private laws, 
which have to resolve the merits of each particular problem.  The principle, jus 
suum cuique tribuere, instructs legislators and judges to ponder carefully private 
and public interests.  But this is what each private law does for itself; the 
function of private international law rules is to choose the applicable law with all 
its evaluations whatever they may be… But, as things are, to inject national 
policies directly into conflicts law, will destroy it.’9 
                                                 
6
 K. Zweigert, ‘Zur Armut des internationalen Privatrechts an sozialen Werten’ (1973) 37 RabelZ 435, 
436, 443. 
7
 F.C. von Savigny, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (Edinburgh, 1869). 
8
 S. Symeonides, ‘Material Justice and Conflicts Justice in Choice of Law’ in P. Borchers and J. Zekoll 
(eds), International Conflict of Laws for the Third Millennium: Essays in Honour of Friedrich K. Juenger 
(Ardsley, NY, 2001) 125. 
9
 E. Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study Vol 1 (Ann Arbor, 2
nd
 ed, 1958) 97. 
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Similarly, no special jurisdictional treatment was traditionally given to employees or 
other weaker parties.
10
 
This state of affairs, labelled ‘poverty of PIL in social values’,11 turned a blind 
eye to the shortcomings of party autonomy in international employment contracts and to 
the states’ legitimate interests in the application of their employment laws.  
Indisputably, the freedom to choose the applicable law and competent court is a basic 
principle of PIL of contract.
12
  But none of the three main reasons that justify the 
widespread acceptance of this principle, namely freedom of contract, economic 
efficiency and legal certainty,
13
 holds fully in relation to most international employment 
contracts.  Special rules are required to remedy deficiencies of party autonomy.  In 
addition, such rules are needed to ensure that party autonomy and other abstract 
connecting factors do not undermine important values and policies pursued by national 
employment laws. 
1.1. Shortcomings of party autonomy: freedom of contract 
Party autonomy in PIL is derived from the wider principle of freedom of contract.  
‘Whether the case brought before the judge raises issues of private international law or 
not, the principle that those who make agreements...ought to perform them is central to 
the nervous system of...law.’14  The parallelism between substantive law and PIL of 
contract is not surprising.  Historically, the freedom to choose the applicable law 
became recognised in many countries in the latter part of the 19
th
 century.
15
  This was 
the heyday of liberalism and its laissez-faire credo.  The parties were regarded as 
                                                 
10
 For instance, in his work ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1964-I) 111 Recueil des 
Cours 1, F.A. Mann mentions no jurisdictional rules concerning weaker parties. 
11
 Zweigert (n6). 
12
 P. Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Oxford, 1999). 
13
 ibid 2-3. 
14
 A. Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford, 2008) 22. 
15
 O. Lando, ‘The Conflict of Laws of Contracts: General Principles’ (1984-VI) 189 Recueil des Cours 
225, 256-284. 
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private legislators in their contractual relationships.  Their will was placed at the 
forefront of the law of contract as the source of contractual rights and obligations.  The 
role of the law and courts was minimal.  Their primary task was to facilitate 
enforcement of contractual rights and prevent fraud, misrepresentation and duress.
16
  
The logical extension of this freedom was to allow the parties to subject the contract to 
the law of their choice.
17
  The freedom to choose the competent court has been justified 
on the same principle.  As the United States Supreme Court stated in M/S Bremen v 
Zapata Off-Shore Co, ‘This approach [of enforcing choice-of-court 
agreements]...accords with ancient concepts of freedom of contract.’18  Freedom of 
contract is therefore a strong argument in favour of party autonomy in the fields of law, 
such as commercial law, where state interference is minimal. 
But employment law is of an essentially different nature.  For much of the 19
th
 
century, the relationship between employers and workers was primarily regulated by the 
general law of contract and property.
19
  The parties to this relationship were seen as 
equals before the law, freely exercising their will over the letting and hiring of the 
worker’s services.  Wages given in exchange depended on the law of supply and 
demand.  This liberal model of regulating employment, however, never brought about 
genuine equality.  Instead, it exposed the difference in socio-economic power between 
employers and workers that enabled the former to impose their terms on the latter.  It 
became acknowledged that the typical features of employment contracts were not 
freedom and equality, but submission, subordination and inequality of bargaining 
power.  As famously observed by KAHN-FREUND: ‘In its inception [the relation between 
an employer and an employee] is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition 
                                                 
16
 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, 1979) 402-408. 
17
 A.L. Diamond, ‘Harmonization of Private International Law Relating to Contractual Obligations’ 
(1986-IV) 199 Recueil des Cours 233, 265. 
18
 407 US 1 (1972) 11 (per Mr Chief Justice Burger). 
19
 B. Veneziani, ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment’ in B. Hepple (ed), The Making of Labour 
Law in Europe: A Comparative Study of Nine Countries up to 1945 (London, 1986) 31. 
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of subordination, however much the submission and subordination may be concealed by 
that indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the “contract of employment”.’20  
This change in perception led to the creation of an autonomous notion of employment 
contract and to the development and extension of collective bargaining and protective 
legislation.
21
  A goal of regulating employment has thereafter been to compensate 
employees for their typically weaker position.  Apart from pursuing the goal of 
distributive justice, modern legal regulation of employment is also motivated by the 
objectives of social inclusion, protection of human rights in the workplace, and greater 
economic efficiency and competitiveness of businesses.
22
  Achieving parallelism with 
substantive law of employment requires commensurable efforts in PIL. 
1.2. Shortcomings of party autonomy: economic efficiency 
Scholars engaged in economic analysis of PIL support party autonomy for reasons of 
economic efficiency.
23
  Their conclusions, however, depend upon certain assumptions.  
Most economic analyses assume that the parties are rational, that there are no 
transaction costs, imperfect information and externalities.
24
 
But the typical features of international employment contracts are high 
transaction costs and asymmetric information.  The comparison of national employment 
                                                 
20
 P. Davies and M. Freedland, Kahn Freund’s Labour and the Law (London, 3rd ed, 1983) 18.  See also 
H. Collins, Employment Law (Oxford, 2
nd
 ed, 2010) 6-14. 
21
 Atiyah (n16) 523-544. 
22
 H. Collins, ‘Against Abstentionism in Labour Law’ in J. Bell and J. Eekelaar (eds), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence 3
rd
 Series (Oxford, 1987) 79; H. Collins, ‘Is there a Third Way in Labour Law?’ in J. 
Conaghan, R.M. Fischl and K. Klare, Labour Law in an Era of Globalization (Oxford, 2002) 449; H. 
Collins, ‘Justifications and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation’ in H. Collins, P. 
Davies and R. Rideout (eds), Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation (London, 2000) 3; A.C.L. 
Davies, Perspectives on Labour Law (Cambridge, 2
nd
 ed, 2009). 
23
 See J. Basedow and T. Kono (eds), An Economic Analysis of Private International Law (Tübingen, 
2006). 
24
 S. Ota, ‘Choice of Law and Economic Analysis: A Methodological Introduction’ in Basedow and Kono 
(eds) ibid 3, 8. 
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laws is an expensive task.
25
  Employees typically lack resources that employers have.  
They usually cannot afford legal advice of comparative employment law specialists or 
employment lawyers from different jurisdictions.  Furthermore, a rational party will 
engage in such comparison only if the value of the envisaged transaction corresponds to 
the cost of legal advice, or if the result thereof can be applied in a great number of cases.  
Employment contracts are characterised by a standardisation on the employers’ side.  It 
is they who benefit from the economies of scale: the greater the number of employees, 
the lower the cost of legal advice per employee.  For employees, by contrast, entering 
into an employment contract does not form part of a large series of similar transactions.  
It is an isolated occurrence, whose value normally does not justify a comprehensive and 
expensive legal analysis.  The difference in practical availability of legal advice and 
experience results in information asymmetry.  Employees are typically far less likely 
than their employers to be knowledgeable of the available alternatives and possible 
risks.  Furthermore, choice-of-law and choice-of-court clauses often form part of 
lengthy and complex standard-form employment contracts, and may therefore pass 
unnoticed by employees.  As with many other contractual terms and conditions, 
employees may underestimate the importance of, or simply not understand, choice-of-
law and choice-of-court clauses.  An employee, even if aware of the available 
alternatives and possible risks, may not object to the employer’s choice of law or court 
for fear of losing the job.  As discussed in the following section, not even managerial, 
advisory and specialist staff can routinely be assumed to be on an equal footing with 
their employers regarding transaction costs and availability of information.  To remedy 
these deficiencies, PIL should safeguard the application of the law and jurisdiction of 
the courts with which employees are sufficiently closely connected and presumably 
familiar, and whose application and jurisdiction the parties reasonably expect.  PIL can 
                                                 
25
 J. Basedow, ‘Lex Mercatoria and the Private International Law of Contracts in Economic Perspective’ 
in Basedow and Kono (eds) ibid 57, 67-68. 
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thereby also assist in the building and maintenance of trust between the parties to an 
international employment contract, which is a key ingredient in improving 
competitiveness.
26
 
The application of lax employment laws may create negative externalities for the 
country in whose labour market the employee participates.  In some countries 
employers are allowed to dismiss employees without stating reasons for dismissal, 
giving notice, or providing redundancy payment.  In England, for example, to qualify 
for the right not to be unfairly dismissed and to a redundancy payment, an employee 
must be continuously employed for more than two years.
27
  In the US, there is the 
‘contract at will’: ‘men must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they 
please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or 
even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se.’28  At the far 
end of the spectrum are countries where employers can require their employees to work 
excessively long hours for low wages in unhealthy and unsafe conditions, without job 
security or freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.  If employers 
were allowed to impose on their employees the application of the law and jurisdiction of 
the courts of such countries, they might be able to avoid the otherwise applicable 
protective legislation.  Such a choice may be efficient for the business itself.  But if the 
broader social costs are taken into account (e.g. the costs of supporting unemployed or 
injured workers and their dependants), the choice may not be efficient overall.  Legal 
                                                 
26
 H. Collins, ‘Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness’ (2001) ILJ 17; H. Collins, 
Regulating Contracts (Oxford, 2002); S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, ‘Labour Law and Economic Theory: 
A Reappraisal’ in Collins, Davies and Rideout (eds) (n22) 29. 
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 Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA 1996’), ss.108, 155. 
28
 Payne v Western & Atl. R.R. 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), 518-519.  See R. Epstein, ‘In Defence of the 
Contract at Will’ (1984) 57 University of Chicago Law Review 947. 
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regulation is often necessary to compel employers to internalise at least a part of the 
social costs.
29
  Party autonomy should not be allowed to thwart this goal. 
1.3. Shortcomings of party autonomy: legal certainty 
International contracts require legal certainty.  Where a number of laws are potentially 
applicable and several forums can assume jurisdiction, the parties should, in principle, 
be allowed to choose the law and forum.  Otherwise, the outcome of a particular case 
will depend on the PIL rules and the administration of justice in the state where the 
claim is brought. 
But because of the importance of the underlying values and policies, states are 
often unwilling to give full effect to choice-of-law and choice-of-court clauses 
contained in international employment contracts.
30
  Inserting such clauses in favour of 
the law or courts of a country not sufficiently closely connected with, and legitimately 
interested in regulating or adjudicating disputes arising out of, a particular employment 
contract may produce a high level of uncertainty.  It may be uncertain whether the 
chosen court will take jurisdiction and whether the courts whose jurisdiction is 
derogated will accept this.  The effect of the choice-of-law clause depends on the 
forum’s PIL rules.  It may be given full effect, limited effect or no effect at all.  Even if 
the chosen court assumes jurisdiction and upholds the choice-of-law clause, the 
proceedings may not be recognised abroad (e.g. through lis pendens or the recognition 
and enforcement of the resulting judgment) or may even be restrained abroad by means 
of anti-suit injunctions, particularly in the country whose employment law and courts 
were avoided.  Achieving legal certainty in this field of PIL therefore requires taking 
into consideration the states’ legitimate interests in applying their laws to, and 
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 H. Collins, ‘Justifications and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation’ (n22) 15-
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adjudicating disputes arising out of, employment contracts with which they are 
sufficiently closely connected.  Restrictions of party autonomy that achieve this goal, 
and that the parties to an employment contract can reasonably foresee, are justified. 
1.4. States’ legitimate interests in the application of their employment 
laws 
The struggle of workers for better terms and conditions of employment was made in 
different countries at different times.  The outcomes depended on many circumstances: 
diverging political histories, paths and stages of economic development, the relative 
power of employers’ and workers’ associations, the role of the state etc.31  Each 
country’s employment law is unique and represents a result of hard bargaining and 
compromises among workers, employers and the state.  It is also a means for states to 
pursue important domestic social, political and economic objectives.  States therefore 
normally have an interest in the application of their employment laws to work 
performed within their borders, often also to their nationals and workers habitually 
working in their territory who are posted abroad, in order to protect their social, political 
and economic organisations and objectives.  This is reflected in the express or implied 
territorial scope of many employment statutes.  For instance, statutes forming part of 
English law apply to employees who work or are based in Britain or the UK, regardless 
of the law governing the employment contract.
32
  Similarly, some US statutes expressly 
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 See Hepple (ed) (n19). 
32
 Patents Act 1977; Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (‘TULR(C)A 1992’); 
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extend their application to US corporations employing US workers and operating 
overseas.
33
 
Irrespective of the differences, national employment laws share a common social 
objective.  ‘Labour is not a commodity’, the motto of the ILO,34 best reflects the 
essence of employment law.  The fight against ‘commodification’ of labour and the 
resulting dangers for human dignity and social injustice is at the heart of this field of 
law.  The common social objective should make it acceptable for states to uphold not 
only their own but also foreign employment laws in appropriate circumstances.
35
  This 
idea is especially strong in federal and quasi-federal unions of states.  Such 
circumstances exist when another state is sufficiently closely connected with the 
employment contract and has a legitimate interest in regulating it (such as when the 
work is performed in that state).  The unwillingness to uphold foreign employment laws 
may result in leaving the employee without any protection.  This is what occurred in the 
mentioned Sayers case.
36
  Here, the countries of the forum and of the governing law had 
no interest in regulating the employment contract, as reflected in the fact that the case 
fell outside the territorial scope of their protective statutes.  Had the Court of Appeal 
upheld the law of Nigeria, which was arguably sufficiently closely connected with the 
contract and had an interest in the application of its employment legislation to work 
performed in its territory, the outcome might have been different. 
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1.5. Conclusion 
Typically, employees are in a weak socio-economic position in relation to their 
employers.  This creates social injustice and market failures that justify state 
intervention.  Employees are assured protection in substantive employment law by 
means of mandatory minimum standards backed by administrative, criminal or civil 
sanctions, and by the promotion of collective bargaining.  Employees are also often 
guaranteed the right to commence proceedings before specialised labour courts or 
tribunals.  The shortcomings of party autonomy in international employment contracts 
and the states’ legitimate interests in the application of their employment laws speak in 
favour of commensurable safeguards in PIL.  General PIL rules, and the principle of 
party autonomy in particular, cannot adequately accommodate these concerns.  Special 
rules that safeguard the application of the law and jurisdiction of the courts of the 
country sufficiently closely connected with, and legitimately interested in regulating and 
adjudicating disputes arising out of, the employment contract, with which law and 
courts the parties to the contract are sufficiently closely connected and presumably 
familiar, and whose application and jurisdiction the parties reasonably expect, are 
justified. 
The examination of the reasons for protecting employees in PIL shows that the 
individualistic view of the objective of employee protection is oversimplified.  
Employee protection in PIL is not only about special rules giving protection to 
individual employees and being more favourable to their interests than the general rules.  
It is also about allocating and protecting adjudicatory and legislative authority of states 
in the field of labour law.  Therefore, the idea of ‘protection of employees’ in PIL is 
somewhat of a misnomer.  It seems to be equally, if not more, correct to talk about the 
idea of protection of the labour law system of the country to which the employee 
24 
 
‘belongs’, in whose labour market he partakes.  For the sake of simplicity, however, the 
conventional term ‘employee protection’ is used throughout this dissertation. 
2. Employees protected in private international law 
In a way, the reasons for protecting employees in PIL can be reduced to one fact: their 
typically weaker socio-economic position.  The shortcomings of party autonomy exist 
because of this fact, which also serves as a justification for legal regulation of 
employment.  But not all employees engaged in international employment are in an 
inferior position.  Many are managerial, advisory or specialist staff, highly qualified and 
well paid.  As MANKOWSKI notes, ‘As an employer, you ordinarily do not order your 
worst and least specialised workers abroad, but to the contrary your expert workforce.  
We are talking about some of the most highly trained and educated (and best paid) 
employees available.’37  Should protective PIL rules take this fact into account, and 
limit their scope to employees in a genuine need for protection?  Looking 
comparatively, we can distinguish three approaches. 
First, the courts may be authorised to examine in each particular case whether a 
contractual party is in a weak position in relation to the other party.  If so, the courts 
should take this fact into account, along with other relevant factors, when applying PIL 
rules.  For example, Art.3540 of the Louisiana Civil Code subjects party autonomy to 
the public policy of the state whose law would otherwise be applicable.  That state is 
determined by reference to factors set out in Art.3537, one of which is the policy ‘of 
protecting one party from undue imposition by the other’.38  A similar approach to 
jurisdictional issues has been adopted by the US Supreme Court, which stated in M/S 
                                                 
37
 P. Mankowski, ‘Employment Contracts under Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation’ in F. Ferrari and S. 
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Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co
39
 that, ‘There are compelling reasons why a freely 
negotiated [choice-of-court clause], unaffected by fraud, undue influence or 
overweening bargaining power...should be given full effect’ (emphasis added). 
The merit of this solution is that it can encompass any worker who finds himself 
in a weaker position in a particular case.  The downside is that it can also embrace 
independent contractors who do not receive protection in substantive employment law.  
Moreover, protection of the weaker party is reduced to one of the factors that the courts 
should take into account.  It is thus uncertain whether the weaker party will actually be 
protected in a particular case, since this depends on a complicated consideration of the 
circumstances of the case, connecting factors and governmental interests. 
The second approach consists in special PIL rules covering all employees, 
except certain senior workers who are deemed to be on an equal footing with their 
employers.  This solution is arguably inspired by German employment law, where there 
are two categories of employees (collectively referred to as Arbeitnehmer).  There are 
manual workers (Arbeiter) and white-collar workers (Angestellte), on the one hand, and 
executive staff (leitende Angestellte), on the other.  It is assumed that the problems and 
interests of executive staff, due to their position, are in many ways not commensurable 
to those of other employees.  Protective legislation is therefore not fully applicable to 
the former category.
40
  This approach was suggested in the 1976 proposal for a 
Regulation on the provisions of conflict of laws on employment relationships within the 
Community (‘draft Regulation’).41  The draft Regulation distinguished between workers 
‘with special position in the establishment’ or ‘with special nature of…work’42 and all 
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other workers.  Workers carrying out managerial or advisory functions and workers 
with a high degree of specialisation fell into the first category.
43
  If the courts verified 
that these workers were in fact ‘in a position to negotiate on an equal footing with the 
employer’, they were free to agree on the applicable law.  This freedom, however, was 
not absolute.  The choice could not have the effect of undermining the law of the 
country of the place of work in respect of 9 specific topics.
44
  For the second category, 
the applicable law was the law of the country of the normal or usual place of work,
45
 
with party autonomy being allowed only exceptionally.
46
 
Shortcomings of this solution are legal uncertainty that it generates and 
difficulty of application.  Even if a person was employed in a managerial, advisory or 
specialist capacity, the courts had to verify that he was indeed free to negotiate a 
particular choice-of-law clause.  Conversely, even in cases concerning blue-collar 
workers, the employer could argue that the worker should be free to choose the 
applicable law due to the ‘special nature of his work’.  The possibility of allowing 
unfettered choice-of-court clauses entered into by senior executives was considered 
during the negotiations of the Hague Convention on jurisdiction and foreign judgments 
in civil and commercial matters, but rejected on the grounds of legal uncertainty and 
difficulty of application.
47
  Furthermore, this approach does not reflect substantive 
employment laws of many countries.  English law, for example, does not differentiate 
between managerial, advisory and specialist staff and other employees.
48
  Even in 
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German employment law the exempted category is defined very narrowly (executives), 
and these employees are not completely removed from the scope of protective 
legislation.  This approach would therefore not bring about the desired parallelism 
between substantive law and PIL, and might enable employers to avoid protective 
legislation that would otherwise be applicable to senior employees. 
Most countries that have special PIL rules adhere to the third approach.  It 
entails bringing all employees as a category of persons who are in a typically weaker 
socio-economic position within the scope of those rules.  The courts need not verify in 
each particular case whether the employee in question is in fact in a weaker position.  
This is the approach of Rome I and Brussels I and many national codes.
49
  It is also 
favoured in legal doctrine.
50
 
This approach has several merits compared to the abovementioned two, and 
seems to be the most appropriate one from the standpoint of the objective of employee 
protection.  First, it acknowledges that employees are typically in an inferior position in 
relation to their employers.  This does not mean that equality cannot exist, or that the 
roles may not be reversed, but it is certainly not the case in a great majority of cases.  
There are no guarantees, as the 1976 draft Regulation concedes, that even highly paid 
and skilled workers are on an equal footing with their, often transnational, employers.  
Legal certainty and ease of application are enhanced because the courts need not verify 
the existence of disparity of bargaining power in each particular case.  Second, by not 
differentiating between different categories of employees, this approach corresponds to 
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the vast majority of substantive employment laws and prevents employers from 
avoiding protective legislation that would otherwise be applicable to senior employees. 
3. Protecting employees by choice-of-law rules 
It is now explored how PIL pursues the objective of employee protection.  Owing to 
different considerations that apply in relation to choice of law and jurisdiction of courts, 
these two areas are treated separately.  With regard to choice of law, a further 
differentiation is made between the freedom of the parties to choose the applicable law 
and the determination of the applicable law in the absence of choice.  A view has been 
expressed in relation to the choice-of-law rules concerning employment of the Rome 
Convention that: 
‘it is impossible to identify one single theoretical background in private 
international law in employment matters, the choice of law process rather being 
a blend of different approaches.  And, additionally, this blend is not the product 
of a systemic thinking, but simply the amalgamation of the different factors 
affecting the finding of the applicable law.’51 
A purpose of this section is to examine whether the European choice-of-law rules are 
indeed the product of haphazardness, or whether there is some underlying theory. 
3.1. Employee protection and party autonomy 
Many legal systems impose general restrictions on party autonomy.
52
  This section deals 
with specific restrictions concerning employment contracts.  There are essentially two 
approaches.  First, party autonomy can be either completely excluded or limited to 
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certain legal systems.  Second, party autonomy can be harnessed by the operation of 
mandatory rules. 
Total exclusion of party autonomy is a rather exceptional measure.  It seems to 
have been pursued in the former German Democratic Republic
53
 and exists now in 
China.
54
  An explanation for such exclusion is that Communist countries do not regard 
employment law as part of private law, since labour is not perceived as a commodity 
that can be bargained for.  To be employed is to enter into the collective of the workers 
of the socialist enterprise.
55
  This measure has also been proposed, with certain 
exceptions, in relation to blue-collar workers in the 1976 draft Regulation.
56
  Here, the 
exclusion aimed at achieving equal treatment of all workers in an establishment.
57
  A 
less radical version of this approach is adopted in Switzerland, whose Federal PIL Code 
limits party autonomy by listing the laws among which the choice can be made.  The 
parties may choose between the law of the country in which the employee is habitually 
resident or in which the employer has his place of business, domicile, or habitual 
residence.
58
  The purpose of this restriction is to avoid the application of the law that is 
not sufficiently closely connected with the employment contract and the uncertainties 
concerning the determination of the habitual place of work, as well as to enable 
employers to submit their overseas employees to the application of one law.
59
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Similarly, the 1966 Polish PIL Code enabled the parties to choose the governing law 
‘provided it has some connection with their relationship’.60 
The downsides of these solutions seem to outweigh their merits.
61
  The 
connection of the employment contract with the objectively applicable law or a listed 
law may be rather tenuous.  Furthermore, the objectively applicable law or a listed law 
may contain low employment standards.  In such cases, the purpose of restricting party 
autonomy would be defeated.  The parties may end up with the law of a country that has 
weak links to, and no interest in regulating, the employment contract, that is an 
unknown factor for one or even both parties, or that is unduly protective of employers’ 
interests.  For example, the Swiss Federal PIL Code allows the parties to choose the law 
of the country of the employer’s place of business.  An English employer can therefore 
insert a valid choice-of-law clause in favour of English law even if the employee is 
habitually employed elsewhere.  But as the employee would be neither working nor 
based in England in this situation, he would most likely fall outside the territorial scope 
of employment statutes forming part of English law,
62
 which are the primary means of 
employee protection in this country.  Moreover, this approach (especially total 
exclusion of party autonomy) disregards the fact that freedom of contract is the starting 
point in employment law.  Statutes and collective agreements usually afford protection 
to employees by setting the floor of rights.  The parties are free to agree to more 
beneficial terms and conditions of employment.  If that is so in substantive law, a 
corresponding possibility should exist in PIL. 
Many legal systems restrict party autonomy by means of overriding mandatory 
rules or public policy of the forum.  This was the solution in many EU countries before 
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the advent of the Rome Convention.  For example, many English employment statutes 
expressly or impliedly defined, and still define, their territorial scope.
63
  If a case falls 
within their scope, the statutes override any choice of foreign law.  In Germany, the 
courts used to determine the reach of domestic labour legislation in a particular case.  If 
a provision of the chosen law was contrary to the ‘object and purpose’ (Sinn und Zweck) 
of the legislation, the general public policy exception would exclude its application.
64
  
French courts applied domestic labour law provisions as lois d’ordre public, lois de 
police or règles d’application immédiates whenever the employment contract was most 
closely connected with France, and these provided a more beneficial treatment to the 
employee than the provisions of the chosen law.
65
  A downside of this unilateralist 
method of employee protection is that foreign employment laws not chosen by the 
parties cannot be applied, regardless of how strongly the foreign country may be 
connected with the employment contract, and interested in regulating it.  French law 
was an exception in this respect.  French courts seemed willing to uphold the law of the 
foreign country of the place of work when it was more favourable for the employee than 
the chosen law.
66
  Another downside of the unilateralist method, which Sayers
67
 
illustrates, is that it is possible that a particular case may not fall within the territorial 
scope of protective legislation both of the forum and of the chosen law, in which case 
the employee is left without any protection. 
A solution truly mindful of the parties’ reasonable expectations and the states’ 
legitimate interests should therefore not exclude party autonomy or limit it to specific 
laws.  The parties should be free to agree on any law, but only to the extent that the 
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agreement improves upon the mandatory minimum standard of protection.  The issue of 
protection then largely depends on determining the law that sets the minimum standard.  
This cannot be left solely to the lex fori.  The minimum standard should be set by the 
law of the country, home or foreign, which is both sufficiently closely connected with a 
particular employment contract and legitimately interested in regulating it, and whose 
application the parties can reasonably foresee. 
Two techniques for achieving this goal have been put forward.  The first is to 
give the forum a general freedom to apply, as the case may be, domestic or foreign 
overriding mandatory provisions.
68
  This solution is accepted in Art.11(2) of the 1994 
Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts.
69
  One 
should, however, recall the fate of Art.7(1) of the Rome Convention to see that such a 
solution is not generally acceptable, certainly not in the EU, because of legal uncertainty 
it creates.
70
  The second technique is to let the objectively applicable law set the 
minimum standard.  This approach was first introduced in the Austrian 1978 PIL Act
71
 
and is today accepted in Art.8(1) Rome I.
72
  The solution of the Second Restatement of 
the Conflict of Laws is similar.  In a general manner, §187(2)(b) gives preference over 
the chosen law to the fundamental policy of a state that has a materially greater interest 
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and that would be the 
state of the applicable law in the absence of choice.  Rules designed to protect 
employees are, indeed, an expression of fundamental policy.
73
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The solution of Rome I has been praised and criticised by many.
74
  While it does 
eliminate many of the pitfalls to which the abovementioned approaches lead, it also 
gives rise to criticism because of the increased legal uncertainty and difficulty of 
application.  Given that only mandatory provisions of the objectively applicable law are 
taken into account under this solution, its effectiveness ultimately depends on the 
formulation of the default rules.  This solution will be analysed in detail in Chapter V. 
3.2. Employee protection and the law applicable in the absence of choice 
Numerous solutions have been developed for determining the applicable law for 
employment contracts in the absence of choice.  Some rely on hard and fast rules, 
whereas others adopt flexible connecting factors; some seem to be concerned primarily 
with the parties’ interests, whereas others seem to emphasise public interests.75  This 
diversity is a reflection of different approaches to determining the objectively applicable 
law existing in PIL of contract
76
 and of various factual situations that such rules have to 
accommodate. 
Some authors have suggested that the objective of employee protection requires 
giving the courts the power to consider the laws of all or some of the states with which a 
particular employment contract is connected, and to apply the law that is most 
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favourable for the employee.  POCAR argues that the employment laws of all the states 
connected with an employment contract should be compared.
77
  LECLERC would limit 
the comparison to the law of the country of the place of work and the law of the country 
of the employer’s place of business.78  But the appropriateness of these solutions is 
questionable.
79
  The states whose laws are to be considered in the course of this exercise 
may have weak links to, and no legitimate interest in regulating, the employment 
contract.  In addition, the position of the parties and judges, who would have to 
determine the content of a range of different laws, would become extremely difficult.  
This would result in a high level of legal uncertainty.  Moreover, there is no reason why 
employees engaged in international employment should be better protected than other 
employees.  The task of PIL should not be to favour employees unreservedly over 
employers.  It should consist in ensuring the application of the law of the state that has a 
sufficiently close connection with the employment contract, that is legitimately 
interested in its regulation, and whose application the parties can reasonably foresee.
80
  
It should be noted in this respect that under LEFLAR’s ‘better law approach’ the 
‘application of the better rule of law’ is one of 5 policies underlying the choice-of-law 
process.
81
  Others are the predictability of results, maintenance of interstate and 
international order, simplification of the judicial task, and advancement of the forum’s 
governmental interests.  The state whose law applies pursuant to this analysis has to be 
substantially connected with, and legitimately interested in regulating, a particular case.  
The better law is not necessarily the one most beneficial for the weaker party in terms of 
its substantive content. 
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A connecting factor that usually accords with the mentioned considerations is 
the habitual (normal, usual, ordinary) place of work.  In a typical employment relation 
the employee works and resides for the entire period of employment in one place, where 
the employer is also established.  In such cases, there is usually no reason to look at 
another law.  The employee is integrated into the working community at the place of 
work, and is entitled to expect equal treatment with his colleagues.  The employer is 
assured that the employment contracts with employees working at a certain place will 
usually be governed by the law of that place, and that he will not be easily exposed to 
the application of foreign laws.  Both parties can be seen as acquiescing to the 
application of this law: the employer by setting up the place of work, the employee by 
agreeing to work there.  Public interests are also ordinarily satisfied, since the protective 
legislation of a country is primarily enacted for the benefit of employees who habitually 
work in that country, and is intended to equally burden all employers employing 
workers there.  Equal treatment of all workers in an establishment also promotes labour 
peace.  The courts for the place of work will normally have jurisdiction, and should be 
enabled to apply their own law.  Not surprisingly, this is the presumptive solution in 
Rome I and many national codes.
82
 
International employment relations, however, are very diverse.  The application 
of the law of the country of the habitual place of work will not be most suitable in all 
cases.  For instance, there may be good reasons for the application of the law of the 
country of the employer’s principal place of business.  Transnational employers often 
transfer their managerial, advisory or specialist employees from one of the countries in 
which they do business to another, or to their branches, subsidiaries or affiliates abroad.  
It is in employers’ interest that such employment relations are governed by the law of 
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the country of their principal place of business, since this avoids them having to 
consider new laws every time a transfer occurs.  Moreover, it is from the employer’s 
principal place of business that such employees usually receive their salary, briefings 
and instructions, to which they are obliged to report, i.e. to which their employment is 
oriented.  Given the nature of such employment relations, one might argue that the 
employees should reasonably expect the application of the employer’s law.  The 
application of this law is particularly justified if the parties share the nationality of, or if 
both are domiciled or habitually resident in, the country in which they enter into an 
employment contract for work abroad.  In such cases, the parties may not reasonably 
contemplate the application of any other law, especially if the work is performed in a 
country whose law is based on fundamentally different notions or contains low 
employment standards.  The state to which the parties belong usually also has a 
legitimate interest in having its law applied.
83
  Similarly, there is a strong argument for 
applying the law of the country of the parties’ joint nationality in cases of employees 
who work in diplomatic missions abroad or are members of the armed forces stationed 
abroad. 
There are situations where the application of the law of the country of the 
employee’s domicile or habitual residence may be most suitable.  An employer may 
actively seek out an employee in the latter’s home country, and conclude or negotiate 
the contract of employment with him there.  The parties may foresee that the employee 
would retain strong links with his homeland, and that he will return there after the 
termination of employment.  In such cases, the application of the law of the employee’s 
country may accord with the parties’ reasonable expectations.  That country may also be 
legitimately interested in having its employment law applied, since any adverse 
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consequences of the employment relation (unemployment, injury) would ultimately be 
felt there.
84
  A parallel can be made with consumer contracts in this regard.  The 
consumer’s habitual residence is often used as a relevant connecting factor when the 
supplier seeks out the consumer in his home country.
85
 
Employees whose employment contracts are governed by the law of the country 
of the habitual place of work or of the employer’s principal place of business or of the 
employee’s domicile or habitual residence can be temporarily sent to an employer’s 
ancillary foreign place of business, branch, subsidiary or affiliate.  In such cases, the 
country to which the employee is posted may also have an interest in the application of 
certain aspects of its employment legislation to posted workers.  For instance, in order 
to protect local employers and workers from competition from abroad, the host country 
may impose on foreign employers posting workers to its territory the application of 
certain local employment law provisions that are of immediate interest during the period 
of posting, e.g. provisions concerning health and safety, minimum wage or anti-
discrimination.  The interest of the host country in the application of its employment 
law frequently conflicts with those of the home country and of home country 
employers.  The interests of posted workers are ambiguous.  On the one hand, local 
employment standards may give them more protection than the home country law.  On 
the other hand, the costs that the employer would have to bear if local employment 
standards were applied might eventually drive the employer out of the host country’s 
market and lead to the loss of jobs for posted workers.  The Posted Workers Directive 
attempts to strike the proper balance between the competing interests in the EU 
context.
86
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Furthermore, particular problems are caused by employment relations where 
there is no habitual place of work.  Commercial representatives, for instance, may be 
covering territories of several countries.  Depending on the circumstances of a particular 
case, the applicable law may be the law of the country from which such employee 
works, the law of the country of the employer’s principal place of business, or even a 
third country’s law (e.g. the law of the country of the place of engagement).87  Another 
example is international transport workers, such as seafarers or air crew members.  
Various solutions have been proposed for them, most widespread being the laws of the 
countries of the ship’s flag or of the place of registration of the aircraft, of the 
employer’s principal place of business, of the place of engagement, and of the base from 
which the work is performed.
88
  The shortcoming of the first solution is obvious if the 
vessel flies a flag of convenience.  The second and third solution may point to the law 
of the country that is not particularly closely connected, such as where the country of 
the employer’s principal place of business or of the place of engagement is not the 
country from which the vessel operates.  The fourth solution seems to be suitable in 
most cases, except where the connections between the international transport worker’s 
work and his base are very weak.  Similar problems arise where there is a fixed place of 
work, but which is not located in any particular country, e.g. offshore installations.
89
 
These different factual patterns show that the determination of the objectively 
applicable law is a delicate matter.  In the words of KAHN-FREUND: 
‘The need for flexibility in the criteria used for the determination of the proper 
law of the contract of employment arises from the generality of the concept of 
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the contract of employment: it covers so many social phenomena that any 
formula of conflict of laws seeking to treat all cases alike would force an infinite 
variety of factual relations into too rigid a legal mould.’90 
An appropriate default rule therefore needs to be flexible and take into account the 
various interests involved.  The solution of Rome I (with its primary and subsidiary 
rules, exception clause, and the possibility of applying overriding mandatory provisions 
of the forum, and even, under certain conditions, of third countries)
91
 represents one 
attempt in this regard.  Another attempt is the solution of the Second Restatement of the 
Conflict of Laws and its progeny.
92
 
4. Protecting employees by jurisdictional rules 
There are various factors that make a forum more attractive to one party than the other 
in an international employment dispute: operation of choice-of-law rules, existence of 
specialised labour courts or tribunals, system of legal fees, availability of legal aid, 
methods of obtaining and location of evidence, geographical proximity, neutrality (or 
even bias, actual or perceived, towards a party), cultural or legal tradition and the like.
93
  
Parties normally seek to pursue their claims or defend their cases in the forums that are 
most advantageous for them according to these factors.  Since it is claimants who 
ordinarily select the forum when initiating proceedings, the parties’ litigational positions 
ultimately depend upon the number and diversity of available jurisdictional bases.  The 
more available and diverse the bases, the greater the chance that the claimant will 
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pursue his claim in an advantageous forum, but also that the defendant will have to 
defend his case in a disadvantageous forum. 
As VON MEHREN rightly noted: 
‘The highest ideal of procedural justice in civil matters is that, insofar as 
possible, each party should be treated equally... [W]here the parties are 
considered essentially equal in litigational capacity and neither’s claim to 
corrective justice is thought to be stronger than the other’s, neither should be 
accorded a jurisdictional preference.’94 
Where the parties are of essentially unequal litigational capacity, however, there are 
compelling reasons to protect the weaker party by granting him a jurisdictional 
preference.  Otherwise, equal treatment could lead to unjust results. 
The manner of achieving corrective justice in employment matters depends on 
whether employees, as a typically weaker category of litigants, act as claimants or as 
defendants.  In the former situation, one or more jurisdictional bases could be made 
available to them in addition to those available to claimants in general.  In the latter 
situation, employers could be denied the use of some generally available jurisdictional 
bases.
95
  Furthermore, the judgment of a foreign court that has unjustifiably assumed 
jurisdiction over an employee could be refused recognition and enforcement.  The 
purpose of such measures is to ensure that employees are able to present their claims in 
favourable forums, and do not have to defend their cases in inaccessible and unfamiliar 
forums. 
Rules of jurisdiction in employment matters should also accord with the 
following two considerations: proportionality and vindication of legitimate state 
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interests.
96
  Proportionality seeks to ensure, among other things, that the jurisdictional 
preference given to employees is not overly burdensome for employers.  The forums 
made available to employees should be appropriate in terms of having sufficient 
connection with the parties or the claim, but also no more numerous than is required to 
achieve corrective justice.  Moreover, barring employers from accessing certain forums 
should not exceed what is necessary for this purpose.  The second consideration arises 
from the states’ legitimate interests in having their courts adjudicate the disputes that 
touch significantly upon their policies.  As discussed, choice-of-law rules for 
employment contracts should be designed in such a way as to ensure the application of 
the law of the country that is sufficiently closely connected with the employment 
contract in question and legitimately interested in regulating it.  It follows that, in 
principle, choice-of-law rules for employment contracts and rules of jurisdiction in 
employment matters should be complementary and, where possible, point to the law and 
courts of the same country.
97
  This is an especially important concern given that many 
states have set up specialised labour courts or tribunals, often with worker 
representation, that are not experienced in applying foreign law.  However, the 
importance of this concern should not be exaggerated.  There are many employment 
disputes where the forum and ius do not coincide.
98
 
Many countries have special jurisdictional rules for employment disputes that 
seek to accommodate at least some of the mentioned concerns.  The current situation is 
one of great diversity.  A study on residual jurisdiction of Member State courts 
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conducted in 2007 illustrates the multitude of existing approaches.
99
  Out of 27 Member 
States, only 7 do not have a jurisdictional rule of this kind.  Jurisdiction is usually 
conferred on the courts for the habitual place of work.  In some countries, jurisdiction is 
asserted on other bases, such as the place of conclusion of the contract, the place of 
business that engaged the employee, the place of payment of salary, common 
nationality of the parties, and the employee’s domicile or habitual residence.  While in 
most Member States these jurisdictional bases are available only to employees, in some 
Member States they are equally available to both parties.  In addition, many countries 
impose restrictions on the effect of choice-of-court agreements in employment 
contracts.  The restrictions consist in either allowing the courts, if the goal of employee 
protection so requires, to deny effect to a particular choice-of-court agreement that 
derogates their jurisdiction, or in denying effect against employees to all choice-of-court 
agreements concluded before the dispute has arisen. 
The habitual place of work is a head of jurisdiction that best satisfies the 
considerations of proportionality and vindication of legitimate state interests.  In 
addition, it does not favour any party a priori.  Other bases are objectionable.  The 
shortcomings of the place of contracting rule are too well known to be repeated here.  
There are no guarantees that the country where an employment contract was concluded 
will be sufficiently closely connected with, or legitimately interested in adjudicating 
disputes arising out of, it.  Moreover, employers might easily manipulate this 
connecting factor and thus seek the benefit of litigating in the forums favourable for 
them.  The same concerns apply to the place of business that engaged the employee
100
 
and the place of payment of salary.  Common nationality of the parties will frequently 
confer jurisdiction on the courts of the country that is sufficiently closely connected 
                                                 
99
 A. Nuyts, ‘Study on Residual Jurisdiction: General Report’, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf (last accessed 26/9/2012), 
43-46. 
100
 Mulox (n5), Opinion of AG Jacobs, [37]. 
43 
 
with, and legitimately interested in adjudicating disputes arising out of, employment 
contracts between its nationals.  However, the problem arises in defining ‘nationality’ of 
legal persons, which the majority of international employers are.  ‘Nationality’ of legal 
persons is usually determined by connecting factors such as the place of incorporation 
or corporate seat.
101
  Since these connecting factors also determine the domicile of legal 
persons, thus representing grounds of general jurisdiction over them,
102
 the common 
nationality rule would ordinarily not open an additional forum to claimant employees.  
On the other hand, this jurisdictional basis would effectively give employers access to 
the courts of their domicile, which obviously does not accord with the objective of 
employee protection.  Finally, employee’s domicile or habitual residence has a rather 
tenuous connection in cases involving frontier workers and whenever the employee 
changes his domicile or habitual residence after the termination of employment, but 
before the commencement of proceedings.  Art.115(2) of the Swiss Federal PIL Code, 
which adopts this solution, has been criticised on the ground that any judgment rendered 
on this basis has virtually no chance of being recognised and enforced abroad, which 
makes the protection that it provides illusory.
103
 
However, there seems to be one situation where the connecting factor of the 
employee’s domicile or habitual residence accords with the mentioned considerations.  
This situation exists when an employer actively seeks out an employee in the latter’s 
home country for work abroad, and the parties foresee that the employee will retain 
strong connection with his home country and return there after the termination of 
employment.  This country is arguably sufficiently closely connected with the 
employment relation, and legitimately interested in adjudicating disputes arising out of 
it, since all adverse consequences of the employment relation would ultimately be felt 
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there.  Thus, the employer’s initiative to recruit the employee away from his home state 
is enough to establish jurisdiction of that state’s courts in the US under the ‘purposeful 
availment’ test.104 
With regard to the restrictions of choice-of-court agreements, the solution which 
allows the courts to deny effect to such agreements, if the goal of employee protection 
so requires, seems inappropriate.  It leads to considerable legal uncertainty, and does not 
guarantee that employees in a genuinely week position will actually receive 
protection.
105
  The goal of employee protection is better advanced by denying effect 
against employees to all choice-of-court agreements entered into before the dispute has 
arisen.  On the one hand, employees are guaranteed that the number of forums which 
are available to them cannot be reduced in advance.  The parties may even expand the 
list of options available to the employee.  On the other hand, the number of forums 
which are available to employers cannot be increased in advance.  This solution, 
however, works well only when the default jurisdictional rules satisfy the considerations 
of jurisdictionally preferring employees, proportionality and vindication of legitimate 
state interests.  Since this solution is accepted in Brussels I,
106
 Chapter IV will focus on 
examining the available jurisdictional bases
107
 in this light.  Yet another possibility is to 
‘guide’ the parties’ choice by listing the forums among which a valid choice can be 
made.  This solution, however, does not guarantee that the listed forums will be 
favourable for the employee, or that they will be sufficiently closely connected with, 
and legitimately interested in adjudicating disputes arising out of, the employment 
contract in question.
108
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Conclusions 
The shortcomings of party autonomy and the states’ legitimate interests in the 
application of their employment laws are strong arguments in favour of special PIL 
rules for employment contracts.  Employees must not be placed in a position where they 
can only ‘put their faith in employers’ and ‘trust that employers will play fair by them’.  
Employment law of the state that is sufficiently closely connected with the employment 
contract in question, legitimately interested in regulating it, with which law the parties 
to the contract are sufficiently closely connected and presumably familiar, and whose 
application they reasonably expect, should be safeguarded.  At the same time, the floor 
of protection should not be turned into the ceiling of protection.  Party autonomy should 
be allowed as long as it benefits the employee by building upon the mandatory 
minimum.  In addition, employees should be guaranteed the right to pursue their claims 
in favourable forums, and not to defend their cases in unfamiliar and inaccessible 
forums.  Jurisdictional preference accorded to them, however, should be proportionate 
and take into account the states’ legitimate interests.  In particular, the courts of the 
country that is sufficiently closely connected with, and legitimately interested in 
adjudicating disputes arising out of, the employment contract, and whose jurisdiction 
the parties can reasonably foresee, must be available. 
 This chapter demonstrates that the objective of employee protection is not only 
about special PIL rules giving protection to individual employees and being more 
favourable to their interests than the general rules.  It is also about safeguarding the 
application of the law and jurisdiction of the courts of the country that is closely 
connected with, and legitimately interested in, the employment contract in question.  A 
PIL regime that is motivated by such objective can therefore be seen as performing a 
regulatory function, one of allocating and protecting regulatory authority of states in the 
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field of labour law.  The following chapters assess whether, and to what extent, the rules 
of European PIL of employment accord with the mentioned considerations, and explore 
the possibilities for improvement.  Before exploring in detail the special jurisdictional 
and choice-of-law rules of Brussels I and Rome I, their ‘personal scope’ must be 
examined. 
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III ‘INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS’ IN EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
‘[I]n deciding whether jurisdiction 
should be claimed, it is relevant that the 
plaintiff is [an employee] but not that he 
is a pauper or a millionaire.’ 
VON MEHREN
1
 
 
The rules of Brussels I and Rome I concerning employment apply ‘in matters relating to 
individual contracts of employment’,2 i.e. to ‘individual employment contracts’.3  
Clearly, those rules cover neither collective labour agreements nor ‘contracts for the 
provision of services’.4  It is unclear, however, which contracts for the performance of 
work do fall within the scope of those rules. 
 Most workers work under ‘standard’ employment contracts, i.e. permanent full-
time contracts with a single employer that bears the chance of profit and risk of loss, 
and has the right to control the workers who are integrated into its organisation.
5
  
National laws classify such workers as ‘typical’ employees’ (and the contracts under 
which they work as typical employment contracts), and accord them the full protection 
                                                 
1
 A.T. von Mehren, ‘Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated’ (1983) 63 
Boston University Law Review 279, 313. 
2
 Brussels I, Art.18(1).  Also 2007 Lugano Convention, Art.18(1); Brussels and 1988 Lugano 
Conventions, Arts.5(1), 17(5). 
3
 Rome I, Art.8(1).  Also Rome Convention, Art.6. 
4
 Brussels I, Art.5(1)(b); Rome I, Art.4(1)(b). 
5
 B. Burchell, S. Deakin and S. Honey, The Employment Status of Individuals in Non-standard 
Employment (March 1999), available at www.dti.gov.uk/files/file11628.pdf (last accessed 26/9/2012); A. 
Perulli, Economically Dependent/Quasi-subordinate (Parasubordinate) Employment: Legal, Social and 
Economic Aspects (2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2510&langId=en 
(last accessed 26/9/2012). 
48 
 
of labour and social legislation.  This is because such workers are subject to a 
considerable degree of control by the employer, and are dependent upon the employer 
economically and/or for the fulfilment of certain social and psychological needs.
6
  Work 
relations between such workers and their employers also typically fall within the scope 
of the European PIL rules concerning employment. 
Nowadays, a large and increasing number of work relations lack one or more 
features of the typical employment contract.  Vertical disintegration of production
7
 has 
led to the distancing of workers from the producing enterprise, as manifested by the 
rising number of fixed-term, part-time, casual, home, volunteer and other types of 
‘atypical’ work arrangements, as well as by the growth of both nominal and genuine 
entrepreneurship.  The loosening of the employer’s control over such workers, their 
relatively low level of integration into the employer’s organisation, and the assumption 
of many business risks have often resulted in the courts classifying such workers as self-
employed, thus outside the scope of protective legislation.  Furthermore, the 
phenomenon of decomposition of the producing enterprise into distinct legal entities 
connected, for instance, by bonds of ownership and control
8
 has created situations 
where a worker may be nominally employed by one legal entity (e.g. one member of a 
corporate group) but work, occasionally or exclusively, for one or more other legal 
entities (e.g. group members).  A related phenomenon is the outsourcing of labour 
through employment agencies.  But the splitting and sharing of employer functions 
among multiple entities is often not followed by a corresponding ascription of employer 
responsibilities.  Given that many workers working under these and other ‘non-
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standard’ work relations may be subject to a considerable degree of control by, and 
dependence upon, their employers, national laws are faced with a difficult question of 
whether and how to adequately bring such workers within the fold of protective 
legislation.  Some countries have responded to this challenge by widening the concept 
of employee to encompass some categories of atypical workers, whereas some countries 
have created intermediate legal categories of workers who are not employees but, 
nevertheless, fall to a certain extent within the scope of protective legislation (referred 
to as the ‘dependent self-employed’ in the following text).  Moreover, countries differ 
with regard to the way they ascribe employer responsibilities among multiple 
employing entities.  European PIL is faced with essentially the same question: should 
the rules concerning employment cover some non-standard work relations?  This 
question goes to the core of the problem of employee protection in PIL. 
This chapter starts by exploring the genealogy of the term ‘individual 
employment contracts’ of Brussels I and Rome I.  It is shown that the use of this term 
does not imply a policy of narrowly interpreting the scope of the special rules by 
confining it to typical employment contracts.  Next, it is examined whether this term has 
an autonomous meaning.  After concluding that an autonomous interpretation should be 
adopted, it is investigated how this term should be defined for the purposes of European 
PIL.  The third section demonstrates that the CJEU case-law concerning the free 
movement of workers and equal pay provisions of TFEU provides crucial guidance.  
Since the third section focuses on the concept of employee, i.e. person working under an 
‘individual employment contract’, the fourth section examines who is the employer for 
the purposes of European PIL.  It is shown that the wide and inclusive scope of the 
special rules can be perceived as an attempt both to provide PIL protection to all 
workers in a genuine need of protection and to allocate and protect regulatory authority 
50 
 
of states that have intermediate legal categories of dependent self-employed workers or 
ascribe employer responsibilities to multiple employing entities. 
 This chapter does not deal with the concept of ‘worker’ under the Posted 
Workers Directive.  Since it is to be interpreted according to the law of the host Member 
State,
9
 no problem of classification of interest for PIL arises. 
1. The genealogy of the term ‘individual employment contracts’ 
It may appear at first sight that the term ‘individual employment contracts’ of Brussels I 
and Rome I should be equated with the notion of typical employment contract.  The 
purpose of this section is twofold.  By examining its genealogy, it is explored whether 
the use of the term ‘individual employment contracts’ implies, first, either an 
autonomous or national interpretation and, second, a policy of narrowly interpreting the 
scope of the special rules by excluding non-standard work relations from their ambit. 
The original 1968 version of the Brussels Convention did not contain any 
special jurisdictional rules concerning employment.  A preliminary draft, however, 
contained such rules which, according to the Jenard Report, were to apply ‘in matters 
relating to contracts of employment in the broadest sense of this word.’10  A reason why 
the special rules were not incorporated into the final version was because at that time 
work was in progress to harmonise choice-of-law rules within the European Economic 
Community (‘EEC’).  It was thought that the jurisdictional rules should follow the 
choice-of-law rules, and the adoption of the special jurisdictional rules concerning 
employment was postponed.
11
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Indeed, the European Commission was then drafting two instruments containing 
special choice-of-law rules concerning employment.  The first instrument, which never 
came to fruition, was the Regulation on the provisions of conflict of laws on 
employment relationships within the Community, two drafts of which were published in 
1972 and 1976.
12
  The draft Regulation was to apply to ‘employment relationships’.13  
According to the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the 1976 draft Regulation, 
‘Each Member State determines, through its own legislation, which legal relationships 
should be considered as employment relationships.’14  Since the interpretation of the 
term ‘employment relationships’ would have been national under this instrument, the 
breadth of the scope of the special choice-of-law rules would have depended on the 
content of the Member States’ employment laws. 
The second instrument started off as the 1972 draft Convention on the law 
applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations.
15
  The application of the 
choice-of-law rules for contract or tort would have depended on the legal basis of the 
claim.  While the 1972 draft Convention contained special rules for contractual 
employment claims that were to apply to ‘contracts relating to labour relations’ or 
‘labour contracts’,16 it contained no special rules for tortious employment claims.  After 
the project of unifying choice-of-law rules for tort had been abandoned, the choice-of-
law rules for contract of the 1972 draft Convention came to life in the form of the 1980 
Rome Convention.  Art.6 of this Convention contains special rules concerning 
employment that apply to ‘individual employment contracts’.  The Giuliano/Lagarde 
Report provides little guidance regarding the interpretation of this term.  After stating 
the obvious that ‘Article 6 applies to individual employment contract and not to 
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collective agreements’, the Report notes that the ‘wording of Article 6 speaks of 
“contract of employment” instead of “employment relationship”’, and concludes that it 
‘covers the case of void contracts and also de facto employment relationships in 
particular those characterised by failure to respect the contract imposed by law for the 
protection of employees’.17  The Rome Convention and the Giuliano/Lagarde Report 
therefore left room for debate whether the term ‘individual employment contracts’ 
should be interpreted autonomously, and did not define its content. 
Largely inspired by the Rome Convention’s choice-of-law rules concerning 
employment, the CJEU carved, in the ground-breaking Ivenel case of 1982,
18
 a special 
jurisdictional rule for ‘contracts of employment’ into the Brussels Convention.  But the 
Court neither said whether this term should be interpreted autonomously nor provided 
guidance regarding its content.  Since the referring court (French Cour de cassation) 
had found that the contract for commercial representation between the parties had been 
an employment contract, the CJEU was concerned only with the jurisdictional 
consequences of that finding.  In a subsequent case, Shenavai,
19
 the Court addressed the 
scope of the Ivenel rule.  Mr Shenavai, a German architect, was commissioned by a 
Dutch client to draw up plans for the building of holiday homes.  The question was 
whether the contract fell within the scope of the Ivenel rule.  In an important paragraph, 
the CJEU stated that: 
‘contracts of employment, like other contracts for work other than on a self-
employed basis, differ from other contracts – even those for the provision of 
services – by virtue of certain particularities: they create a lasting bond which 
brings the worker to some extent within the organizational framework of the 
business of the undertaking or employer, and they are linked to the place where 
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the activities are pursued, which determines the application of mandatory rules 
and collective agreements.’20 
Since the contract between Mr Shenavai and his client had no such particularities, it fell 
outside the scope of the Ivenel rule. 
The special jurisdictional rules concerning employment were incorporated into 
the 1988 Lugano Convention and, by means of the 1989 Convention on the accession of 
Spain and Portugal,
21
 into the Brussels Convention.  With regard to the term ‘individual 
employment contracts’ that was used to delineate their scope, the Jenard/Möler Report 
accompanying the 1988 Lugano Convention stated that, ‘The question whether a 
contract of employment exists is not settled by the Convention...  Although there is as 
yet no independent concept of what constitutes a contract of employment, it may be 
considered that it presupposes a relationship of subordination of the employee to the 
employer.’22  The CJEU has not had another opportunity to decide on the scope of the 
special jurisdictional rules, but it did confirm the cited paragraph of Shenavai.
23
 
The Rome, Brussels and 1988 Lugano Conventions have been replaced by 
Rome I, Brussels I and the 2007 Lugano Convention.  The special rules concerning 
employment underwent little changes of substance, and continue to apply to ‘individual 
employment contracts’.  Choice-of-law rules for tort have been unified by Rome II.  
There are no special rules for tortious employment claims, however. 
There seem to be two reasons for the use of the term ‘individual employment 
contracts’ in Brussels I and Rome I and their predecessors.  This term prevailed over 
other terms (‘employment relations’, ‘labour relations’, ‘labour contracts’) with the 
adoption of the Rome Convention in 1980 and the CJEU decision in Ivenel in 1982.  At 
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that time, the binary divide between employment contracts and services contracts was 
paradigmatic in the laws of Member States.
24
  National employment laws, in principle, 
covered only employees working under employment contracts.  The concept of 
employment contract was defined by reference to the following characteristics: personal 
subordination of the employee in the performance of work, continuity, full-time 
working hours and bilaterality.
25
  Although some Member States also brought certain 
categories of workers working under atypical work relations within the scope of some 
of their protective legislation, this was rather exceptional.
26
  Thus, it must have been 
quite obvious and uncontroversial in the early 1980s that the rules of European PIL 
concerning employment should cover employees working under employment contracts. 
Another reason probably lies in the fact that the UK and Ireland, countries 
familiar with the legal concept of employment contract but not employment relationship 
or labour relations, joined the EEC in 1973.  Since the concept of employment contract 
was also in use in other Member States, the term ‘individual employment contracts’ was 
arguably accepted as common to all Member States. 
Two conclusions can be derived from this presentation of the evolution of 
European PIL of employment.  First, it has never been conclusively clarified whether 
the term ‘individual employment contracts’ should be interpreted autonomously.  
Second, the use of this term does not imply a policy of narrowly interpreting the scope 
of the rules concerning employment. 
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2. Autonomous or national interpretation? 
An autonomous interpretation of the term ‘individual employment contracts’ is 
favoured by the overwhelming majority of academics and in national case-law.
27
  
Nevertheless, the reasons for adopting such an interpretation must be examined.  This is 
because a national interpretation is still preferred by a very influential minority, and 
pursued by an occasional judge.
28
  Furthermore, such an interpretation was favoured, in 
relation to the rules of the Rome Convention, by the authors of Dicey, Morris and 
Collins on the Conflict of Laws, under the influence of MORSE.
29
 
 Brussels I and Rome I are directly effective EU legislation and, as a matter of 
EU law, should, as far as possible, be accorded an autonomous interpretation.
30
  
Furthermore, many EU employment law instruments expressly refer to national 
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definitions of the terms ‘worker’, ‘employee’, ‘employment contract’ and ‘employment 
relationship’ they employ; a contrario, since Brussels I and Rome I are silent in this 
respect, an autonomous definition should prima faciae be adopted.
31
 
Only an autonomous interpretation enables the achievement of the objectives 
pursued by European PIL.  According to Recital 6 Rome I: 
‘The proper functioning of the internal market creates a need, in order to 
improve the predictability of the outcome of litigation [and] certainty as to the 
law applicable, for the conflict-of-law rules in the Member States to designate 
the same national law irrespective of the country in which an action is brought.’ 
Recital 2 Brussels I is worded in similar terms.  Truly uniform jurisdictional and choice-
of-law rules (as well as rules on recognition and enforcement of judgments) cannot exist 
unless the terms and concepts they employ are interpreted identically in all Member 
States.  Lack of uniformity should, as far as possible, be avoided, since it leads to legal 
uncertainty, unpredictability and, according to the Preambles to the two Regulations, 
also hampers the sound operation of the internal market.  Truly uniform rules can be 
achieved only if the terms and concepts they use are interpreted autonomously, not by 
reference to national law. 
The following example illustrates this point.  Suppose an atypical worker (W), 
who is domiciled and habitually resident in one Member State (MS1), habitually works 
in another Member State (MS2) for an employer from a third Member State (MS3).  
Furthermore, suppose W is classified as an independent contractor in MS1, as a 
dependent self-employed in MS2, and as an employee in MS3, and thus falls outside the 
scope of employment law of MS1, within the scope of some of the protective legislation 
of MS2, and within the scope of the whole of employment law of MS3.  A recent CJEU 
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case, Voogsgeerd,
32
 shows that factual scenarios of this kind are not just fictional.  Here, 
a Dutch national and domiciliary entered into an employment contract with a 
Luxembourg company to habitually work from Belgium.  The following section of this 
chapter shows that an atypical worker can indeed be classified as an independent 
contractor in one country, but as a dependent self-employed or an employee in another.  
If the term ‘individual employment contracts’ of the two Regulations were interpreted 
by reference to national law, the application of their rules concerning employment 
would be uncertain and unpredictable. 
If the lex fori classification were adopted, the application of the European PIL 
rules concerning employment would depend on where the claimant brought his claim.  
Those rules would not apply if the claim were brought in MS1, but would apply if the 
claim were brought in MS3.  If the claim were brought in MS2, another point of 
uncertainty and unpredictability would arise.  Would the fact that W is classified as a 
dependent self-employed in MS2 be enough to also bring W within the scope of the 
special rules of the two Regulations?  Prima facie the answer should be negative, since 
the dependent self-employed by definition do not work under employment contracts.  
However, if the law of MS2 gave W the right to access the labour courts, there would be 
a good argument in favour of bringing W at least within the scope of the special 
jurisdictional rules of Brussels I.
33
 
Even the authors favouring a national interpretation reject the lex fori 
classification.  As MORSE notes in relation to the rules of the Rome Convention,
34
 after 
deciding that the relationship between the parties is an employment contract under the 
lex fori, the court may discover that this contract is governed by a foreign law that 
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regards it as a services contract.  If the court, nevertheless, applied the rules of the 
applicable law concerning employment, it would seriously distort the applicable law, 
and apply it contrary to the intentions of the enacting legislature.  ‘And, as a matter of 
logic, of course, the forum which adopts such an approach disposes of the case by 
applying neither the foreign law nor, for that matter, the law of any country 
whatsoever.’35  MORSE further notes that it may appear that the distortion can be 
avoided if the court applies the rules of the applicable law concerning services contracts.  
But in this situation, ‘a choice-of-law rule deemed appropriate for contracts of 
employment may be used to secure the application of domestic substantive rules which 
are not applicable to the contracts of employment...  Such a result might be thought to 
distort the [Rome] Convention itself.’36  Similar distortions occur if the lex fori does not 
regard the contract as one of employment, but the applicable law determined pursuant to 
the general choice-of-law rules does. 
The authors who still favour a national interpretation argue for the lex causae 
classification.
37
  Since choice-of-law rules for contract are uniform within the EU and 
aim to ‘designate the same national law irrespective of the country in which an action is 
brought’, in the view of the proponents of the lex causae classification, no uncertainty 
and unpredictability would arise if the applicable law were to classify the relationship 
between the parties.  Returning to the given example, the choice-of-law rules of Rome I 
would lead to the application of one of the laws of MS1, MS2 and MS3 regardless of 
the court seized, and that applicable law would determine whether W works under an 
employment contract for the purposes of the European choice-of-law rules.  But this 
argument cannot withstand closer scrutiny. 
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Where W’s employee status is unclear, the question arises of whether the 
general or special choice-of-law rules of Rome I should apply to designate the law that, 
in turn, would determine whether W works under an employment contract.  If, in the 
given example, the general choice-of-law rules were applied, the applicable law would, 
absent a choice-of-law agreement and a manifestly more closer connection with another 
country, be the law of the country of W’s habitual residence, i.e. MS1.38  Since W is 
classified as an independent contractor in MS1, he would fall outside the scope of the 
rules concerning employment of the two Regulations.  If, on the other hand, the choice-
of-law rules for employment contracts were applied, the applicable law would, absent a 
choice-of-law agreement and a closer connection with another country, be the law of the 
country of the habitual place of work, i.e. MS2.
39
  Although W is classified as a 
dependent self-employed in MS2, the court might still find that he falls within the scope 
of the European PIL rules concerning employment.  It is therefore of crucial importance 
whether the law that should determine whether W works under an employment contract 
is determined by applying the general or special choice-of-law rules. 
PLENDER and WILDERSPIN attempt to solve this problem in the following way.
40
  
The court should apply, in the first instance, the choice-of-law rules for employment 
contracts, and then ascertain whether the law designated by those rules classifies the 
relationship between the parties as an employment contract.  If so, the court should 
apply the rules of the applicable law concerning employment.  If not, the court should 
apply the law designated by the general choice-of-law rules.  The application of the 
special choice-of-law rules as the first step is justified by analogy with Art.10 Rome I 
which provides that the existence and validity of a contract, or any term thereof, shall be 
determined by the law that would govern it if the contract or term were valid.  Returning 
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to the given example, the court should, as the first step, apply the law of MS2 to 
determine whether the relationship between the parties is an employment contract.  If 
the court finds that a dependent self-employed falls within the scope of the rules 
concerning employment of the two Regulations, it should apply the law of MS2.  
Otherwise, it should apply the law designated by the general choice-of-law rules, i.e. the 
law of MS1. 
Even if one disregards the problems inherent in determining the content of 
foreign laws and their interpretation, this solution leads to considerable legal uncertainty 
and unpredictability on two accounts.  Suppose W is classified as an employee in the 
Member State where he is domiciled and habitually resident (MS1), but as an 
independent contractor in the Member State where he habitually works (MS2).  First, 
the parties to an employment contract may choose the applicable law.
41
  But the choice 
cannot deprive the employee of the protection afforded to him by mandatory provisions 
of the objectively applicable law.
42
  An employment contract can therefore be governed 
by two laws.  If the parties chose the law of MS1, both the law of MS1 (the chosen law) 
and MS2 (the objectively applicable law) would logically have to be taken into 
consideration for determining the nature of the relationship between the parties.  Where 
one applicable law, but not the other, regards the worker as an employee, preference 
would have to be given to the view of one applicable law over the other.  Second, and 
assuming there is no choice-of-law agreement, the court should, as the first step, apply 
the law of MS2 to determine whether the relationship between the parties is an 
employment contract.  However, since W is classified as an independent contractor in 
MS2, the court should apply the law designated by the general choice-of-law rules, i.e. 
the law of MS1.  But the problem is that W is classified as an employee in MS1.  If the 
                                                 
41
 Rome I, Art.8(1). 
42
 ibid. 
61 
 
court applied the rules of MS1 concerning employment, it would, in the opinion of the 
proponents of the lex causae classification, distort Rome I.
43
  If, on the other hand, the 
court applied the rules of MS1 concerning services contracts, it would, in their opinion, 
distort the applicable law.
44
  This is presumably why PLENDER and WILDERSPIN 
concede that the lex causae classification ‘presents certain logical problems’, and adopt 
it ‘with some hesitation’.45 
In addition to promoting the objectives of legal certainty and predictability, an 
autonomous interpretation advances the objective of employee protection.  As discussed 
in the following section, many Member States’ employment laws cover not only typical 
employees but also, completely or partially, some other categories of workers who are 
subject to a considerable degree of control by, and dependence upon, their employers.  
If the term ‘individual employment contracts’ is interpreted autonomously, it can be 
given a wide meaning that encompasses all workers who are in a genuine need of 
protection.  An autonomous interpretation thereby allows European PIL of employment 
to take into consideration, and develop under the influence of, legal, economic, social 
and political trends that shape the scope of national employment laws, and perform a 
progressive social function of providing jurisdictional and choice-of-law protection to 
all workers who genuinely need it.  An autonomous interpretation puts European PIL of 
employment in a position to adequately perform its regulatory function.  Only an 
autonomous and wide interpretation enables the allocation and protection of regulatory 
authority of states that have intermediate legal categories of dependent self-employed 
workers or ascribe employer responsibilities to multiple employing entities. 
The following two sections examine which work relations fall within the scope 
of the European PIL rules concerning employment.  Before proceeding further, 
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however, an argument that has been advanced against an autonomous interpretation 
should be addressed: 
‘[W]ere an autonomous meaning to be attributed to the concept of contract of 
employment one might reach the result that a particular State’s employment law 
would be applied to a particular contract even though that State would regard the 
contract as not being one of employment…or, alternatively, that a particular 
State’s employment law would not be applied to the particular contract because 
although that State’s law regarded the particular contract as one of employment, 
the autonomous definition would place it under another heading…  In either 
situation, there is a danger of distorting the applicable law.’46 
But the purpose of choice-of-law rules for contract is to designate a law to 
govern a particular contractual relationship.  The role of the choice-of-law rules is 
exhausted once the applicable law has been determined.  The relationship is governed 
by the rules of the applicable law which, according to that law, are applicable to the 
relationship.  In other words, if the applicable law regards the relationship as an 
employment contract, the rules of the applicable law concerning employment apply.  
Similarly, if the applicable law regards the relationship as a services contract, the rules 
of the applicable law concerning services contracts apply.  An autonomous and wide 
interpretation of the term ‘individual employment contracts’ enables European PIL of 
employment to adequately perform its regulatory function.  But if the law that is 
objectively applicable pursuant to the special rules of Rome I regards the worker in 
question as self-employed and thus outside the scope of protective legislation, there is 
no reason to safeguard the application of the rules concerning employment of that law.  
A choice-of-law agreement in favour of a foreign law should be given full effect.  
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Absent such an agreement, the rules concerning services contracts of the objectively 
applicable law should be applied. 
In sum, only an autonomous and wide interpretation of the term ‘individual 
employment contracts’ enables the achievement of the objectives of legal certainty, 
predictability, and employee protection.  This term should also, as far as possible, be 
interpreted consistently between the two Regulations.
47
 
3. Who is the employee? 
A number of methods of interpretation are used to interpret autonomous terms and 
concepts of European law, namely verbal, historic, systematic, comparative and 
teleological interpretations.
48
  The wording and evolution of the term ‘individual 
employment contracts’ were explored in section 1.  This section examines whether the 
elements of an autonomous definition can be found, first, in a comparative analysis of 
the scope of the Member States’ employment laws and, second, in substantive EU law.  
The focus here is on the concept of employee, i.e. person working under an ‘individual 
employment contract’ for the purposes of Brussels I and Rome I. 
3.1. Elements of an autonomous definition: comparative analysis 
The Member States’ employment laws differ considerably regarding their scope.  As the 
following text demonstrates, the differences are such that, as in the examples used in the 
previous section, a worker may indeed find himself outside the scope of employment 
law of one Member State but, completely or partially, within the scope of employment 
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law of another Member State.  This section presents briefly how some Member States, 
namely England, France and Germany, delineate the scope of their employment laws.
49
 
In all Member States, the concept of employment contract forms the paradigm of 
the kind of contract that falls within the ambit of, and receives protection in, 
employment law.  On the other side of the binary divide is the concept of services 
contract that is regulated by commercial or contract law.  But these concepts are not 
perceived and defined identically in Member States. 
In England, the common law of employment applies to employment contracts, 
also labelled as contracts of service.  Furthermore, only employees who work under 
employment contracts and meet the qualifying conditions are given all statutory 
employment rights.
50
  There is no statutory definition of the concept of employee.  The 
statutes using this concept refer to the common law definition.
51
  The basic principle of 
the common law is freedom of contract.  An employer can employ the work of another 
under an infinite variety of contractual arrangements.  To determine whether it is an 
employment contract or a contract for services, each contract for the provision of work 
must be analysed carefully.  Classification under the common law is therefore an 
inherently complex and uncertain process, exacerbated by the fact there are several tests 
for distinguishing between employment and services contracts under which numerous 
factors have to be considered.  Pursuant to the ‘control test’, one essentially has to 
consider whether the employer has the right to give orders regarding the workers’ 
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activities.
52
  But the control test cannot be decisive in cases concerning skilled 
employees, professionals and managers who enjoy considerable discretion in 
performing their work.  The more inclusive ‘integration’ or ‘organisation test’ considers 
the extent to which the worker is integrated into the employer’s organisation, i.e. subject 
to the organisation’s rules and procedures.53  However, the organisation test may not be 
decisive in some cases of flexible forms of employment.  Pursuant to another inclusive 
test, the ‘economic reality test’, one essentially has to consider whether the worker takes 
the chance of profit and risk of loss.
54
  But the economic reality test may not be 
decisive, for example, in cases concerning employees whose payment is tied to personal 
performance and business profits.  Moreover, for an employment contract to exist, there 
has to be a ‘mutuality of obligations’, i.e. the employer must promise to provide work in 
exchange for pay, and the worker must promise to perform work.
55
  It is therefore the 
combination of the factors that fall to be considered under the four tests, i.e. their 
quantity and quality, rather than the (non)existence of a particular factor, that leads to 
the conclusion that there is an employment or a services contract.
56
 
In France, the employee status also brings a person within the fold of protective 
legislation.  Since there is no statutory definition of the concept of employment contract, 
this concept is interpreted and developed by the courts and legal doctrine.  An 
employment contract presupposes three elements: personal performance of work (or 
promise to personally perform work), remuneration (or promise to pay remuneration) 
and a relationship of subordination.
57
  Only legal subordination arising out of the 
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contract between the parties, not economic dependence, is relevant.
58
  Legal 
subordination implies the performance of work under the authority of the employer that 
has the right to direct, supervise and discipline the employee.
59
  This requirement has 
been interpreted widely enough to encompass workers who enjoy considerable 
discretion in performing their work, provided that the employer has a requisite degree of 
control concerning matters such as the place of work, working hours or discipline.
60
  
But in a 2000 decision, the Cour de cassation departed from the traditional approach 
when it found there had been an employment contract between a taxi company and a 
taxi driver, notwithstanding the fact that the company had leased the vehicle to the 
driver and had no right to control the driver, who had been free to determine his zone of 
work and working hours.
61
  In any event, the existence of an employment contract does 
not depend on the will of the parties or the terms of the contract, but on the actual 
content of the parties’ relationship in practice.62  To determine whether there is an 
employment contract, the courts take into consideration a number of factors: the 
behaviour of the parties; the personal relationship between the parties; the place of 
work; working hours; the fact that the employee works alone or with the support of 
another; the ownership of material, tools and equipment; the existence or absence of the 
employer’s direction and supervision; the extent of the employee’s integration into the 
employer’s organisation; the existence and methods of remuneration.63 
In Germany, although there is no statutory definition of the concept of 
employee, there is a statutory definition of the term ‘self-employed’.  Pursuant to §84(1) 
sentence 2 of the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch), which deals with self-
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employed commercial representatives, self-employed is ‘anyone who essentially is free 
to organise his work and to determine his working time’.  Despite the narrow scope of 
application of this section, the courts and academics perceive it as expressing a general 
principle.
64
  Personal freedom is considered to be the main characteristic of self-
employed workers.
65
  The concept of employee, traditionally opposed to that of self-
employed workers, implies the lack of such freedom.  An ‘employee’ is therefore 
defined as a person who is obliged to work for another in return for salary on the basis 
of a private contract in a relationship of personal subordination.
66
  Like in France, the 
requirement of subordination is interpreted widely.  The freedom to organise one’s work 
and working time is not decisive, since there are employees who enjoy considerable 
discretion in this respect.
67
  German courts take into consideration a number of different 
factors when examining whether a worker is an employee.  The most important are 
whether the employer expects the worker to be always ready to accept new tasks, 
whether the worker is free to refuse new tasks, the extent to which the worker is 
integrated into the employer’s organisation, and the length of time required by the 
worker for performing the task for the employer.
68
  Like their French counterparts, 
German courts place more weight on the actual performance of the contract than its 
terms.
69
 
This synoptic comparative account of the concept of employment contract 
shows that a person may indeed be regarded as an employee in one Member State, but 
as self-employed in another.  For example, the taxi driver from the 2000 Cour de 
cassation decision would probably have been regarded as self-employed by English 
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courts.
70
  Similarly, freelance journalists in the media classified as employees by the 
German Bundesarbeitsgericht would probably have been regarded as self-employed in 
England.
71
  English courts place more emphasis on the terms of the contract than their 
Continental counterparts.  This can be explained by the central place accorded to 
freedom of contract by the common law of employment.  Indeed, English employers, in 
pursuit of numerical flexibility of their internal labour market or of reducing compliance 
costs, often avail themselves of this freedom by shaping their contracts for the provision 
of work in a way that appears to bring the worker outside the employee category.  The 
employer may insert clauses that, for example, shift many business risks onto the 
worker (e.g. by employing him as a casual worker, on a ‘zero-hours’ basis, or by linking 
the payment to personal performance and business profits), enable the worker to refuse 
future offers of work (‘obligations clause’), entitle the worker to employ a substitute or 
oblige him to do so if unable to perform the work personally (‘substitution clause’), 
prescribe that the worker is to provide his own tools and equipment, provide that the 
worker is responsible for paying national insurance contributions and taxes, and 
expressly designate the contract in question as a services contract.  Unless the contract 
containing such clauses is a sham,
72
 the courts are likely to regard it as a services 
contract.
73
  In cases concerning casual workers, particularly those entitled to refuse 
future offers of work, the courts may also find there is no continuous contract between 
the parties due to the lack of a mutuality of obligations.
74
  However, workers working 
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under such contractual arrangements may be in a genuine need of protection.  They may 
be subject to a considerable degree of control by, and dependence upon, their 
employers.  They may be unable to negotiate the change of the contract or to expand 
their base of clients and customers.  In order to advance the objectives of, and to 
preclude employers from avoiding, protective legislation, many pieces of employment 
legislation forming part of English law extend their scope to certain categories of 
workers whom the common law regards as self-employed.  The legislatures in Germany 
and, to a certain extent, in France have also extended the scope of some of their 
protective legislation to workers who would not be regarded as employees pursuant to 
the described tests, as shown below. 
Some English statutes and analogous regulations, or at least some of the rights 
they confer, apply to ‘workers’.  Employment Rights Act 1996 gives ‘workers’ the right 
not to suffer unauthorised deductions from wages,
75
 right not to have to make payments 
to the employer,
76
 and the right not to suffer detriment in employment in working time 
cases.
77
  The scope of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998,
78
 Working Time 
Regulations 1998 (‘WTR 1998’), Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable 
Treatment) Regulations 2000 (‘PTWR 2000’),79 of the right to be accompanied to a 
disciplinary hearing of the Employment Relations Act 1999 (‘ERelA 1999’),80 and of 
the right not to suffer detriment by reason of union membership of the Trade Union and 
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Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992
81
 also extend to ‘workers’.  A ‘worker’ is 
defined as: 
‘an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment 
has ceased, worked under): a) a contract of employment, or b) any other 
contract, whether express or implied and (if it is expressed) whether oral or in 
writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any 
work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of 
the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business 
undertaking carried on by the individual.’82 
The courts have added a gloss to this definition.  In order to qualify as a ‘worker’, a 
person must work under a contract whose ‘dominant purpose’ is the personal 
performance of work.
83
 
The scope of anti-discrimination legislation is expressed in different terms.  The 
provisions of the Equality Act 2010 concerning employment apply to ‘employment 
under a contract of employment, a contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to 
do work.’84  The wording of this definition, and in particular the lack of an express 
profession or business undertaking exclusion, suggests that EqA 2010 covers not only 
‘employees’ and ‘workers’ but also some other individuals working under a contract 
personally to do work.  However, the courts have interpreted this statutory definition 
very restrictively.  There has to be a mutuality of obligations.
85
  The personal 
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performance of work must be the ‘dominant purpose’ of the contract.86  Most 
importantly, in Jivraj v Hashwani,
87
 the Supreme Court treated the first two words of 
the definition (‘employment under’) as imposing a crucial restriction, confining the 
scope of EqA 2010 to relations of ‘employment’.  It seems that Jivraj effectively limits 
the scope of anti-discrimination legislation to employees working under employment 
contracts ‘either in the traditional sense or in a slightly but not crucially extended 
sense’.88 
Finally, it should be mentioned that ERA 1996 contains a special, wide 
definition of the concept of ‘worker’ for the purposes of the right not to suffer detriment 
in employment for making protected disclosures, i.e. ‘whistle-blowing’.89  Certain 
statutes and analogous regulations contain provisions that apply to particular categories 
of workers, e.g. apprentices, trainees, agency and home workers.  Legislation 
concerning health and safety at work extends not only to employees and the dependent 
self-employed but also to independent contractors.
90
 
In France, the Labour Code (Code du travail) extends the protection of 
employment law to particular categories of workers who are not legally subordinated, 
but are economically dependent upon their employers.  It is presumed that the following 
categories of workers are employees: sales representatives (voyageurs, représentants ou 
placiers – VRPs),91 journalists,92 artists93 and models.94  Unlike for VRPs, the 
presumptions that the contracts entered into by the other three categories of workers are 
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employment contracts are rebuttable.  Furthermore, the Code accords some other 
particular categories of workers such as home workers some employment rights without 
according them the employee status. 
In Germany, some workers who are not in a relationship of personal 
subordination, but are economically dependent upon their employers, labelled as 
‘employee-like persons’ (arbeitnehmerähnliche Personen), are also accorded some 
employment rights.  Pursuant to §12a of the Collective Agreements Act 
(Tarifvertragsgesetz), a person is economically dependent and in need of social 
protection comparable to that of an employee if: 1) he has to perform the work 
personally and essentially without the help of others, and 2) either the major part of his 
work is performed for one person or on average more than half of his income is received 
from one person.  For artists, writers and journalists, it is sufficient that more than one 
third of their income is received from one person.  Employment rights of ‘employee-
like persons’ include the right to access the labour courts,95 right to annual and public 
holidays,
96
 right not to be discriminated against,
97
 right to collective bargaining,
98
 and 
the rights relating to health and safety at work.
99
  Two particular categories of 
‘employee-like persons’ are treated separately, namely commercial agents and home 
workers.  Furthermore, there are some special rules that apply, for example, to agency 
workers and apprentices. 
In conclusion, employees working under employment contracts are completely 
covered by the Member States’ employment laws.  There are also certain categories of 
workers who fall outside the concept of employee but are, nevertheless, accorded some 
employment rights.  However, Member States differ significantly regarding the 
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definition of the concepts of employee and, in particular, the dependent self-employed.  
A worker may therefore be regarded as an employee in one Member State, but as a 
dependent self-employed or an independent contractor in another.  Given these 
differences, the definition of the person working under an ‘individual employment 
contract’ for the purposes of Brussels I and Rome I should not be derived directly from 
national concepts of employee and the dependent self-employed.  Any such definition 
would run the risk of being reduced to the lowest common denominator.  The 
comparative analysis is, nevertheless, useful for disclosing a trend of enlarging the 
scope of the Member States’ employment laws.  European PIL should acknowledge this 
trend and give its rules concerning employment a scope wide enough to encompass not 
only employees but also the dependent self-employed. 
3.2. Elements of an autonomous definition: substantive EU law 
The instruments of secondary EU law use the terms ‘worker’,100 ‘employee’101 and 
‘contract of employment or employment relationship’102 to define their scope.  Since 
these instruments refer to national definitions of these terms,
103
 the definition of the 
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person working under an ‘individual employment contract’ for the purposes of Brussels 
I and Rome I cannot be derived directly from them. 
The term ‘worker’ is defined autonomously for the purposes of the free 
movement and equal pay provisions of TFEU.  Since neither Art.45 TFEU (ex Art.39 
TEC) concerning free movement nor Art.157 TFEU (ex Art.141 TEC) concerning equal 
pay defines the term ‘worker’, the CJEU case-law is crucial.  The CJEU has held that 
this term should be given a broad autonomous interpretation in accordance with 
objective criteria.
104
  According to Lawrie-Blum and Allonby, ‘the essential feature of an 
employment relationship...is that for a certain period of time a person performs services 
for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives 
remuneration.’105  Therefore, the autonomous concept of ‘worker’ presupposes three 
elements: 1) personal performance of work; 2) a degree of control; 3) remuneration.  A 
person is to be regarded as a worker if he carries on genuine and effective economic 
activities, to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely 
marginal and ancillary.
106
  EU law does not impose additional conditions such as the 
existence of a formal contract between the worker and the employer.  To determine 
whether a person is a ‘worker’, all factors and circumstances characterising the 
arrangement between the parties have to be considered ‘such as, for example the sharing 
of the commercial risks of the business, the freedom for a person to choose his own 
working hours and to engage his own assistants.’107  Classification of a person as self-
employed under national law does not prevent that person from being regarded as a 
‘worker’ for the purposes of TFEU ‘if his independence is merely notional, thereby 
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disguising an employment relationship in the meaning of [TFEU]’.108  The concept of 
‘worker’ has been interpreted widely enough to encompass certain categories of 
workers that might not be covered by some of the Member States’ employment laws 
such as professional sportsmen,
109
 trainees and apprentices,
110
 members of religious 
communities,
111
 casual workers,
112
 and agency workers not having a formal contract 
with the end-user.
113
 
Deriving the definition of the person working under an ‘individual employment 
contract’ for the purposes of Brussels I and Rome I from the autonomous concept of 
‘worker’ in EU law accords with the objectives pursued by European PIL of 
employment.  Such an approach leads to legal certainty and predictability.  Since this 
concept is interpreted widely, it can bring a wide range of workers who are in a genuine 
need of protection within the scope of the special rules, thereby putting European PIL of 
employment in a position to adequately perform its regulatory function.  
Although the reports accompanying the two Regulations and their predecessors 
and the CJEU case-law are inconclusive regarding the manner of interpretation of the 
term ‘individual employment contracts’, they provide some support for an autonomous 
interpretation along these lines.  The Jenard Report notes that the preliminary draft of 
the Brussels Convention contained special jurisdictional rules which were to apply ‘in 
matters relating to contracts of employment in the broadest sense of this word.’114  
According to the Jenard/Möler Report, ‘it may be considered that [an employment 
contract] presupposes a relationship of subordination of the employee to the 
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employer.’115  The CJEU referred in Shenavai to ‘contracts of employment’ and ‘other 
contracts for work other than on a self-employed basis’.116  Moreover, in her recent 
Opinion in Voogsgeerd, dealing with the interpretation of the connecting factor of the 
engaging place of business for the purposes of the Rome Convention, Advocate General 
TRSTENJAK assumed that the term ‘individual employment contracts’ should be defined 
by reference to the autonomous concept of ‘worker’ in EU law.117  In her view: 
‘It follows from [the CJEU case-law on Art.45 TFEU] that the fact that the 
employee acts under direction is a characteristic feature of any employment 
relationship which, in essence, requires that the person concerned should work 
under the direction or supervision of another person who determines the services 
to be performed by him and/or his working hours and with whose instructions or 
rules the employee must comply.’118 
English case-law confirms that the autonomous concept of ‘worker’ in EU law 
informs the definition of the person working under an ‘individual employment contract’ 
for the purposes of Brussels I and Rome I.  The leading case is WPP Holding Italy SRL 
v Benatti.
119
  This case concerned a contract between Mr Benatti, an Italian national and 
domiciliary, and an Italian member of a corporate group, under which Mr Benatti was 
appointed as a consultant to the employer and the group’s UK parent company in 
respect of their business activities in Italy.  Mr Benatti was to provide his services to the 
employer and any other group member whenever requested to do so, be subject to the 
directions and instructions of the parent company’s board, and report to the parent 
company’s CEO.  He was entitled to use the services of another person in the 
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performance of his duties, although this entitlement had not been exercised.  Mr Benatti 
was further entitled not to work on average more than one and a half days per week, 
although he had in fact been working full-time when the contract was terminated.  His 
remuneration consisted of a fixed fee, the amount of which increased on two occasions, 
and a commission.  Mr Benatti was also entitled to a personal assistant and an office.  
He was responsible for paying his own taxes and national insurance contributions.  
Furthermore, he was free to have interests in almost 80 listed companies not forming 
part of the employer’s group, many of which were in competition with the group.  The 
contract included English law and exclusive jurisdiction clauses.  Following the 
termination of the contract, the employer, the parent company and a Dutch group 
member commenced proceedings in England for breach of contract and breach of 
fiduciary duties.  Mr Benatti challenged the English courts’ jurisdiction on the basis that 
the contract was one of employment and that, pursuant to Brussels I, he could only be 
sued in Italy.  FIELD J referred to the CJEU decisions in Lawrie-Blum and Shenavai in 
order to create his own test for distinguishing between employment and services 
contracts: 
‘the objective criteria of an employment contract for the purposes of…[Brussels 
I] are: (i) the provision of services by one party over a period of time for which 
remuneration is paid; (ii) control and direction over the provision of services by 
the counterparty; (iii) integration to some extent of the provider of the services 
within the organisational framework of the counterparty.  In applying these 
broad criteria…regard must be had particularly to the terms of the contract; the 
conduct of the parties is relevant too.’120 
TOULSON LJ in the Court of Appeal added that ‘these are not “hard edged” criteria 
which can be mechanistically applied.  For example...there may be degrees of control 
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and degrees of integration within the organisational framework of the company.’121  On 
the facts of the case, the court found that the contract was not one of employment.  Of 
weight in reaching this conclusion were the method of remuneration, the nature of Mr 
Benatti’s duties, his various entitlements, and the fact that he was registered for VAT 
and submitted VAT invoices.  These factors outweighed the fact that Mr Benatti worked 
under a long-term contract effectively 5 days a week under the directions and 
instructions of the employer, and was integrated to a significant extent into the 
employer’s organisation.  Although this case has been criticised for its focus on the 
terms of the contract rather than its actual performance,
122
 it is an authority for the 
proposition that the definition of the person working under an ‘individual employment 
contract’ for the purposes of European PIL should be derived from the autonomous 
concept of ‘worker’ in EU law. 
3.3. Conclusion 
This section has shown that the definition of the person working under an ‘individual 
employment contract’ for the purposes of Brussels I and Rome I should be derived from 
the autonomous concept of ‘worker’ in EU law.  This approach accords with the 
objectives pursued by European PIL, most importantly that of employee protection.  
This approach is capable of encompassing a wide range of workers who are in a genuine 
need of protection and puts European PIL of employment in a position to adequately 
perform its regulatory function.  This approach accords with the existing division of 
legislative competence within the EU, and supports the diversity of the Member States’ 
labour laws.  At the moment, Member States retain most of the legislative competence 
in the field of labour law.  While some Member States exercise their legislative 
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autonomy by according the benefit of protective legislation only to employees working 
under employment contracts, other Member States also protect, to a certain extent, the 
dependent self-employed.  Although the term ‘individual employment contracts’ of the 
two Regulations covers a wide range of workers, it does not oblige Member States to 
extend their protective legislation beyond the boundaries they deem appropriate.  But 
because of the breadth of the scope of the rules concerning employment, European PIL 
is able to safeguard, in appropriate circumstances, the application of the law and 
jurisdiction of the courts of states that have intermediate legal categories of dependent 
self-employed workers. 
4. Who is the employer? 
This section deals with the flipside of the autonomous definition of the term ‘individual 
employment contracts’ of Brussels I and Rome I.  It examines who is to be regarded as 
an employer for the purposes of European PIL.  In principle, the employer is a natural or 
legal person at the other end of the employment contract.
123
  Typically, employees work 
for, under the control, and within the organisation of a single employer, so the 
employer’s identity is rarely an issue.  But where employer functions are divided among 
multiple legal entities, the ascription of employer responsibilities becomes problematic.  
This is illustrated by the cases of triangular employment relationships. 
Triangular relationships arise in the context of employment within a corporate 
group and agency employment.  In a triangular relationship, the employee enters into an 
employment contract with one person, a group member or an employment agency, but 
works for and under the control of a third person, another group member or the end-user 
of the employee’s services (the client of the employment agency).  While the two group 
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members/the employment agency and the end-user normally enter into a contract 
regulating their rights and obligations regarding the ‘hiring-out’ of workers, the 
employee does not ordinarily enter into an employment contract with the group 
member/end-user to which he is ‘hired-out’.  But the contract that the employee has 
with the engaging group member/employment agency normally obliges him to work 
like an employee of the third person.  Sometimes the employee may enter into an 
employment contract with the person to whom he is ‘hired-out’, particularly when this 
is mandated by the immigration and other laws of the country where the services are 
provided.  Triangular relationships can take a variety of forms depending on the way 
employer functions are divided among multiple employing entities.  At the far end of 
the spectrum are the cases in which the engaging group member/employment agency 
merely administers the employment contract and the employee works for one or more 
third persons.  At the other end are the cases in which the employee works for the 
engaging group member but also occasionally for another group member(s). 
The cases of triangular relationships have caused difficulties in national 
employment laws, since they do not fit easily with the perception of the typical 
employment relationship as a personal and binary relationship.  National laws are faced 
with the question of how to distribute employer responsibilities among multiple entities 
performing employer functions.  With regard to agency employment, there are four 
alternatives.
124
  Some countries place employer responsibilities, in principle, exclusively 
either on the employment agency or the end-user; some divide employer responsibilities 
between the two entities; a fourth group of countries makes both entities jointly and 
severally responsible.  Similarly, countries allocate employer responsibilities among 
different group members in a variety of ways.
125
  In cases concerning international 
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employment, these problems are exacerbated, since a worker may be engaged by a 
group member/employment agency in one country, but work for a third person in 
another country, and the two countries may differ with regard to how they ascribe 
employer responsibilities to multiple employing entities.  A PIL system which aims to 
uphold the objectives of legal certainty, predictability and particularly employee 
protection must be able to accommodate the various substantive law systems of 
ascription of employer responsibilities. 
The recent CJEU decision in Voogsgeerd
126
 touched upon the question of who is 
the employer for the purposes of European PIL.  Mr Voogsgeerd entered into an 
employment contract with Navimer SA, a Luxembourg company.  The contract was 
concluded at the headquarters of Naviglobe NV, a Belgian subsidiary.  Mr Voogsgeerd 
worked as a seaman on board ships belonging to Navimer.  He received his salary from 
Navimer.  But he was obliged to report to, and received briefings and instructions from, 
Naviglobe in Belgium, where all of his voyages commenced and terminated.  Although 
this case primarily concerned the interpretation of the connecting factor of the engaging 
place of business for the purposes of the Rome Convention, both the Opinion of 
Advocate General TRSTENJAK and the CJEU judgment provide guidance regarding the 
concept of employer in the context of a triangular relationship. 
The Advocate General seems to have adopted a strict approach in stating that: 
‘The fact that the third party is entitled, with the employer’s consent, to control 
the employee’s activities by issuing instructions and carrying out supervisory 
duties does nothing, from a legal point of view, to alter the fact that the 
employee ultimately performs his contractual obligations for the employer.  In 
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so far as Mr Voogsgeerd usually took instructions directly from Naviglobe, he 
clearly did so in performance of his contractual obligations towards Navimer.’127 
According to the Advocate General, the privity of contract precluded any party other 
than Navimer from being regarded as the employer.  This approach would have allowed 
Mr Voogsgeerd to rely on the jurisdictional and choice-of-law rules concerning 
employment only against Navimer.  Even if the law applicable to the putative 
relationship between Mr Voogsgeerd and Naviglobe had imposed employer 
responsibilities on this company, the strict approach adopted by the Advocate General 
would have disabled Mr Voogsgeerd from relying on the special PIL rules in a dispute 
against this company. 
On the contrary, the CJEU seems to have adopted a more relaxed approach in 
stating that: 
‘it is a matter for the referring court to assess what is the real relationship 
between the two companies in order to establish whether Naviglobe is, indeed, 
the employer of the personnel engaged by Navimer.  The court seised must, in 
particular, take into consideration all the objective factors enabling it to establish 
the actual situation which differs from that which appears from the terms of the 
contract... 
In making this assessment...the absence of a transfer of [the employer’s] 
authority to Naviglobe, constitutes one of the factors to be taken into 
consideration, but it is not, in itself, decisive.’128 
According to the CJEU, it is possible to regard a person other than the nominal 
employer as the employer for the purposes of European PIL. 
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But it is not clear whether, in cases of triangular relationships, the CJEU would 
allow both the engaging group member/employment agency and the group 
member/end-user to which the employee is ‘hired-out’ to be regarded as employers.  
Such a possibility should be allowed.  For example, if the law of the country in which 
the employee works for the group member/end-user to which he is ‘hired-out’ imposes 
employer responsibilities on that group member/end-user, the relationship between the 
employee and that group member/end-user must not fall outside the scope of the special 
PIL rules.  The alternative would be for this relationship to fall within the scope of the 
general rules, which must be rejected as being contrary to the scheme and objectives of 
Brussels I and Rome I.  This relationship exhibits all the features justifying the special 
treatment of employees in PIL.  Possible arguments to the contrary based, for instance, 
on the principle of legal certainty and foreseeability are not compelling.  The group 
member/end-user to which the employee is ‘hired out’ should not be allowed to evade 
the jurisdiction of the courts and application of the law designated by the European PIL 
rules concerning employment.  After all, it is that group member/end-user that has 
chosen to procure labour by means of ‘hiring-out’ of workers, and is, as a typically 
stronger party, in a relatively good position to obtain information on the legal pros and 
cons of procuring labour in this way.  The autonomous definition of the concept of 
employer for the purposes of the two Regulations should be derived from the 
autonomous definition of the person working under an ‘individual employment 
contract’ and, generally speaking, cover entities which in fact benefit from the 
employee’s work, which control the employee, and upon which the employee is 
dependent.  Furthermore, European PIL should prevent any attempt to evade the rules 
concerning employment, and not permit members of the corporate group which are not 
the employee’s nominal employers to bring proceeding against the employee outside the 
forums available to employers under the special rules of Brussels I. 
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This view is supported by both the CJEU and English case-law.  In Allonby,
129
 
the employment agency supplied part-time workers as independent contractors to the 
end-user.  The CJEU did not limit the scope of the autonomous concept of ‘worker’ in 
EU law to the cases where there was a formal contract between the agency worker and 
the end-user.  On the contrary, the CJEU regarded the agency workers as the ‘workers’ 
of the end-user for the purposes of the equal pay provisions of TFEU. 
As discussed, WPP Holding Italy SRL v Benatti
130
 concerned a consultancy 
agreement between Mr Benatti and an Italian member of a corporate group, under which 
Mr Benatti provided services to the group in Italy.  Following the termination of the 
agreement, the nominal employer, the group’s UK parent company and a Dutch group 
member commenced proceeding in England.  The nominal employer relied on the 
English choice-of-court clause contained in the agreement.  The other two claimants 
argued they could also enforce the agreement pursuant to the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999 and, alternatively, that English courts had jurisdiction over their 
claims for breach of fiduciary duties under Art.5(1) or 5(3) Brussels I.  Mr Benatti 
challenged the English courts’ jurisdiction on the basis that the agreement was an 
employment contract and that, pursuant to Brussels I, he could only be sued in Italy.  
Although FIELD J held that the agreement was not an employment contract, he did 
indicate that, had it been otherwise, none of the claimants could have relied on the 
choice-of-court clause and, furthermore, that the claims for breach of fiduciary duties 
would have been regarded as claims brought by the employer for the purposes of 
Brussels I.
131
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Another relevant case is Samengo-Turner.
132
  The claimants were reinsurance 
brokers employed in England by the first defendant, the English service company for a 
corporate group, whose business was to employ persons to work for other group 
members.  The second defendant was the American group member for which the 
claimants in fact worked.  The third defendant was the group’s American parent 
company.  During their employment, the claimants became eligible to participate in an 
executive incentive scheme administered by the group’s parent company, and each 
received a bonus.  The terms and conditions of the bonus agreement included an 
obligation on the part of the claimants to repay the bonus if they engaged in detrimental 
activity, and to provide information to enable the ‘Company’ to determine whether they 
were in compliance with their obligations.  The ‘Company’ was defined as 
encompassing the parent company or any of its affiliates and subsidiaries.  The bonus 
agreement included a New York law and exclusive jurisdiction clauses.  After the 
claimants had handed in the notice and disclosed their intention to join a competitor, the 
two American companies brought an action in New York for breach of contract.  The 
claimants then commenced proceedings in England with the view of obtaining an anti-
suit injunction to restrain the New York proceedings.  The basis of the claim before the 
English court was that the bonus agreement was an ‘individual employment contract’ in 
the meaning of Brussels I, that the New York proceedings were brought by the 
employers, and that the claimants therefore had the right not to be sued outside of 
England.  After deciding that the agreement was an ‘individual employment contract’, 
the Court of Appeal held that the two American companies were the claimant’s 
employers for the purposes of Brussels I.  According to TUCKEY LJ: 
‘their claim in New York...is an employment claim against the employees and 
one would expect such a claim to be made by an employer...  [The two 
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American companies] as companies in the same group [as the English company] 
have an economic interest in the contracts containing those terms and their 
enforcement and should be subject to the same jurisdictional restraint as [the 
English company].  I do not think that this is a strained construction.  It simply 
recognises the reality of the situation without adopting an over formalistic 
approach. 
Nor does this construction pierce the corporate veil in any real way.  [Brussels I] 
is only concerned with the allocation of jurisdiction.  The fact that [the two 
American companies] should be treated as employers for such purposes does not 
mean that they should be so treated for any other purpose.’133 
Conclusions 
Many national employment laws extend their scope beyond standard or typical 
employment contracts to cover certain categories of workers traditionally classified as 
self-employed or ascribe employer responsibilities to multiple employing entities.  
Nevertheless, many national employment laws remain under-inclusive, in the sense of 
not covering certain categories of workers in a genuine need of protection.  Calls have 
been made to redefine employment law around wider, more inclusive concepts.  For 
example, FREEDLAND, an influential participant in this debate, has put forward the 
concepts of ‘personal employment contract’ and, more recently, ‘personal work 
contract’, ‘personal work nexus’ and ‘personal work relations’.134  The autonomous 
                                                 
133
 ibid [33]-[34]. 
134
 M. Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford, 2003); M. Freedland, ‘From the Contract 
of Employment to the Personal Work Nexus’ (2006) 35 ILJ 1; M. Freedland, ‘Application of Labour and 
Employment Law Beyond the Contract of Employment’ (2007) 146 ILR 3; see also M. Freedland and N. 
Countouris, ‘Towards a Comparative Theory of the Contractual Construction of Personal Work Relations 
in Europe’ (2008) 37 ILJ 49; M. Freedland and N. Countouris, The Legal Construction of Personal Work 
Relations (Oxford, 2011). 
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definition of the term ‘individual employment contracts’ of European PIL seems to 
converge towards those wide and inclusive concepts. 
From the point of view of their scope, the European PIL rules concerning 
employment largely meet the proclaimed objectives.  The objectives of legal certainty 
and predictability are largely fulfilled, since the term ‘individual employment contracts’ 
is interpreted uniformly within the EU.  The objective of employee protection is also 
met given the breadth and inclusivity of this term.  The special rules encompass a wide 
range of workers who are in a genuine need of protection.  By enabling the allocation 
and protection of regulatory authority of states that have intermediate legal categories of 
dependent self-employed workers or ascribe employer responsibilities to multiple 
employing entities, an autonomous and wide interpretation of the term ‘individual 
employment contracts’ also puts European PIL of employment in a position to 
adequately perform its regulatory function.  This approach accords with the existing 
division of legislative competence within the EU, and supports the diversity of the 
Member States’ labour laws.  European PIL, as a matter of principle, does not oblige 
Member States to extend the scope of their protective legislation beyond the boundaries 
they deem appropriate, but is able to safeguard, in appropriate circumstances, the 
application of their laws and jurisdiction of their courts.  The following sections explore 
whether European PIL of employment does in fact adequately perform its regulatory 
function by assessing whether, and to what extent, its rules accord with the 
considerations identified in the previous chapter.  This assessment commences with the 
jurisdictional rules of Brussels I. 
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IV JURISDICTION* 
 
‘[Brussels I], in its current version, 
notwithstanding the objective of 
protection referred to...in the Preamble 
thereto, does not afford particular 
protection to an employee in a situation 
such as [the claimant employee’s]...’ 
CJEU
1
 
 
The structure of Section 5 of Chapter II Brussels I
2
 is simple.  There is one set of 
jurisdictional rules applicable when employees act as claimants.  In general terms, an 
employee may commence proceedings: 
 in the courts of the employer’s domicile;3 
 in the courts for the habitual place of work;4 
 absent a habitual place of work, in the courts of the engaging place of business;5 
                                                 
* An earlier version of this chapter was published in (2012) 61 ICLQ 91. 
1
 Case C-462/06 GlaxoSmithKline [2008] ECR I-3965, [34]. 
2
 The rules of jurisdiction in employment matters of the 2007 Lugano Convention are identical to those of 
Brussels I and are not analysed explicitly.  The relevant provisions of the Brussels and 1988 Lugano 
Conventions are mentioned to the extent to which they differ from those of Brussels I.  Chapter VIII, 
section 3.1, deals with the jurisdictional rules of PWD. 
3
 Art.19(1). 
4
 Art.19(2)(a). 
5
 Art.19(2)(b). 
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 regarding a dispute arising out of the operations of the employer’s branch, 
agency or other establishment, in the courts for the place of that establishment;
6
 
and 
 on a counter-claim, in the court in which the original claim is pending.7 
There is another set of jurisdictional rules applicable when employees act as defendants.  
An employer may commence proceedings: 
 in the courts of the employee’s domicile;8 and 
 on a counter-claim, in the court in which the original claim is pending.9 
A jurisdiction agreement entered into before the dispute has arisen is not given effect if 
it reduces the number of forums available to the employee or increases the number of 
forums available to the employer.
10
 
These rules apply ‘in matters relating to’ employment contracts and seem to 
cover all employment claims.  As MERRETT demonstrated, regardless of whether a party 
to an employment contract advances a contractual, statutory or tortious claim during or 
after the termination of employment, and regardless of whether it concerns employment 
in the private or public sector, the special jurisdictional rules of Brussels I are engaged, 
provided that the employment contract is legally relevant to the claim.
11
  Thus, a claim 
against an employee for conspiracy to harm the employer’s business by soliciting fellow 
                                                 
6
 Art.18(1).  Although, in theory, claimant employers can also invoke this jurisdictional rule, this is 
practically impossible, since employees do not have ancillary establishments. 
7
 Art.20(2). 
8
 Art.20(1). 
9
 Art.20(2). 
10
 Art.21. 
11
 L. Merrett, Employment Contracts in Private International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011) [4.07]-[4.17], 
[4.46]-[4.58].  See also A. Briggs and P. Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (London, 5
th
 ed, 2009) 
[2.103]; B. Hess, T. Pfeiffer and P. Schlosser, ‘Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the 
Member States’, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf (last accessed 26/9/2012), 
[352]-[356]. 
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employees is a matter relating to the employment contract.
12
  But claims for breaches of 
copyright and confidence against a former employee who obtained the employer’s 
design drawings by bribing a fellow employee for the purpose of facilitating unlawful 
competition against the employer are not.
13
 
The objective of these rules is employee protection.  As mentioned, Recital 13 
Brussels I states, ‘In relation to...employment, the weaker party should be protected by 
rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules provide for.’  
But the CJEU judgment in GlaxoSmithKline
14
 casts doubt upon the achievement of this 
objective.  Mr Rouard worked for two companies in the same group.  One was 
domiciled in France, the other in the UK.  The work was performed in Africa.  
Following his dismissal, Mr Rouard brought proceedings in France, French courts 
having jurisdiction over the French company.  Mr Rouard further sought to join the UK 
company as co-defendant pursuant to Art.6(1) Brussels I.  Had the claimant not been an 
employee, Art.6(1) would undoubtedly have been an available jurisdictional basis.  But 
the CJEU found that Section 5 of Chapter II Brussels I is exhaustive.  The Court relied 
primarily on the wording of Art.18(1): ‘In matters relating to individual contracts of 
employment, jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without prejudice to 
Article 4 and point 5 of Article 5’.15  Since the provisions of this Section neither 
referred to Art.6(1) nor prescribed a rule for co-defendants, the CJEU held that this 
generally available head of jurisdiction could not be invoked by Mr Rouard.
16
  
                                                 
12
 CEF Holdings Ltd v Mundey [2012] EWHC 1524 (QB), disapproving Swithenbank Foods Ltd v Bowers 
[2002] EWHC 2257 (QB) (a claim for conspiracy to injure the former employer’s contractual relations 
with a supplier not a matter ‘relating to’ the employment contract). 
13
 Alpha Laval Tumba AB v Separator Spares International Ltd [2012] EWHC 1155 (Ch) (appeal 
pending). 
14
 (n1). 
15
 ibid [18]-[19]. 
16
 The rules of jurisdiction in employment matters of the Brussels and 1988 Lugano Conventions were not 
set out in separate, self-contained sections.  Hence, Art.6(1) of these Conventions was an available basis 
of jurisdiction in employment disputes: see French Cour de cassation, Martine Carasset-Marillier v 
Salahadin Imam et autres, 13 January 1998, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/1998/27-1998.htm (last accessed 26/9/2012). 
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Evidently, the special rules did not afford the employee any protection and were not 
more favourable to his interests than the general rules.  On the contrary, they were less 
favourable. 
This judgment has received strong criticism throughout Europe.
17
  The European 
Commission has also acknowledged the problem and proposed an amendment to 
Brussels I that would make the jurisdictional rule for co-defendants available to 
claimant employees.
18
  No other changes to the rules of jurisdiction in employment 
matters are contemplated by the Commission.  The satisfaction with the general 
operation of these rules echoes the conclusions of the Heidelberg Report on the 
application of Brussels I: ‘No major problems [in relation to the rules of jurisdiction in 
employment matters] could be discovered’;19 ‘None of the open issues [regarding the 
rules of jurisdiction in employment matters] are of a dimension justifying the 
conclusion that an amendment being drafted is self-suggesting’.20  This chapter explores 
whether satisfaction is justified, and in particular whether, and to what extent, Brussels I 
achieves the objective of employee protection. 
The following section presents the evolution of the special jurisdictional rules.  
It is shown that the reason for the present structure and content of those rules lies in 
their haphazard evolution.  Next, the importance of according a balanced jurisdictional 
preference to claimant employees is underlined, followed by a demonstration of how 
Brussels I fails in this respect.  Finally, possibilities for improvement are discussed. 
                                                 
17
 S. Frodl, ‘Rechtssicherheit vor Arbeitnehmerschutz’ (2009) 21 Österreichische Juristenzeitung 935; J. 
Harris, ‘The Brussels I Regulation, the ECJ and the Rulebook’ (2008) 124 LQR 523; F. Jault-Seseke, 
‘GlaxoSmithKline’ (2008) 97 Revue critique DIP 853; S. Krebber, ‘Einheitlicher Gerichtsstand für die 
Klage eines Arbeitnehmers gegen mehrere Arbeitgeber bei Beschäftigung in einem 
grenzüberschreitenden Konzern’ (2009) 19 IPRax 409. 
18
 ‘Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (recast)’ COM(2010) 748 final, 11-12. 
19
 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (n11) [311]. 
20
 ibid [359]. 
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1. Evolution of jurisdictional rules 
Unlike for employment matters, the original 1968 version of the Brussels Convention 
contained protective jurisdictional rules for matters relating to insurance (Section 3 of 
Title II) and instalment sales and loans (Section 4 of Title II).  Yet the drafters of the 
Convention did consider prescribing special rules for employment disputes: the 
preliminary draft contained a provision giving exclusive jurisdiction to the courts either 
for the place in which the undertaking concerned was situated or in which the work was 
or was to be performed.
21
  But this provision was omitted from the final version for two 
reasons.  At that time work was in progress to harmonise choice-of-law rules within the 
EEC, and the adoption of the special jurisdictional rules concerning employment was 
postponed.
22
  Second, there was no agreement between the drafters on the question of 
whether, and to what extent, party autonomy should be allowed.
23
  Consequently, the 
general jurisdictional rules were made applicable to employment disputes. 
The lack of jurisdictional protection of employees led to certain problems in 
practice.  First, jurisdiction agreements were given full effect in employment disputes 
irrespective of the shortcomings of party autonomy in international employment 
contracts.  Second, the general rule of jurisdiction in contractual matters of Art.5(1) of 
the Convention proved to be ill-suited to employment disputes. 
The problem with jurisdiction agreements was revealed by Sanicentral.
24
  Mr 
Collin, a Frenchman domiciled in France, worked for Sanicentral, a German company.  
The employment contract, which contained a jurisdiction clause in favour of German 
courts, was concluded and terminated before the entry into force of the Convention.  
The employee brought proceedings in France after its entry into force.  He invoked a 
                                                 
21
 Jenard Report [1979] OJ C59/1, 24. 
22
 ibid. 
23
 ibid. 
24
 Case 25/79 [1979] ECR 3423.  See also Case 150/80 Elefanten Schuh [1981] ECR 1671. 
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provision of French employment law invalidating jurisdiction agreements in 
employment contracts such as the one at hand.  After concluding that the dispute fell 
within the substantive and temporal scope of the Convention,
25
 the CJEU held that the 
provisions of this instrument took precedence over the provisions of national procedural 
laws.
26
  Since the requirements of the Convention were satisfied, the jurisdiction 
agreement was upheld and French courts had to decline jurisdiction.  This judgment put 
employees in an unfavourable position, since it enabled employers to (ab)use their 
typically superior position and impose upon their employees jurisdiction of the courts 
favourable for them.  The only requirements that such jurisdiction agreements had to 
fulfil were the formal requirements of Art.17 of the Convention.
27
 
The unsuitability of Art.5(1) of the Convention for employment disputes was 
discussed in the ground-breaking Ivenel case.
28
  This case concerned a dispute between 
Mr Ivenel, a French commercial representative, and his German employer over payment 
of commission and other sums of money.  Mr Ivenel performed his work in France, but 
the commission and other sums were payable in Germany.  The proceedings were 
brought in France.  Art.5(1) conferred jurisdiction in contractual matters upon the courts 
‘for the place where the obligation was, or was to be, performed’.  Jurisdiction of 
French courts thus depended on which obligation (to work or to pay) was the 
jurisdictionally relevant obligation, and on its place of performance.  The CJEU had 
previously held that the obligation to be taken into account for the purposes of Art.5(1) 
was the obligation forming the basis of the claim,
29
 and that its place of performance 
was to be determined under the law designated by the choice-of-law rules of the 
                                                 
25
 Sanicentral, [3]. 
26
 ibid [5]. 
27
 Cf 1968 version of the Brussels Convention, Arts.12, 15, regarding the requirements for validity of 
jurisdiction agreements in insurance and instalment sales and loans contracts. 
28
 Case 133/81 [1982] ECR 1891. 
29
 Case 14/76 De Bloos v Bouyer [1976] ECR 1497. 
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forum.
30
  Since the basis of Mr Ivenel’s claim was the employer’s obligation of 
payment, and since under both French and German law the commission and other sums 
were payable at the address of the debtor, it seemed that Art.5(1) could only give 
jurisdiction to German courts.  However, the CJEU found that this interpretation would 
be contrary to the Convention’s objectives of proximity and protection of weaker 
parties.  It would give jurisdiction to the courts of the country where the work was not 
performed and that were not closely connected with the dispute,
31
 the courts of the 
country whose law was not applicable,
32
 and where the employer had his domicile.  The 
Court therefore departed from the language of Art.5(1) and the preceding case-law, and 
held that the jurisdictionally relevant obligation regarding employment contracts was 
always the obligation that characterised the contract, namely the obligation to perform 
work.
33
    It was also implicit in Ivenel that the place of work was to be determined 
autonomously, not by reference to the law applicable under the choice-of-law rules of 
the forum.
34
  Thus, French courts had jurisdiction. 
These deficiencies of the 1968 version of the Brussels Convention were 
remedied in the 1988 Lugano Convention, which expanded the ‘Brussels regime’ to 
EFTA Member States.  First, the problem of jurisdiction agreements contained in 
international employment contracts was resolved through the insertion of a rule that 
denied effect to such agreements entered into before the dispute has arisen.
35
  Second, 
Art.5(1) of the 1988 Lugano Convention introduced a special rule of jurisdiction in 
employment matters alongside the general rule of jurisdiction in contractual matters.  
This special rule incorporated the CJEU case-law, in particular Ivenel.  Since the ruling 
in this case was largely influenced by the fact that Art.5(1) of the 1968 version of the 
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 Case 12/76 Tessili v Dunlop [1976] ECR 1473. 
31
 Ivenel, [15]. 
32
 ibid [13]-[15], [19]. 
33
 ibid [20]; see also Case 266/85 Shenavai [1987] ECR 239. 
34
 Confirmed in Case C-125/92 Mulox [1993] ECR I-4075, [12]-[16]. 
35
 Art.17(5). 
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Brussels Convention did not give jurisdiction to the courts of the country whose law 
was applicable pursuant to Art.6 of the Rome Convention, the drafters of the 1988 
Lugano Convention decided that the special rule of jurisdiction in employment matters 
should follow this Article of the Rome Convention.
36
  Thus, the new jurisdictional rule 
provided not only that ‘in matters relating to individual contracts of employment, [the 
place of performance of the obligation in question] is that where the employee 
habitually carries out his work’ but also that ‘if the employee does not habitually carry 
out his work in any one country, this place shall be the place of business through which 
he was engaged’. 
However, the jurisdictional rules of the 1988 Lugano Convention had 
shortcomings of their own.  First, this instrument denied any effect to jurisdiction 
clauses contained in international employment contracts entered into before the dispute 
has arisen, irrespective of whether they were beneficial for employees or not.  Second, 
the rule of the engaging place of business was introduced without any assessment of its 
appropriateness.
37
  Moreover, this jurisdictional rule was equally available to both 
employers and employees. 
A further step in the evolution occurred in 1989, when the Convention on the 
accession of Spain and Portugal to the Brussels Convention was concluded.
38
  Although 
this Convention came along less than a year after the conclusion of the 1988 Lugano 
Convention, it significantly departed from the provisions of the latter instrument.  First, 
the solution of the 1988 Lugano Convention regarding jurisdiction agreements was 
considered ‘too radical’ by the drafters of the 1989 Accession Convention.39  Thus, 
                                                 
36
 Jenard/Möler Report [1990] OJ C189/57, [37]-[38], [40]. 
37
 See Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, Convention de Lugano: Convention concernant la 
compétence judiciaire et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale faite à Lugano le 16 
septembre 1988 (Zurich, 1991) 164-165. 
38
 [1989] OJ L285/1. 
39
 Cruz/Real/Jenard Report [1990] OJ C189/35, [27](d). 
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Art.17(5) of the 1989 version of the Brussels Convention provided that a jurisdiction 
agreement was effective in an employment dispute not only if it was entered into after 
the dispute had arisen but also if it was favourable for the employee.  Second, Art.5(1) 
of the Brussels Convention was amended along the lines of Art.5(1) of the 1988 Lugano 
Convention, with one significant difference: the rule of the engaging place of business 
could be invoked only by employees, not by employers.  Furthermore, it was clarified 
that the jurisdictionally relevant place was not only where the business that engaged the 
employee was situated at the moment of engagement but also where it was situated at 
the moment of commencement of proceedings. 
The latest stage in the evolution came with Brussels I in 2001.  This instrument 
introduced several important changes.  First, the rules of jurisdiction in employment 
matters were set out in a separate, self-contained section.  Second, the rule extending the 
notion of the employer’s domicile was introduced in Art.18(2).  Third, employers lost 
the right to invoke the rule of the habitual place of work.  It would appear that the 
drafters of Brussels I were of the opinion that the objective of employee protection 
could be achieved only if the rules of jurisdiction in employment matters closely 
followed the existing rules of jurisdiction for consumer and insurance disputes.
40
  
However, they failed to examine the impact that these changes would have on the 
jurisdictional position of employees.  Similarly, the jurisdictional rules of Brussels I 
were simply transposed into the 2007 Lugano Convention without assessment of their 
impact.
41
   
                                                 
40
 The rules applicable in these two types of dispute had been contained in separate, self-contained 
sections (3 and 4 of Title II) since the adoption of the Brussels Convention.  Consumers and insured 
persons could normally be sued only in the courts of their domicile (Arts.11(1), 14(2)).  There was also a 
rule extending the notion of the insurer’s domicile (Art.18(2)).  See European Commission, Explanatory 
Memorandum accompanying the proposal of Brussels I COM(1999) 348 final, 17. 
41
 See Pocar Report [2009] OJ C319/1, [85]-[90]. 
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In sum, the reason for the present structure and content of the rules of 
jurisdiction in employment matters of Brussels I lies in their haphazard evolution.  
These rules were introduced and amended with the objective of employee protection in 
mind.  The following text examines whether they really achieve this goal. 
2. Importance, in practice, of jurisdictionally preferring claimant 
employees 
Indisputably, Brussels I protects employees whenever they act as defendants.  An 
employer can ordinarily bring proceedings only in the courts of the employee’s 
domicile.
42
  This guarantees that employees will not have to defend their cases in 
foreign, potentially inaccessible and unfamiliar courts.  An employee can be sued 
outside his home country only if he consents to the jurisdiction of a foreign court after 
the dispute has arisen.  Art.21 is explicit in this regard: a jurisdiction agreement 
purporting to confer jurisdiction over an employment claim on the courts of a foreign 
country is given effect only if entered post litem natam.  The general requirements of 
Art.23 must also be satisfied.
43
  In practice it may be difficult to determine when an 
employment dispute has arisen.  The Jenard Report suggests that this occurs ‘as soon as 
the parties disagree on a specific point and legal proceedings are imminent or 
contemplated.’44  The rationale of this rule is that an employee who has a specific 
dispute with his employer is in a position to assess the pros and cons of litigation in 
various countries.  He will not easily give up the privilege of defending in his home 
country, and will accept the jurisdiction of a foreign court only if he considers that to be 
                                                 
42
 Art.20(1).  According to Art.59, domicile of employees is determined by reference to the Member 
States’ national laws.  Under the Brussels and 1988 Lugano Conventions an employer was not confined to 
suing the employee in the courts of the employee’s domicile. 
43
 Schlosser Report [1979] OJ C59/71, [161]. 
44
 (n21) 33; cf Merrett (n11) [4.97]: ‘The date of the facts giving rise to the alleged breach may be a more 
logical and precise date.  However, the agreement has to be about the, extant, dispute and the dispute 
must be sufficiently identifiable as a dispute to be described in the agreement.’ (footnote omitted) 
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in his interest.  It should be noted, however, that this rule slightly disfavours defendant 
employees in one respect: an employee who is sued in the courts of his domicile cannot 
invoke a jurisdiction clause in favour of a foreign court entered into before the dispute 
has arisen.
45
  The same rationale underlies the employer’s right to bring a counter-claim 
in the court in which the original claim is pending.
46
  By commencing proceedings in a 
foreign court, the employee accepts the jurisdiction of that court to entertain a counter-
claim against him.  The court in which the action against the employer is pending must 
have jurisdiction specifically under Section 5 of Chapter II.  In addition, the general 
requirements of Art.6(3) have to be satisfied: the counter-claim must arise from the 
same contract or facts on which the original claim was based.  The idea of consent also 
suggests that an employee can confer jurisdiction upon a court by entering an 
appearance.
47
 
 In Samengo-Turner,
48
 the Court of Appeal interpreted Art.20(1) Brussels I as 
giving employees a statutory right to be sued in the courts of their domicile and not to 
be sued elsewhere that could be protected by an anti-suit injunction.  Here, the 
employers, relying on choice-of-court clauses contained in employment contracts, 
commenced proceedings in New York for breach of contract.  According to TUCKEY LJ: 
‘Doing nothing is not an option in my judgment.  The New York court cannot 
give effect to [Brussels I] and has already decided…that it has exclusive 
jurisdiction.  The only way to give effect to the English claimants’ statutory 
rights is to restrain those proceedings.  A multinational business must expect to 
be subject to the employment laws applicable to those they employ in different 
                                                 
45
 Cruz/Real/Jenard Report (n39) [27](e)(2). 
46
 Art.20(2). 
47
 The fact that the rule of Art.24, dealing with submission to jurisdiction by entering an appearance, is 
neither contained nor referred to in Section 5 of Chapter II is irrelevant: Case C-111/09 Bilas [2010] ECR 
I-4545, noted by U. Grušić, ‘Submission and Protective Jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation’ 
(2011) 48 CMLR 947. 
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jurisdictions.  Those employed to work…in London who are domiciled here are 
entitled to be sued only in the English courts and to be protected if that right is 
not respected.’49 
This decision has been criticised on a number of grounds, in particular that Brussels I 
imposes obligations on Member State courts, and does not create rights or obligations in 
individuals.
50
  Nevertheless, the decision demonstrates the strength of the idea of 
employee protection which the courts of Member States are bound to uphold.
51
  It 
should be noted, however, that English courts cannot restrain proceedings in other 
Member States.
52
  Since Member State courts are bound by Brussels I, they must 
decline jurisdiction over a claim against an employee domiciled in another Member 
State. 
Suppose for a moment that this is the only jurisdictional preference that 
employees receive; in other words, that the jurisdictional preference consists only in 
denying claimant employers the use of certain generally available jurisdictional bases.  
Would this type of jurisdictional imbalance (favouring solely defendant, but not 
claimant employees), in and of itself, lead to the achievement of the objective of 
employee protection?  The answer largely depends on the relative practical importance 
of situations where employees act as defendants compared to those where they act as 
claimants. 
The relative practical importance of the two types of situation can be ascertained 
by looking at the CJEU case-law on Brussels I and the Brussels Convention.  So far 
                                                 
49
 ibid [43]. 
50
 A. Dickinson, ‘Resurgence of the Anti-suit Injunction: The Brussels I Regulation as the Source of Civil 
Obligations?’ (2008) 57 ICLQ 465, 469-471.  See also A. Briggs, ‘Who is Bound by the Brussels 
Regulation?’ [2007] LMCLQ 433, 437-438. 
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employees have initiated proceedings in 13 cases.
53
  In only 2 cases have employers 
done so.
54
  This suggests that situations where employees act as claimants are much 
more frequent than those where they act as defendants.  This is hardly surprising.  
‘Employers rarely sue employees, not because they cannot do so…but because they 
have a whole armoury of weapons from gradings, salaries, promotions, through 
disciplinary process ultimately to dismissal, to enforce the contract upon the 
employee.’55  This impression is corroborated by data from certain national 
jurisdictions.  In Germany, for example, it is estimated that more than 95% of 
employment disputes are commenced by employees.
56
  For employees, therefore, the 
jurisdictional rules applicable when they act as claimants are of a crucial practical 
importance. 
  This impression is shared by the European Commission.  We must now turn 
briefly to recognition and enforcement of judgments.  Brussels I does not allow the 
court in which recognition and enforcement of a judgment concerning employment is 
sought to review the jurisdiction of the court of origin.  This is in striking contrast to the 
rule that allows such review in matters relating to insurance and consumer contracts.
57
   
The explanation provided by the Commission is that any review of the foreign courts’ 
jurisdiction would only affect employees, since it is they who generally seek recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments.
58
  This argument clearly implies that disputes in 
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437/00 Pugliese [2003] ECR I-3573; Turner v Grovit (n52); Case C-555/03 Warbecq [2004] ECR I-6041; 
GlaxoSmithKline (n1); Case C-413/07 Haase v Superfast Ferries [2008] OJ C51/40; Case C-154/11 
Mahamdia [2012] ECR 00000.  See also Case C-29/10 Koelzsch [2011] ECR 00000 and Case C-384/10 
Voogsgeerd [2011] ECR 00000, dealing with the Rome Convention, Art.6. 
54
 Case 288/82 Duijnstee v Goderbauer [1983] ECR 3663.  In Turner v Grovit (n52), an action brought by 
the employee in England was followed by a vexatious action brought by the employer in Spain. 
55
 R. Smith and V. Cromack, ‘International Employment Contracts – the Applicable Law’ (1993) 22 ILJ 
1, 6. 
56
 A. Junker, ‘Vom Brüsseler Übereinkommen zur Brüsseler Verordnung – Wandlungen des 
Internationalen Zivilprozessrechts’ (2002) 48 RIW 569, 575. 
57
 Art.35(1). 
58
 Explanatory Memorandum (n40) 23. 
101 
 
which employees act as defendants are so rare that protection from wrongful assumption 
of jurisdiction over them is unnecessary. 
Furthermore, judging from English case-law, disputes in which employees act as 
defendants usually concern senior employees and the enforcement of various restrictive 
covenants and the employee’s duty of fidelity and confidentiality.59  Samengo-Turner,60 
for instance, concerned the enforcement of an obligation on the part of reinsurance 
brokers to repay the bonus they had received if they engaged in detrimental activity.  
Other cases concerned solicitors, consultants and managers.
61
  The reasons for 
protecting senior employees are not as strong as the reasons for protecting other 
employees.  Consequently, since situations where employees act as claimants are of a 
significantly greater practical importance, giving a jurisdictional preference solely to 
defendant employees cannot suffice. 
Furthermore, the theoretical considerations discussed in section 4 of Chapter II 
show that the objective of employee protection requires more than just denying 
employers the use of some generally available jurisdictional bases.  This objective 
supports favouring claimant employees by making available to them one or more 
jurisdictional bases in addition to those available to claimants in general.  The rules of 
jurisdiction in employment matters must also accord with the considerations of 
proportionality and vindication of legitimate state interests. 
Given these practical and theoretical considerations, in order for the objective of 
employee protection to be achieved, it is not enough that the special rules accord a 
jurisdictional preference solely to defendant employees.  These rules must also accord a 
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balanced jurisdictional preference to claimant employees.  Only thereby can the 
jurisdictional rules of European PIL adequately perform their regulatory function, one 
of allocating and protecting adjudicatory authority of states in the field of labour law.  
The following section examines whether this is the case. 
3. Claimant employees versus other claimants: is the objective of employee 
protection yet to be attained? 
In order to ascertain whether Brussels I achieves the objective of employee protection, 
the position of claimant employees will be compared with that of claimants generally.  
Specifically, the jurisdictional bases available to claimant employees will be compared 
with those available to other claimants in comparable situations. 
3.1. Employer’s domicile versus defendant’s domicile 
An employee may commence proceedings in the Member State where the employer is 
domiciled.
62
  Even if an employer is domiciled outside the EU, he will be deemed to be 
domiciled in a Member State where he has a branch, agency or other establishment 
(‘ancillary establishment’) regarding disputes arising out of the operations of that 
establishment.
63
  Similarly, other claimants may commence proceedings in the Member 
State where the defendant is domiciled.
64
  However, in this instance there can be no 
extension of the notion of the defendant’s domicile upon which other claimants can 
rely.  The following text examines whether the rule extending the notion of the 
employer’s domicile accords claimant employees a jurisdictional preference. 
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In principle, the jurisdictional rules of Brussels I apply when the defendant is 
domiciled in the EU.
65
  Member State courts can normally assume jurisdiction over 
non-EU domiciliaries only pursuant to the Member States’ traditional jurisdictional 
rules, regardless of any ancillary establishment that such defendants might have in the 
EU.  However, the rule extending the notion of the employer’s domicile brings non-EU 
employers with European ancillary establishments within the scope of Brussels I 
regarding employment disputes arising out of the operations of those establishments.  
This rule aims to protect employees by guaranteeing they will be able to commence 
proceedings against such non-EU employers in at least one Member State.  Otherwise 
(the theory goes) the operation of the Member States’ traditional rules might result in 
employees not being able to sue such non-EU employers anywhere in the EU. 
What is, however, the practical result of the application of the rule extending the 
notion of the employer’s domicile?  This rule applies in situations such as the one that 
arose in Six Constructions.
66
  Six Constructions was a company domiciled in the United 
Arab Emirate of Sharjah.  Mr Humbert was a worker of French nationality and 
domicile.  He was engaged through Six Constructions’ Belgian branch to work outside 
the EU.  Following his dismissal, Mr Humbert commenced proceedings in France.  If 
the mentioned rule had been applied in this case, Six Constructions would have been 
deemed to be domiciled in Belgium: the employment dispute arose out of the operations 
of that company’s Belgian branch because Mr Humbert was engaged through that 
branch.
67
  French courts would therefore have been entitled and obliged to apply the 
jurisdictional rules of Brussels I.  Since Mr Humbert’s work was performed outside the 
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EU, Brussels I would have provided no basis for the jurisdiction of French courts.  Mr 
Humbert would then have been left with the option of bringing proceedings in Belgium 
(the country where the employer would have been deemed to be domiciled), Sharja (the 
country where the employer was in fact domiciled) or possibly in Libya, Zaire or Abu 
Dhabi, another of the United Arab Emirates (non-EU countries where the work was 
performed). 
Had the rule extending the notion of the employer’s domicile not existed, the 
Member States’ traditional jurisdictional rules would have been applicable in this 
situation.  The French traditional rules would have conferred jurisdiction upon French 
courts, possibly on two accounts.
68
  First, Art.14 of the French Civil Code (Code Civil) 
enables claimants of French nationality to sue foreign parties in France.  Second, the 
second indent of Art.R517-1 of the French Labour Code gives employees domiciled in 
France the right to commence proceedings in France when the work is performed 
outside any establishment.  It is not clear whether the work in Six Constructions was 
performed in an establishment.  In any event, Art.14 of the Civil Code would have been 
sufficient to give jurisdiction to French courts.
69
  In addition, the Belgian traditional 
rules would have conferred jurisdiction on Belgian courts: Art.5(2) of the Belgian PIL 
Code mirrors Art.5(5) Brussels I.
70
 
The question whether the rule extending the notion of the employer’s domicile 
accords a jurisdictional preference to claimant employees cannot be answered in the 
abstract.  This rule would not, for example, have benefitted an employee in the shoes of 
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Mr Humbert.  On the one hand, it would have given jurisdiction to Belgian courts, 
which would anyway have been competent under the Belgian traditional rules.  On the 
other hand, it would have precluded such an employee from bringing proceedings in 
France pursuant to the French traditional rules.  In different circumstances, this rule 
could confer jurisdiction upon the courts that would otherwise not have it.  This is most 
likely to occur where the existence of a non-EU employer’s ancillary establishment in a 
Member State does not give jurisdiction to that Member State’s courts pursuant to that 
country’s traditional rules, even over employment disputes arising out of the operations 
of that ancillary establishment.  Given that Greece and Poland seem to be the only 
Member States that would not give jurisdiction to their courts on this basis,
71
 the rule 
extending the notion of the employer’s domicile more often than not actually disfavours 
employees since it shields non-EU employers with European ancillary establishments 
from the Member States’ traditional, often excessive, jurisdictional rules.  Another 
extremely rare situation where the rule extending the notion of the employer’s domicile 
would give jurisdiction to the courts that would otherwise not have it is where an 
employee is engaged by a non-EU employer through that employer’s ancillary 
establishment situated in one Member State to work in another Member State and the 
latter Member State’s traditional rules do not confer jurisdiction upon its courts in this 
situation.
72
   
3.2. Habitual place of work versus place of provision of services 
The primary rule of jurisdiction in employment matters (conferring jurisdiction upon the 
courts for the habitual place of work) will be compared with the rule of jurisdiction in 
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 A. Nuyts, ‘Study on Residual Jurisdiction: General Report’, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf (last accessed 26/9/2012), 
36. 
72
 Not all Member States’ traditional rules give jurisdiction to their courts on the basis of the habitual 
place of work: Study on Residual Jurisdiction ibid 43-46. 
106 
 
matters relating to a services contract.  This comparison is justified given the similar 
nature of the two types of contract. 
3.2.1. Habitual place of work 
An employer domiciled in one Member State may be sued in another Member State in 
the courts for the place where the employee habitually carries out his work or for the 
last place where he did so.
73
  This rule is of practical importance only if there is a 
habitual place of work in a Member State.
74
  If a habitual place of work does not exist, 
the fall-back rule of the engaging place of business applies.  If there is a habitual place 
of work outside the EU, neither the primary rule of the habitual place of work nor the 
fall-back rule of the engaging place of business applies.
75
 
The habitual place of work is easily identifiable where the work is performed in 
one place.  However, where the work is carried out in more than one place, determining 
the habitual place of work is problematic.  The CJEU dealt with this problem in the 
following four cases: Mulox, Rutten, Weber and Pugliese. 
Mulox
76
 concerned a dispute between Mulox, an English company, and Mr 
Geels, a Dutch national with French domicile.  Mr Geels, who was employed as a 
commercial representative, used his French home as an office and base of operations.  
In the first 14 months of his employment, he sold Mulox products in Germany, 
                                                 
73
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Belgium, the Netherlands and Scandinavia (but not France), to which countries he 
travelled frequently.  In the last 5 months, he worked solely in France.  Following his 
dismissal, Mr Geels brought proceedings in France.  The employer argued that the place 
of performance was not confined to France, that it covered the whole of Europe and 
that, consequently, French courts had no jurisdiction.  The CJEU held that, where the 
work was performed in more than one country, the multiplication of courts having 
jurisdiction should be avoided.  Jurisdiction should not be conferred upon the courts of 
each Member State in which the work was performed.
77
  Jurisdiction over the whole 
dispute should be concentrated at ‘the place where or from which the employee 
principally discharges his obligations towards his employer.’78  The most important 
factor in determining this place was that ‘the work entrusted to the employee was 
carried out from an office…from which he performed his work and to which he returned 
after each business trip.’79  Other relevant factors were that Mr Geels was domiciled in 
France and that the work was carried out solely in France when the dispute arose.  
French courts therefore had jurisdiction. 
The facts of Rutten
80
 were strikingly similar.
81
  Mr Rutten, a commercial 
representative of Dutch nationality and domicile, commenced proceedings in the 
Netherlands against Cross Medical, his English employer.  Mr Rutten performed some 
two thirds of his work in the Netherlands, the rest being divided among the UK, 
Belgium, Germany and the US.  The work was carried out from an office established in 
Mr Rutten’s home.  The CJEU had an easy task: after referring to Mulox,82 it held, in 
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line therewith, that the habitual place of work was ‘the place where the employee has 
established the effective centre of his working activities and where, or from which, he in 
fact performs the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer.’83  The most 
important factors in identifying this place were that Mr Rutten carried out two thirds of 
his work in the Netherlands and that he had an office there.
84
   
Mulox and Rutten clarify that the most important factors for determining the 
habitual place of work are the location of the employee’s office and the distribution of 
the working time among various countries.  Since the ‘office’ and ‘time’ factors 
coincided in these two cases (i.e. the employees had their offices in the countries where 
they spent most of their working time), the CJEU had no problem in identifying the 
habitual place of work.  However, which of the two factors is to be given greater weight 
if they do not coincide?   
This question was discussed before the CJEU.  Advocate General JACOBS, who 
delivered Opinions in both Mulox and Rutten, argued that the main purpose of the rule 
of jurisdiction in employment matters (conferring jurisdiction upon the court with a 
particularly close connection with the dispute) was best satisfied if the ‘office factor’ 
was given preference.
85
  In his view, this was because the existence of an office in a 
place where the work was performed indicated that that place of work was more 
important than the others.  In other words, the Advocate General equated the term 
‘habitual place of work’ with ‘principal place of employment’.86  The European 
Commission, on the other hand, argued that preference should be given to the ‘time 
factor’.87  It indicated that the term ‘habitual’ referred to the temporal organisation of 
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work, and that it could not be equated with the term ‘principal’ which referred to the 
central point of work.  It suggested that jurisdiction should be given to the courts of the 
country where ‘a clear majority of days was spent’.88 
Although the CJEU refrained from addressing this issue directly, it did indirectly 
express its preference for the Advocate General’s approach.  As previously noted, Mr 
Geels’ activities did not cover France until 14 months into his employment, and then did 
so for approximately 5 months.  Nevertheless, the CJEU did not compare the amount of 
time Mr Geels had spent in various countries.  It did, however, refer to the ‘place where 
or from which the employee principally discharges his obligations towards his 
employer’89 and then mentioned the location of the office, but not the distribution of the 
working time, as the relevant factor for determining this place.
90
  Furthermore, in Rutten 
the CJEU referred to ‘the place where the employee has established the effective centre 
of his working activities and where, or from which, he in fact performs the essential part 
of his duties vis-à-vis his employer.’91  If an employee has an office, the effective centre 
of his working activities will rarely be somewhere else.  The existence of an office in a 
country therefore creates a strong presumption that the habitual place of work is in that 
country.
92
  This presumption is rebuttable only in exceptional cases where other relevant 
factors (the subject matter of the dispute; the amount, value, nature and importance of 
work performed in another country; the employee’s domicile or residence in another 
country etc.) establish a particularly strong connection with the courts of another 
country. 
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Weber
93
 concerned an employee who did not have an office that could constitute 
the effective centre of his working activities.  Mr Weber, a German national domiciled 
in Germany, was employed by Universal Ogden Services, a Scottish company, as a 
cook.  He performed his work on board various vessels and sea installations, initially in 
the Netherlands, thereafter in Denmark.  The CJEU held that, in this situation, which 
involved a change of the place of work, the habitual place of work ‘is, in principle, the 
place where [the employee] spends most of his working time’; this place is to be 
determined by looking at the whole period of employment.
94
  Since Mr Weber spent the 
majority of his working time in the Netherlands, Dutch courts had jurisdiction. 
The CJEU acknowledged that the sole application of the quantitative, temporal 
criterion in this type of case might point to a court that did not have a particularly close 
connection with the dispute.  That is why it stated that the place where the majority of 
work was performed was ‘in principle’ the habitual place of work.95  All the 
circumstances of the case should be taken into account to ascertain whether there is 
another place with a stronger connection.
96
  In particular, the intention of the parties 
should be considered.  The fact that the parties intended to shift the place of work 
permanently from one place to another might indicate that the former had ceased, and 
the latter had become, the habitual place of work, irrespective of the fact that overall the 
majority of work had been performed in the former place.
97
 
The importance of the intention of the parties should, however, not be limited to 
the Weber type of case.  It is potentially relevant whenever an employee (irrespective of 
whether his work is performed from an office or not) is sent abroad by his employer, 
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either to an employer’s foreign place of business, branch, subsidiary or affiliate, or to 
another company under a cooperation agreement or a contract of ‘hiring-out’ of 
workers.  The fact that the parties intend the sending to be temporary (i.e. limited to the 
completion of a certain task or to a certain period of time) supports the conclusion that 
there is no change of the habitual place of work.  The fact that the parties intend the 
sending to be permanent supports a different conclusion.
98
 
In Pugliese,
99
 the CJEU addressed a related question of whether the habitual 
place of work under an employment contract with employer B from one country (in this 
case Germany) was relevant in a dispute arising under an employment contract with 
employer A from another country (in this case Italy), where employers A and B were 
related through membership in the same corporate group, and the employment with 
employer A was suspended owing to the employee’s transfer to employer B.  The Court 
held that the habitual place of work under the second employment contract was relevant 
provided that employer A had an interest in the employee’s work for employer B in a 
place decided on by the latter.
100
  The existence of that interest must be determined in an 
overall manner taking into consideration all the facts of the case, and in particular: the 
fact that the conclusion of the second contract was envisaged when the first was being 
concluded; the fact that the first contract was amended on account of the conclusion of 
the second contract; the fact that there is an organisational or economic link between the 
two employers; the fact that there is an agreement between the two employers providing 
a framework for the coexistence of the two contracts; the fact that the first employer 
                                                 
98
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retains management powers in respect of the employee; the fact that the first employer 
is able to decide the duration of the employee’s work for the second employer.101 
In conclusion, the CJEU has interpreted the term ‘habitual place of work’ 
narrowly in certain respects but widely in others.  The term is given a narrow 
interpretation in the sense that there cannot be more than one habitual place of work.  
This is considered necessary for avoiding the multiplication of competent courts.
102
  The 
term ‘habitual place of work’ is thus effectively equated to ‘principal place of 
employment’.  The term is interpreted widely in that the determination of the habitual 
place of work is essentially a search for the place that is most closely connected with the 
employment dispute.
103
  The ‘office’ and ‘time’ factors create presumptions that the 
habitual place of work is the place where the office is located or, if none, where the 
employee spends most of his working time.  If another place of work is, in light of all 
relevant objective and subjective factors, more closely connected, the presumption will 
be rebutted in favour of that place.
104
  The following text compares the rule of the 
habitual place of work with the rule concerning services contracts. 
 
 
3.2.2. Place of provision of services 
Art.5(1)(a) Brussels I lays down the general rule of jurisdiction in contractual matters.  
In matters relating to a contract, the courts for the place of performance of the obligation 
in question shall have jurisdiction.  The ‘obligation in question’ is the obligation 
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forming the basis of the claim;
105
 the ‘place of performance’ is determined by reference 
to the law applicable under the choice-of-law rules of the forum.
106
   
With regard to services contracts, the second indent of Art.5(1)(b) contains an 
exception to the general rule.  It prescribes that ‘unless otherwise agreed, the place of 
performance of the obligation in question shall be...the place in a Member State where, 
under the contract, the services were provided or should have been provided’.  
Therefore, even if the claim under a services contract concerns non-payment, the 
jurisdictionally relevant obligation is ordinarily the obligation to provide services.  
Furthermore, the place of provision of services is ordinarily defined autonomously, and 
is determined by reference to provisions of the contract and the facts of the case, not the 
applicable law.
107
  In this respect, the rule concerning services contracts largely 
corresponds to the primary rule of jurisdiction in employment matters.  However, there 
are significant differences between the two rules. 
First, the jurisdictionally relevant obligation regarding employment contracts is 
always the obligation to perform work, and the term ‘habitual place of work’ is always 
defined autonomously.  In contrast, the parties to a services contract may agree that the 
exception contained in the second indent of Art.5(1)(b) does not apply.  In other words, 
they may agree that the jurisdictionally relevant obligation is the obligation forming the 
basis of the claim, whose place of performance is to be determined by reference to the 
law applicable under the choice-of-law rules of the forum.  This agreement need not 
satisfy the general requirements concerning jurisdiction agreements of Art.23.
108
  Thus, 
if A contracts with B to provide services in one Member State in return for payment in 
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another Member State, the courts of the first Member State shall normally have 
jurisdiction over the whole dispute.  However, if the parties agree that the exception 
contained in the second indent of Art.5(1)(b) does not apply, the courts of the second 
Member State shall have jurisdiction over claims for non-payment pursuant to the 
general rule of Art.5(1)(a).  In contrast, the rule of the habitual place of work does not 
enable an employee to sue his employer for non-payment of salary in a Member State 
other than that where the work was habitually performed.  Therefore, the primary rule of 
jurisdiction in employment matters is narrower in this respect than the rule concerning 
services contracts. 
The second difference stems from the fact that the exception contained in the 
second indent of Art.5(1)(b) does not apply where the services were provided or should 
have been provided outside the EU.  In that situation, a ‘place in a Member State 
where...the services were provided or should have been provided’ does not exist, and a 
requirement for the application of the second indent of Art.5(1)(b) is not met.  The 
general rule of Art.5(1)(a) then regains applicability.
109
  Thus, if A contracts with B to 
provide services in a non-EU country in return for payment in a Member State, the 
mentioned exception does not apply.  A may rely on the general rule, and sue B for non-
payment in the Member State where the payment should have been performed.  In 
contrast, if the work under an employment contract is habitually performed outside the 
EU, the rule of the habitual place of work does not enable an employee to sue his 
employer for unpaid salary in the Member State where the salary should have been paid.  
This is another situation where the primary rule of jurisdiction in employment matters is 
narrower than the rule concerning services contracts. 
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With regard to the determination of the place of provision of services for the 
purposes of the second indent of Art.5(1)(b), there is no problem if the services were 
provided or should have been provided in one place.  The courts for that place shall 
have jurisdiction.  As with employment contracts, the problem arises where the services 
were provided or should have been provided in more than one place.  The CJEU dealt 
with it in Rehder
110
 and Wood Floor.
111
 
Those two cases concerned the determination of the place of provision of 
services where there were several places of performance in different Member States.  
The CJEU held that, in such cases, it was necessary to identify the court with the closest 
connection with the dispute, which it said was the court for ‘the place where, pursuant 
to [the] contract, the main provision of services is to be carried out’.112  Thus, with 
regard to commercial agency contracts, the relevant place is determined first by 
reference to the provisions of the contract.
113
  In the words of the CJEU, the search is 
for ‘the place where the agent was to carry out his work on behalf of the principal, 
consisting in particular in preparing, negotiating and, where appropriate, concluding the 
transactions for which he has authority’.114  A commercial agent normally performs 
these activities in his office.  If the contract does not enable the determination of the 
place of the main provision of services (e.g. because several places or none were 
specified), and if the agent has already provided services in accordance with the 
contract, account should be taken of the place where the agent has in fact for the most 
part carried out his activities in performance of the contract.
115
  The relevant factors, 
such as the time spent and the importance of the activities carried out in various places, 
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will also normally point to the agent’s office.  If the two abovementioned criteria are not 
helpful, the place where the agent is domiciled (again ordinarily the place where his 
office is located) will be deemed to be the relevant place.
116
  Sometimes, however, the 
place of the main provision of services cannot be determined.  For example, the relevant 
services in cases concerning passenger air transport are, by their very nature, performed 
in an indivisible and identical manner from the place of departure to that of arrival of 
the aircraft.  One place of the main provision of services does not therefore exist.
117
  In 
such cases, jurisdiction is conferred upon the courts for each place of provision of 
services, provided there is a sufficiently close connection between those places and the 
dispute.
118
 
3.2.3. Conclusion 
The criteria for determining the habitual place of work and the place of provision of 
services for the purposes of the jurisdictional rules of Brussels I are inherently the same.  
The habitual place of work is interpreted as the principal place of employment, and the 
place of provision of services as the place of the main provision of services.  In both 
situations, the purpose of determining these places is to confer jurisdiction upon the 
court most closely connected with the dispute.  The fact that the search for the habitual 
place of work is facilitated by the existence of presumptions created by the ‘office’ and 
‘time’ factors reflects the relatively specific nature of the rule of jurisdiction for 
employment contracts.  The more general nature of the rule concerning services 
contracts (which covers a range of widely distinct contracts) does not allow an a priori 
elevation of one or more factors to the status of presumptions.  However, with regard to 
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commercial agency contracts, which are akin to international employment contracts 
entered into by commercial representatives, the location of the agent’s office weighs 
more than other factors.  This supports the conclusion that the criteria for determining 
the two places are inherently the same. 
Therefore, the primary rule of jurisdiction in employment matters and the rule 
concerning services contracts correspond closely.  However, there are three differences 
between the two rules.  First, the relevant obligation for establishing jurisdiction over an 
employment dispute is always the obligation to perform work, and the term ‘habitual 
place of work’ is always defined autonomously.  In contrast, the parties to a services 
contract may agree that the exception contained in the second indent of Art.5(1)(b) does 
not apply.  If so, the general rule of Art.5(1)(a) allows the service provider to bring the 
claim for non-payment in the place where the payment should have been performed.  
Second, the fact that the place of payment of salary is in a Member State is always 
irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes.  In contrast, if the services were provided or 
should have been provided outside the EU, the exception contained in the second indent 
of Art.5(1)(b) does not apply.  If the place of payment happens to be in the EU, the 
general rule of Art.5(1)(a) then allows the service provider to bring the claim for non-
payment at that place.  Third, if the habitual place of work cannot be determined, the 
fall-back rule of the engaging place of business applies.  In contrast, if the place of the 
main provision of services cannot be identified, the service provider can sue the other 
party in the courts for each place of provision of services. 
Do the differences between the two rules result in claimant employees being in a 
better or worse jurisdictional position than claimant service providers?  The first 
difference may open an additional forum to service providers.  However, this depends 
on the agreement of the parties.  Since the parties to an employment contract may also 
118 
 
agree to expand the number of forums available to the employee, the first difference has 
no practical importance apart from the fact that a jurisdiction agreement must satisfy the 
general requirements of Art.23, while an agreement on not applying the exception 
contained in the second indent of Art.5(1)(b) need not.  The second and third differences 
are of practical importance.  They open additional forums to service providers but not to 
employees in comparable situations.  The primary rule of jurisdiction in employment 
matters is therefore slightly less favourable for claimant employees than the generally 
applicable rule concerning services contracts is for claimant service providers.  
3.3. Engaging place of business 
An employee who does not or did not habitually carry out his work in any country may 
sue the employer domiciled in one Member State in another Member State in the courts 
for the place where the business that engaged him is or was situated.
119
  This rule is not 
applicable where there is a habitual place of work outside the EU.
120
  It is also not 
applicable where the whole of the employee’s work is carried out in a single Member 
State, but not habitually in any one place within that Member State.  By analogy with 
Color Drack,
121
 the court for each place of work seems to have jurisdiction over the 
whole employment dispute in that situation. 
The recent CJEU judgment in Voogsgeerd
122
 sheds light on the meaning of the 
concept of the engaging place of business.  Although this decision concerned the 
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interpretation of Art.6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention, it is nevertheless relevant for the 
present discussion, since the concepts used in European PIL instruments should be 
interpreted consistently.  ‘Place of business’ refers not only to the employer’s domicile 
but also to any establishment, regardless of whether it possesses legal personality, over 
which the employer exercises effective control so that its actions are attributable to the 
employer, which possesses a sufficient degree of permanence, and which has been set 
up in accordance with the relevant provisions of the country in which it has been 
established.
123
  Some authors argue that ‘place of business’ also refers to independent 
employment agencies.
124
  But the fact that jurisdiction is given to the courts for both the 
place where the engaging place of business is located at the moment of commencement 
of proceedings and for the place where it was located at the moment of engagement
125
 
goes against such a broad interpretation.  An employer cannot be exposed to litigation in 
foreign countries just because an employment agency, which might have been used a 
long time ago, is transferred from one Member State to another.  ‘Place of business’ 
therefore seems to encompass the employer’s domicile and ‘branch agency and other 
establishment’ in the meaning of Art.5(5) Brussels I.126  The term ‘engaged’ refers to 
active engagement of employees, manifested by the conclusion and negotiation of the 
employment contract.
127
 
Given that the CJEU has widely interpreted the term ‘habitual place work’, 
equating it to ‘principal place of employment’, there are not many situations where the 
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fall-back rule of the engaging place of business applies.  It is of practical importance 
primarily where the employee’s work is not carried out from an office (e.g. construction 
workers), and the distribution of the working time spent in various countries and the 
parties’ intentions do not establish a habitual place of work.  This rule is also applicable 
where an employee maintains two or more offices of equal importance in different 
countries.  In Portec (UK) v Mogensen,
128
 for example, the employee worked in Paris 
and Ruabon, Wales, maintained offices in both places, and divided his time more or less 
equally between both places (in 1973-74 he worked 83 days inside and 87 days outside 
Britain).  The court held that the employee ordinarily worked, for the purposes of the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, both in Britain and abroad.  Yet another 
example is employees working outside the territory of any country (e.g. Antarctica
129
 or 
oil rigs on the high seas). 
Does the work of international transport workers fall under the rule of the 
engaging place of business?  Two jurisdictional cases involving the work of this kind 
have been referred to the CJEU.  Warbecq
130
 concerned a dispute between an air hostess 
of Belgian nationality and domicile and an Irish airline.  The referring court (the 
Tribunal du travail de Charleroi) wanted to know whether a habitual place of work 
existed where the work was performed partly on the ground and partly on an aircraft 
flying the flag of the employer’s country.  Another case, Haase v Superfast Ferries,131 
concerned a dispute brought by a seaman who worked on a ship used for regular 
passenger services between Germany and Finland.  The referring court (the 
Landesarbeitsgericht Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) wanted to know if a habitual place of 
work existed in such a situation. 
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Since the references in these two cases had not been made by the authorised 
courts, the CJEU had no jurisdiction to render preliminary rulings.
132
  Although the 
employees in these two cases had no offices, they seem to have had effective centres of 
their working activities.  In the first case, this was Charleroi airport, where Ms Warbeck 
performed her ground duties and returned after each flight.  Given that an air crew 
member typically works on aircrafts flying from one airport (i.e. one place of departure) 
to various destinations (i.e. various places of arrival), the essential part of such an 
employee’s working activities is performed at the place of departure.  In the second 
case, the effective centre of the employee’s working activities was arguably the place in 
Germany from which the ferry was departing to Finland and to which the employee 
returned after each trip.  Admittedly, the employee in Haase v Superfast Ferries worked 
on a ship connecting only two places in two different countries, and it cannot be said 
that the provision of services in one of those places was more important.  However, the 
facts that the employee’s activities were directed from the place in Germany, that the 
employee had his domicile there and that the ship seems to have had its home port there, 
point to that place as the effective centre of the employee’s working activities.  As 
discussed in more detail in Chapter VI, the CJEU has adopted, in the context of 
Art.6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention, a wide interpretation of the term ‘habitual place of 
work’ in disputes involving an international driver and a seaman.133  The practical 
relevance of the rule of the engaging place of business is therefore limited to cases 
where the connection between the international transport worker’s work and his base are 
very weak (e.g. some globetrotting seamen). 
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The CJEU has interpreted the term ‘habitual place of work’ widely, and thereby 
marginalised the rule of the engaging place of business, because this rule does not meet 
the objectives of proximity and employee protection.  First, there is no guarantee that 
the courts of the engaging place of business will have a sufficiently close connection 
with the dispute.  Suppose an English company were to use its Belgian business to 
engage European employees for work on a cruise ship.  If a dispute arises some time 
after the engagement, the likelihood that Belgian courts would have a sufficiently close 
connection with the dispute would be low, particularly if the employee had no other 
connection with Belgium.  The likelihood would be even lower if the business that 
engaged the employee were transferred from one country to another (e.g. from Belgium 
to France).  The employee might then commence proceedings either at the place where 
the business that engaged him was situated at the moment of engagement (Belgium) or 
at the place where it was situated at the moment of commencement of proceedings 
(France).  The courts for neither place would be particularly likely to have a sufficiently 
close connection with the dispute.
134
  Second, the engaging place of business is 
ordinarily determined unilaterally by the employer and usually corresponds with the 
employer’s domicile.  That is why this rule is not in employees’ interests. 
In conclusion, by interpreting widely the term ‘habitual place of work’, the 
CJEU reduced the application of the rule of the engaging place of business to a few 
situations of relatively marginal importance.  Even when it is applicable, this rule results 
in the concentration of the entire employment dispute in the courts of the engaging place 
of business.
135
  This is clearly less favourable for employees’ interests than the 
multiplication of competent courts to which the rule concerning services contracts leads 
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in comparable situations (i.e. where the place of the main provision of services does not 
exist). 
3.4. Branches, agencies and other establishments 
An employee may sue an employer domiciled in one Member State, regarding a dispute 
arising out of the operations of that employer’s ancillary establishment, in another 
Member State in the courts for the place where that establishment is situated.
136
  
Claimant employees are in the same position as other claimants in this regard since this 
jurisdictional basis is equally available to both categories. 
The requirement that the dispute must arise out of the operations of an ancillary 
establishment is discussed here in more detail.
137
  Initially, the CJEU interpreted this 
requirement rather strictly.  It held that the concept of ‘operations’ comprised three 
types of actions: 1) actions concerning the management of the ancillary establishment 
‘such as...the local engagement of staff to work [at the place where the establishment 
was situated];’ 2) actions relating to contractual obligations entered into in the name of 
the parent at the place, and to be performed in the country, where the establishment was 
situated; and 3) actions relating to non-contractual obligations arising out of the local 
activities of the ancillary establishment.
138
  It is remarkable that the courts for the place 
where the ancillary establishment was situated would have had jurisdiction in these 
three situations on other bases as well.
139
  It is therefore not surprising that the CJEU 
has subsequently given a wider interpretation to this requirement.  With regard to the 
second type of action, the Court held in Lloyd’s Register of Shipping v Société 
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Campenon Bernard
140
 that it was not necessary for the contractual obligations entered 
into by the ancillary establishment to be performed in the Member State where the 
establishment was situated.  In order for a contractual claim to be regarded as arising out 
of the operations of the ancillary establishment, it is enough that the contract was either 
concluded or negotiated
141
 through that establishment. 
Such a wide interpretation means that, whenever an employer’s ancillary 
establishment concludes or negotiates an employment contract on behalf of its parent, 
the employee may sue the employer under the contract in the courts for the place where 
that establishment is located, regardless of where the work is in fact performed.  This 
also means that the rule of jurisdiction over defendants dealing through branches, 
agencies or other establishment covers almost all situations where the rule of the 
engaging place of business is applicable.  The difference between the two rules is that 
the former is always applicable, whereas the latter is applicable only if there is no 
habitual place of work.  The rule of the engaging place of business is therefore of 
practical importance only in rare situations where the business that engaged the 
employee is transferred from one place to another after the engagement.  The employee 
may sue his employer at either place under the rule of the engaging place of business.  
An equivalent option does not exist under Arts.2 and 5(5).
142
 
3.5. Other jurisdictional bases 
The CJEU has held that claimant employees cannot invoke the basis of jurisdiction over 
co-defendants (Art.6(1)), which basis is generally available to other claimants.
143
  The 
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reasoning of the CJEU extends to other bases that are neither contained in Section 5 of 
Chapter II nor referred to therein.  The only exception is submission to jurisdiction by 
entering an appearance.
144
  Special jurisdictional rules therefore put claimant employees 
in a less favourable position in this respect.  
3.6. Jurisdiction agreements 
Claimant employees are given a significant jurisdictional preference regarding 
jurisdiction agreements.  A jurisdiction agreement is given effect in an employment 
dispute either if it is entered into after the dispute has arisen or if it allows the employee 
to bring proceedings in the courts other than those indicated by the default jurisdictional 
rules, provided that the general requirements of Art.23 are also satisfied.
145
  Suppose an 
employee habitually works in England for a French company.  If the parties agree ex 
ante on the jurisdiction of Belgian courts, such an agreement will be effective only if 
the employee invokes it.  Any provision of national law that aims to make such an 
agreement void
146
 does not apply.
147
  In contrast, in disputes not involving a weaker 
contractual party, jurisdiction agreements are given full effect provided they satisfy the 
requirements of Art.23.   
3.7. Conclusion 
In certain respects, the rules of jurisdiction in employment matters of Brussels I give 
claimant employees a jurisdictional preference.  Most notably, jurisdiction agreements 
are given effect against employees under very strict conditions.  This guarantees that 
employers will be unable to (ab)use their typically superior position and reduce the 
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number of forums available to employees.  This is undoubtedly a very important aspect 
of jurisdictional protection. 
However, the crucial aspect of protection is the existence of the relatively 
numerous and diverse jurisdictional bases that claimant employees can invoke.  Only 
thereby are the chances of employees pursuing their claims in favourable forums 
increased and safeguarded.  Brussels I fails in this respect.  First, the rule of general 
jurisdiction and the primary rule of jurisdiction in employment matters are somewhat 
less favourable for employees than the generally applicable rule of general jurisdiction 
and the rule concerning services contracts.  Second, the fall-back rule of the engaging 
place of business does not meet the objectives of proximity and jurisdictionally 
favouring employees and is, furthermore, deprived of almost any practical importance.  
Third, the generally available jurisdictional bases that are neither contained in Section 5 
of Chapter II nor referred to therein are not available to claimant employees.  The 
examination of the rules of jurisdiction in employment matters therefore reveals that 
claimant employees are overall not given a jurisdictional preference.  In many respects 
they are even put in a less favourable position than other claimants.  Given the 
theoretical and practical importance of according a balanced jurisdictional preference to 
claimant employees, Brussels I fails to achieve the objective of employee protection. 
4. How to achieve employee protection? 
The reason for the current structure and content of the rules of jurisdiction in 
employment matters of Brussels I lies in their haphazard evolution.  If this instrument is 
to achieve the objective of employee protection, the existing rules need to be amended 
in a more systematic manner.  The first part of this section explores the ways of 
127 
 
improving the existing rules.  The second part examines the possibility of introducing 
new rules. 
4.1. Improving the existing rules 
The shortcoming of the rule of general jurisdiction is that the rule extending the notion 
of the employer’s domicile often disfavours claimant employees.  Admittedly, this rule 
does guarantee that employees will be able to sue non-EU employers with European 
ancillary establishments, regarding disputes arising out of the operations of those 
establishments, in at least one Member State.  However, this rule also shields such non-
EU employers from the Member States’ traditional, often excessive, jurisdictional rules.  
There is no reason why this kind of jurisdictional protection should be accorded to non-
EU employers with EU ancillary establishments.  Rather, such non-EU employers 
should be treated as all other non-EU defendants, and be amenable to suit in Member 
State courts pursuant to the traditional rules.  Art.18(2) Brussels I should therefore be 
amended by inserting a provision explicitly stating that the rule extending the notion of 
the employer’s domicile applies without prejudice to Art.4.  The European 
Commission, however, proposed to abolish the traditional rules through the extension of 
the scope of the existing jurisdictional rules of Brussels I to third states’ 
domiciliaries.
148
 
The primary rule of jurisdiction in employment matters (conferring jurisdiction 
upon the courts for the habitual place of work) could be amended to reflect the fact that 
the CJEU has effectively equated the term ‘habitual place of work’ with ‘principal place 
of employment’.  The CJEU’s interpretation has already been implemented in Rome 
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I.
149
  Art.8(2) Rome I, dealing with the applicable law for employment contracts in the 
absence of choice, refers to the ‘country in which or, failing that, from which the 
employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract.’150  Arguably, 
the essence of the CJEU’s interpretation would have been better expressed if the 
reference to the place ‘in which or from which the employee principally carries out his 
work’ had been made instead.  Nevertheless, to achieve the desirable convergence 
between the two instruments, it is better to amend Art.19(2)(a) Brussels I along the lines 
of Art.8(2) Rome I.  Indeed, the European Commission has proposed the following 
wording for the recast Brussels I: ‘an employer may be sued...in the courts for the place 
where or from where the employee habitually carries out his work or in the courts for 
the last place where he did so’151 
As discussed, there are two differences between the primary rule of jurisdiction 
in employment matters and the rule concerning services contracts, which result in a 
somewhat less favourable position of claimant employees in comparison to other 
claimants.  The first difference stems from the fact that the obligation of payment of 
salary is always irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes.  In contrast, where the place of 
provision of services is outside the EU, the obligation to pay remuneration in a Member 
State represents a jurisdictional basis of that Member State’s courts over the claim for 
non-payment.  Should the rules of jurisdiction in employment matters be amended to 
enable claimant employees to bring claims for non-payment of salary in the courts for 
the place of payment if the habitual place of work is outside the EU?
152
  Although such 
a rule would contribute to equating the jurisdictional position of claimant employees 
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and other claimants, the answer must be negative.  Such a rule would not accord with 
the considerations of proportionality and vindication of legitimate state interests.  The 
chances of the place of payment of salary being sufficiently closely connected with the 
dispute and the law of that place being applicable where there is a habitual place of 
work in another country are low.  Moreover, this rule would not be particularly 
protective of employees’ interests.  An employer might unilaterally determine the place 
of payment of salary and thereby seek the benefit of litigating in a favourable forum. 
The second difference is that, absent a habitual place of work, an employee can 
commence proceedings only in the courts of the engaging place of business.  In a 
comparable situation, a service provider can sue the other party in the courts for each 
place of provision of services.  In order to equate the position of claimant employees 
and other claimants in this respect, the forum of the engaging place of business should 
be abolished.  If this were done, an employee who does not habitually perform his work 
in any country should be able to commence proceedings in the courts for each place of 
work, provided there is a sufficiently close connection between those places and the 
dispute.  Thus, if there is no habitual place of work because two or more places of work 
are equally important, the employee should be able to commence proceedings in each of 
those places.
153
  However, if the habitual place of work does not exist because no place 
of work is sufficiently closely connected with the dispute, the employee should not be 
able to commence proceedings in any place of work. 
There are further reasons for abandoning the rule of the engaging place of 
business.  The CJEU has deprived this rule of almost any practical importance by 
widely interpreting the term ‘habitual place of work’ and giving a broad scope to the 
rule of jurisdiction over defendants dealing through branches, agencies and other 
establishments.  Moreover, the rule of the engaging place of business does not accord 
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with the consideration of proportionality and jurisdictionally preferring employees.  The 
chances of this place being sufficiently closely connected with the employment dispute 
are low; moreover it is a place that is determined unilaterally by the employer.  It is for 
these reasons that the Netherlands and Belgium, which have otherwise implemented the 
solutions of Brussels I in their national jurisdictional codes, have decided not to 
introduce the rule of the engaging place of business.
154
 
Seemingly, this rule accords better with the consideration of vindication of 
legitimate state interests.  Rome I prescribes that, absent a habitual place of work, the 
employment contract is governed by the law of the country where the place of business 
through which the employee was engaged is situated.
155
  However, there are many 
situations where there is no habitual place of work and the forum and ius do not 
coincide.  First, if the engaging business is transferred from one place to another after 
the engagement, the employee may commence proceedings in the courts for either 
place.  In contrast, only the latter place seems relevant for choice-of-law purposes.
156
  
Second, the rule of Rome I that points to the law of the country of the engaging place of 
business can be departed from whenever it appears from the circumstances as a whole 
that the employment contract is more closely connected with another country.
157
  Since 
there are no guarantees that the country of the engaging place of business will be 
sufficiently closely connected with the employment contract, the chances of departure 
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from the rule are relatively high.  Third, the parties to an employment contract may, 
under certain restriction, choose the applicable law.
158
 
Finally, some of the jurisdictional bases that are neither contained in Section 5 
of Chapter II nor referred to therein should be made available to claimant employees.  
This applies primarily to the rule of jurisdiction over co-defendants.  Indeed, the 
European Commission has proposed making this jurisdictional rule available to 
claimant employees.
159
  Furthermore, with regard to submission to jurisdiction, the 
Commission has proposed a rule that would oblige the court seized with a dispute 
involving a weaker party to ensure that the defendant is given information concerning 
his right to contest the jurisdiction of the court and the consequences of entering an 
appearance.
160
 
If the changes proposed here were adopted, the rules of jurisdiction in 
employment matters would cease to be less favourable for claimant employees than the 
general rules.  However, they would not thereby become more favourable.  The 
following part of this section explores the possibility of introducing additional 
jurisdictional bases. 
4.2. Introducing new rules 
As discussed in section 4 of Chapter II, many countries have special rules of jurisdiction 
for employment disputes.  Jurisdiction is asserted on various bases such as the location 
of the habitual place of work, the engaging place of business, the place of conclusion of 
the contract, the place of payment of salary, common nationality of the parties, and the 
employee’s domicile or habitual residence.  It was argued that most of these bases do 
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not accord with the considerations of proportionality, vindication of legitimate state 
interests and jurisdictionally preferring employees.  It was also noted that there seems to 
be one situation where the connecting factor of the employee’s domicile or habitual 
residence accords with the mentioned considerations.  This situation exists when an 
employer actively seeks out an employee in the latter’s home country for work abroad, 
and the parties foresee that the employee will retain strong connection with his home 
country and return there after the termination of employment. 
A rule that confers jurisdiction upon the courts of the employee’s domicile 
where the employer takes the initiative to recruit the employee away from his home 
state is applied in the US,
161
 but it is only active seeking out of employees that meets the 
requirements of the ‘minimum contacts’ doctrine and the ‘purposeful availment’ test.  
The US case-law shows that these tests are satisfied, for example, where the employer 
advertises in local newspapers and contacts employees locally (either directly or 
through an agent),
162
 uses a local employment agency,
163
 actively recruits employees 
locally for work abroad
164
 and so forth.  Mere hiring of a national employment agency 
is not enough.
165
  Jurisdiction is also not allowed where it is the employee who initiates 
contact.
166
 
Introducing a jurisdictional rule of this kind in Brussels I appears consistent with 
the spirit of that instrument.  The rationale of the ‘seeking out’ rule is the existence of a 
sufficiently strong connection between the defendant and the forum, which rationale 
also underlies some of the existing rules such as the rule of general jurisdiction of 
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Art.2(1) and the rule of special jurisdiction of Art.5(5).  Admittedly, the link between 
the defendant and the forum under the proposed ‘seeking out’ rule would usually not be 
as strong as under the mentioned rules of Brussels I.  Nevertheless, the objective of 
employee protection justifies the introduction of such a rule.  A parallel can be made 
with consumer contracts.  The consumer’s domicile represents a relevant connecting 
factor whenever the supplier seeks out the consumer in his home country.
167
  The 
proposed ‘seeking out’ rule for employment disputes is essentially based on the same 
idea. 
If this new jurisdictional rule and the changes proposed in the first part of this 
section were introduced, employees would arguably be accorded a disproportionate 
jurisdictional preference.  In order to avoid tilting the jurisdictional scale excessively in 
employees’ favour, an additional jurisdictional basis could also be made available to 
claimant employers.  Claimant employers could be restored the right to initiate 
proceedings in the courts for the habitual place of work.
168
  Several arguments support 
this proposition. 
First, habitual place of work is a jurisdictional basis that best satisfies the 
considerations of proportionality and vindication of legitimate state interests.  The court 
for this place is usually the proper forum for resolving an employment dispute.  
Moreover, this basis does not favour either party a priori, as the habitual place of work 
can be in the employee’s or the employer’s country, or in a third country.  What is 
important is that the employer cannot unilaterally change the habitual place of work and 
thereby obtain the benefit of litigating in a favourable forum.  As discussed, there must 
be a combination of objective and subjective factors on both the employee’s and 
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employer’s side in order for the change of this place to occur.  Second, both the 
Brussels and 1988 Lugano Conventions enabled employers to commence proceedings 
in the courts for the habitual place of work.  There is no empirical evidence that this rule 
had the effect of putting defendant employees in an unfavourable position.
169
  Third, 
denying claimant employers access to the courts for the habitual place of work has led 
to practical problems in some Member States.  In the Netherlands, for example, 
employers who wish to terminate an employment contract have the option to petition for 
judicial rescission instead of dismissal.  In some cases, judicial rescission is 
mandatory.
170
  Employers from such Member States therefore have considerable 
practical problems with terminating employment contracts with employees who work in 
such a Member State but live elsewhere (e.g. frontier workers).  A way of ensuring that 
the mentioned concerns are accommodated and that defendant employees are given a 
jurisdictional preference could be to give employers a limited right to commence 
proceedings in the forum of the habitual place of work only during the employment 
relationship, not once it has come to an end.  Such a rule, for example, was envisaged in 
Art.8(2)(ii) of the 2000 preliminary draft Hague Convention on jurisdiction and foreign 
judgments in civil and commercial matters
 171
 
In particular, the possibility of introducing new jurisdictional rules should be 
examined in the context of the forthcoming review of Brussels I.  The European 
Commission has proposed to change this instrument radically by expanding the scope of 
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its jurisdictional rules to persons not domiciled in the EU.
172
  But a simple extension of 
the existing rules to claims against third states’ domiciliaries would not be adequate 
from the standpoint of employee protection.  Admittedly, the position of employees 
who habitually work for foreign companies within the EU would be improved.  These 
employees would be guaranteed the right to initiate proceedings in at least one Member 
State.
173
  However, the position of claimant employees who habitually work for foreign 
companies outside the EU would be considerably worsened, since those employees 
would lose the right to invoke the traditional, often excessive, jurisdictional rules.  
Consequently, they could not normally commence proceedings in the EU since the 
relevant connecting factors (employer’s domicile and habitual place of work) would be 
located outside the EU.  Furthermore, the simple extension of the existing rules could 
put EU employers in an unfavourable position whenever their employees move out of 
the EU after the termination of employment.  In this situation, such employers might not 
be able to bring proceedings anywhere in the EU.  These considerations therefore 
support the introduction of the two additional jurisdictional rules (the ‘seeking out’ rule 
for claimant employees and the rule of the habitual place of work for claimant 
employers) proposed above. 
Conclusions 
The objective of protecting employees by jurisdictional rules cannot be achieved unless 
employees are accorded a balanced jurisdictional preference when they act both as 
claimants and as defendants.  Indisputably, Brussels I protects defendant employees 
since it denies employers the use of most of the generally available jurisdictional bases.  
However, not only does Brussels I fail to accord a jurisdictional preference to claimant 
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employees, it actually puts them in a less favourable position in comparison to other 
claimants.  First, the rule of general jurisdiction in employment matters and the rule of 
the habitual place of work are somewhat less favourable for employees than the 
corresponding generally applicable rules of general jurisdiction and the rule concerning 
services contracts.  Second, the rule of the engaging place of business is deprived of 
almost any practical importance.  Third, the generally available jurisdictional bases that 
are neither contained in Section 5 of Chapter II nor referred to therein, particularly the 
rule of jurisdiction over co-defendants, are not available to claimant employees.  Given 
the theoretical and practical importance of according a balanced jurisdictional 
preference to claimant employees, Brussels I overall fails to achieve the objective of 
employee protection.  The reason for this lies in the haphazard evolution of the relevant 
rules. 
Bearing in mind the forthcoming review of Brussels I, the time is ripe for a 
systematic reassessment of the rules of jurisdiction in employment matters.  The 
existing rules need to be improved.  However, merely amending them will not suffice.  
Additional jurisdictional rules could be introduced: one in favour of claimant employees 
(the ‘seeking out’ rule), the other in favour of claimant employers (the rule of the 
habitual place of work).  These changes would contribute to more evenly balanced 
protection of employees by jurisdictional rules and enable European PIL to adequately 
perform its regulatory function, one of allocating and protecting adjudicatory authority 
of states in the field of labour law. 
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V CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS 
 
‘Employment is a complex and sui 
generis relationship, contractual in origin 
but, once created, having elements of 
status and capable of having consecutive 
or simultaneous points of contact with 
different jurisdictions.’ 
LORD HOFFMANN
1
 
 
Finding a competent court is a halfway stop to resolving an international employment 
dispute.  Another problem is the applicable law.  As mentioned, employment claims in 
English law fall into three basic categories: contractual, statutory and tortious claims.  A 
contractual claim is based on a breach of either an express or implied term of an 
employment contract (e.g. claims for unpaid wages, for breach of a restrictive covenant 
or of implied duty of mutual trust and confidence).  The law applicable to contractual 
claims, which for example determines whether an express term is valid or whether a 
particular term is to be implied into the contract, has always been determined pursuant 
to choice-of-law rules for contract.  Such rules are today contained in Rome I. 
 In a nutshell, Rome I allows the parties to an employment contract to choose the 
applicable law.
2
  But the choice cannot deprive the employee of the protection afforded 
to him by mandatory provisions of the objectively applicable law.
3
  In the absence of 
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3
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choice, the contract is governed by the law of the country of the habitual place of work
4
 
or, if none, by the law of the country of the engaging place of business.
5
  However, 
where it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely 
connected with another country, that country’s law applies.6  There are also special 
choice-of-law rules for formal validity of contracts,
7
 whereas the law applicable to legal 
capacity is determined pursuant to national choice-of-law rules.
8
  Furthermore, the 
courts are allowed to apply overriding mandatory provisions of the forum and, under 
certain conditions, even overriding mandatory provisions of the country of 
performance.
9
 
Section 3 of Chapter II examined the theory underlying the European choice-of-
law rules for employment contracts.  At first sight, those rules seem to accord with the 
relevant considerations.  In particular, the parties are free to agree on any law, but only 
to the extent that the agreement improves upon the mandatory minimum standard of 
protection set by the objectively applicable law.  The rules for determining the 
objectively applicable law seem flexible enough to point to the law of a country that is 
both sufficiently closely connected with a particular employment contract and 
legitimately interested in regulating it, and whose application the parties can reasonably 
foresee.  Rome I is of universal application in the sense that the country of the 
applicable law need not be a Member State.
10
  This shows that Rome I is concerned not 
just with the Member States’ regulatory authority in the field of labour law.  But since 
the majority of international employment disputes brought in Member State courts 
involve intra-EU employment relations, Rome I is performing its regulatory function 
first and foremost in the EU context.  Given that the rules of Rome I accord with the 
                                                 
4
 Art.8(2). 
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relevant considerations, this instrument seems, at first sight, to be adequately 
performing its regulatory function.  To determine whether practice conforms to theory, 
this chapter examines in detail the operation of the rules of Rome I. 
The first section presents the evolution of the European choice-of-law rules for 
employment contracts.  The following two sections examine party autonomy and its 
limitations, and the rules for determining the objectively applicable law, respectively.  
After identifying the shortcomings of those rules, possibilities for improvement are 
discussed. 
1. Evolution of choice-of-law rules 
The evolution began in 1972 with the publication of the draft Convention on the law 
applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations.  Art.2(3) provided that, in 
labour relations, the choice of law could not affect mandatory provisions for the 
protection of the worker in force in the country where he habitually worked.  Art.5 
prescribed that, in the absence of choice, labour contracts were governed by the law of 
the country of the habitual place of work.  If none, the law of the country of the place of 
business that hired the worker applied, unless it resulted from all the circumstances that 
the contract was more closely connected with another country.  The 1972 draft 
Convention was revised following the 1973 enlargement of the EEC.  The choice-of-
law rules for employment contracts remained essentially unchanged and were 
consolidated in Art.6 of the 1980 Rome Convention. 
Simultaneously with the drafting of what eventually became the Rome 
Convention, the European Commission was working on an instrument dealing 
exclusively with PIL of employment.  This work resulted in the 1972 and 1976 drafts of 
the Regulation on the provisions of conflict of laws on employment relationships within 
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the Community.  The primary legal basis for this instrument was Art.49 TEC 
concerning the freedom of movement of workers.  The territorial scope of the 1976 draft 
Regulation was limited to employment relationships executed in the EEC.
11
  The 
applicable law was the law of the country of the normal place of work.
12
  For seamen, it 
was the law of the flag;
13
 for international transport workers, it was the law of the 
country where the employing undertaking had its registered office or a branch or 
permanent representation by which they were employed.
14
  There was neither a rule for 
determining the applicable law in the absence of a normal place of work nor an escape 
clause.  Party autonomy was allowed only in the most limited circumstances.  
Employees ‘with special position in the establishment’ or ‘with special nature of their 
work’ were free to agree on the applicable law.15  Party autonomy, limited to several 
listed laws, was also allowed in certain cases of intra-group transfers of employees
16
 and 
in certain cases where a normal place of work did not exist.
17
  But the choice could not 
undermine the law of the place of work in respect of 9 topics set out in Art.8.  
Fortunately, the draft Regulation was withdrawn following the adoption of the Rome 
Convention.  Some aspects of the former instrument, such as the differentiation between 
white-collar and blue-collar workers and the restrictions of party autonomy, were 
criticised in section 2 of Chapter II.  Moreover, the adoption of both the draft 
Regulation and the Rome Convention covering the same subject matter would have 
created not only an unnecessary complication for the users of these instruments but also 
certain anomalies.
18
 
                                                 
11
 Art.1. 
12
 Art.3(1); see also Art.4 concerning temporary sendings. 
13
 Art.3(1). 
14
 ibid. 
15
 Art.7. 
16
 Art.5. 
17
 Art.6. 
18
 B.A. Hepple, ‘Conflict of Laws on Employment Relationships within the EEC’ in K. Lipstein (ed), 
Harmonisation of Private International Law by the EEC (London, 1978) 39, 40-41. 
 141 
Rome I, which largely follows the rules of the Rome Convention concerning 
employment, was adopted in 2009, to whose provisions this chapter now turns. 
2. Party autonomy and its limitations 
This section presents the ways in which party autonomy can be exercised before 
examining its limitations. 
2.1. Choosing the applicable law 
The first sentence of Art.8(1) stipulates that an employment contract is governed by the 
law chosen by the parties in accordance with Art.3.
19
  Art.3, entitled ‘Freedom of 
choice’, has 5 paragraphs.  The following text analyses three paragraphs thereof: para.1 
prescribing that the choice can be either express or tacit, and that the parties may subject 
different parts of their contract to different laws, and paras.3 and 4 prescribing that the 
choice cannot prejudice the application of mandatory provisions of the law of the 
country with which the contract is exclusively objectively connected/of EU law where 
the contract has no foreign/non-EU elements.
20
 
2.1.1. Express choice 
An express choice is usually made at the time of contracting by means of a choice-of-
law clause inserted in the contract.  It can also be made subsequently by means of a 
choice-of-law agreement.  An express choice seldom causes problems, exceptions being 
a meaningless choice, a negative choice and a choice of non-state rules of law. 
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In Shekar v Satyam Computer Services Ltd
21
 the contract provided: 
‘Governing law: The work permit in UK/or any other European country shall be 
governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the country 
you are placed at and at Secunderabad, India.’ 
The Employment Tribunal found this clause too unclear to be given a plain meaning.  It 
was unclear whether it referred to the governing law or to work permits.  The way it 
referred cumulatively to multiple laws was meaningless.  The applicable law was 
determined as if the choice had never been attempted. 
A negative choice is an express exclusion of a specific law.  In Sayers,
22
 for 
instance, the contract provided: 
‘As the company is a Netherlands corporation, and as my employment 
contract...will be wholly performable...outside of United Kingdom...I realise that 
I shall not be covered by virtue of my proposed employment with the company 
by workmen’s compensation insurance or benefits under the law of United 
Kingdom.’ 
The Court of Appeal (SALMON LJ dissenting) held that this clause excluded English law 
in respect of the issue before the court.  A problem arises where the parties attempt to 
exclude the objectively applicable law.  If the parties do not simultaneously agree on 
another law, such a negative choice, if upheld, would place the employment contract 
outside the reach of any law.  But since employment contracts cannot exist in a legal 
vacuum, such a negative choice should be disregarded as meaningless.  Even if the 
parties do simultaneously agree on another law, a negative choice purporting to exclude 
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the objectively applicable law should be disregarded, since upholding it would 
undermine the mechanism of Art.8(1). 
Another problem arises where the parties choose non-state rules of law by, for 
example, incorporating by reference certain codes of conduct.  Such rules of law are 
often used by multinational companies to establish minimum labour standards that all 
their businesses worldwide must conform to.  Since employment contracts must have a 
governing national law, non-state rules of law may be given effect only in the context of 
that law.
23
 
2.1.2. Tacit choice 
According to Art.3(1), a tacit choice must be clearly demonstrated by the terms of the 
contract or the circumstances of the case. 
The courts have drawn inferences from the terms of the employment contract in 
the following situations: the contract referred to a specific collective agreement;
24
 the 
contract referred to a specific employment statute;
25
 the contract contained an exclusive 
choice-of-court clause in favour of the courts of a specific country.
26
  However, one 
should bear in mind that Brussels I gives full effect to a jurisdiction agreement in an 
employment dispute only if entered into after the dispute has arisen.  A jurisdiction 
agreement entered into before this moment is therefore unlikely to demonstrate a tacit 
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choice.
27
  Another relevant factor may be a reference to the tax or social security 
legislation of a specific country. 
The courts have also drawn inferences from the circumstances of the case.  For 
example, the existence of a closely connected contract governed by a specific law has 
been held to demonstrate a tacit choice.
28
  French courts have often held that French 
employers and employees who enter into contracts in France tacitly choose French 
law.
29
  The courts also often refer to the place of work, the language of the contract, and 
the place and currency of payment of salary as supplementary indications of a tacit 
choice. 
A tacit choice is a real choice.  The courts should not search for the law that the 
parties would have chosen had they thought about it at the time of contracting.
30
  The 
courts should acknowledge a tacit choice only where its existence is apparent. 
2.1.3. Severance (dépeçage) 
Art.3(1) allows the parties to subject different parts of their contract to different laws.  
Such a choice must be logically consistent, i.e. relate to elements in the contract that can 
be governed by different laws without giving rise to contradictions.
31
  Some authors 
argue that dépeçage of employment contracts should not be allowed because it enables 
employers to abuse their typically superior position and impose the application of 
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different laws in a way most favourable for them.
32
  But the mechanism of Art.8(1) 
provides a solid defence against all abuses of party autonomy.  Indeed, the courts allow 
dépeçage of employment contracts.
33
 
2.1.4. Contracts without foreign or non-EU elements 
Art.3(3) prescribes that, where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of 
the choice are located in a country other than the country of the chosen law, the choice 
cannot prejudice the application of mandatory provisions of the law of the former 
country.  Similarly, Art.3(4) upholds mandatory EU law where the contract, apart from 
the choice of law, has no non-EU elements.  However, Art.3(3) and 3(4) are of little 
importance for employment contracts.  Art.8(1) safeguards the application of mandatory 
provisions of the objectively applicable law.  If a contract has no foreign/non-EU 
elements, the objectively applicable law is the law of the country with which the 
contract is exclusively objectively connected/the law of a Member State that must give 
effect to mandatory EU law.  The effect of Art.8(1) is therefore largely the same as that 
of Art.3(3) and 3(4).  But, as argued in section 2.2.1. below, Art.8(1) only safeguards 
the application of mandatory provisions concerning employee protection.  Since 
Art.3(3) and 3(4) safeguard the application of all mandatory provisions, regardless of 
their objective, there is not a complete overlap between the two Articles. 
In conclusion, employment contracts are identical to other contracts regarding 
the ways in which party autonomy can be exercised.  The following part of this section 
                                                 
32
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examines the limitations of party autonomy, which are the hallmark of the special 
treatment of employment contracts in European PIL. 
2.2. Limitations of party autonomy 
The second sentence of Art.8(1) prescribes that the choice of law cannot deprive the 
employee of the protection afforded to him by mandatory provisions of the objectively 
applicable law.
34
  This rule has given rise to many interpretational difficulties.  What are 
the relevant mandatory provisions?  What are the sources of such provisions?  When do 
such provisions apply?  How should the laws in question be compared?  What is the 
role of the courts? 
2.2.1. Relevant mandatory provisions 
Art.8(1) safeguards the application of ‘provisions that cannot be derogated from by 
agreement’ under the objectively applicable law.  According to Recital 37, ‘provisions 
which cannot be derogated from by agreement’ are distinguishable from the narrower 
category of ‘overriding mandatory provisions’.  Art.8(1) therefore refers to the 
provisions of the objectively applicable law that the parties cannot exclude by 
agreement in purely domestic situations.  Those provisions need not be overridingly 
mandatory in the sense of Art.9. 
Does Art.8(1) refer to all mandatory provisions or only those concerning 
employee protection?
35
  As discussed in section 1.4 of Chapter II, states are willing to 
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uphold foreign employment laws in appropriate circumstances because of the common 
social objective.  Indeed, this is a rationale for the universal application of Art.8 of 
Rome I.  But the objectives of mandatory provisions in other areas of law may be of 
purely political or economic nature.  States are unwilling to routinely uphold such 
foreign mandatory provisions, although they may be willing to do so exceptionally.  
Rome I recognises this in Art.9(3), and allows the courts to give effect, under certain 
conditions, to overriding mandatory provisions of the country of performance.  
Consequently, a wide interpretation of Art.8(1), which would result in safeguarding the 
application of all mandatory provisions of the objectively applicable law, would run 
counter to the scheme and objectives of Rome I. 
Verbal and historic interpretations of Art.8(1) further support this view.  This 
Article states that the choice of law cannot deprive ‘the employee of the protection 
afforded to him’ by mandatory provisions of the objectively applicable law.36  This 
wording suggests that only provisions concerning employee protection are relevant.  
Furthermore, Art.2(3) of the 1972 draft Convention referred explicitly to ‘mandatory 
provisions for the protection of the worker’.  There is no indication in the 
Giuliano/Lagarde Report that the drafters of the Rome Convention intended to change 
this.  In fact, when describing the content of the relevant mandatory provisions, the 
Report refers to provisions concerning employment in the broadest sense: ‘[the relevant 
mandatory provisions] consist not only of provisions relating to the contract of 
employment itself but also provisions such as those concerning industrial safety and 
hygiene...’37 
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Indeed, the High Court held in Duarte v Black & Decker Corp
38
 that ‘the 
mandatory rules referred to in Article 6(1) [of the Rome Convention] are specific 
provisions...whose overriding purpose is to protect employees.’39  English rules on 
restrictive covenants in employment contracts were held not to be such provisions, but 
rather part of the general contract law.  The court further held that if the covenants had 
been valid and enforceable under the foreign governing law, but invalid and 
unenforceable under English law, they would have been denied effect in England as 
being against public policy.  This decision can be criticised on the ground that the 
limitations of restrictive covenants in employment contracts serve a dual purpose, 
protection of competition in the labour market and protection of employees.  If so, there 
is no reason not to regard English rules on restrictive covenants in employment 
contracts as the relevant mandatory provisions in the sense of Art.8(1).
40
  By way of 
comparison, German rules concerning non-compete clauses in employment contracts 
are regarded as such provisions.
41
  Duarte v Black & Decker Corp has also been 
criticised on the ground that English rules on restrictive covenants do not rise to the 
standard of public policy for the purposes of PIL.
42
 
2.2.2. Sources of mandatory provisions 
In most countries, employment statutes are the most important source of the relevant 
mandatory provisions.  But some authors have voiced a concern that certain mandatory 
provisions contained in employment statutes forming part of English law, e.g. in the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, are essentially rules of criminal law and therefore 
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outside the scope of the European choice-of-law instruments for contracts.
43
  They 
further state that, in so far as such provisions may create civil liability, the remedy lies 
in tort and also for this reason outside the scope of those instruments.
44
  Indeed, HSWA 
1974 and certain other employment statutes do prescribe that breach of some of their 
provisions is an offence, and give inspectors or similar bodies the task of monitoring 
and enforcing the relevant provisions.  Furthermore, a breach of statutory duty by the 
employer normally entitles the employee to a remedy in tort in English employment 
law.
45
 
Nevertheless, employment statutes should be regarded as a source of the relevant 
mandatory provisions.  The issue of whether statutory duties imposed by employment 
legislation fall within the scope of Rome I is crucial for the analysis undertaken in the 
following chapter, and is examined there in detail.  Suffice it to say here that mandatory 
provisions of English employment statutes do fall within the scope of, and should 
consequently be upheld under, Art.8(1).  Two further arguments speak in favour thereof.  
First, since in mainland European countries Art.8(1) undoubtedly safeguards the 
application of protective statutory provisions,
46
 the goals of legal certainty, 
predictability and uniform interpretation and application of Rome I require that 
functionally identical English statutory provisions are treated identically.  Second, if 
Art.8(1) did not uphold mandatory provisions of English employment statutes, the 
mechanism of Art.8(1) would be inoperable whenever English law is objectively 
applicable, since other sources of English employment law do not contain mandatory 
provisions.  English courts have no doubts that English employment statutes are a 
                                                 
43
 P.R. Beaumont and P.E. McEleavy, Anton’s Private International Law (Edinburgh, 3nd ed, 2011) 
[10.351]. 
44
 Beaumont and McEleavy ibid; Kaye (n35) 227-228. 
45
 M. Lunney and K. Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (Oxford, 4
th
 ed, 2010) Ch 15. 
46
 In Case C-29/10 Koelzsch [2011] ECR 00000, for example, the CJEU had no doubt that mandatory 
provisions of the German statute concerning dismissal were to be upheld under Art.6(1) of the Rome 
Convention had German law been found to be objectively applicable; see also Giuliano/Lagarde Report 
(n30) 25. 
 150 
source of the relevant mandatory provisions.  For example, in Duarte v Black & Decker 
Corp,
47
 FIELD J referred to the Employment Rights Act 1996 and the Factories Acts 
1961 as statutes containing the relevant mandatory provisions. 
In many countries, collective agreements also contain mandatory provisions.
48
  
In many Member States, an employer who is a party, either directly or indirectly, to a 
collective agreement cannot impose less favourable terms and conditions upon his 
employees than those contained in the collective agreement.  Usually, all employees of 
an employer who is a party to a collective agreement are covered.  Sometimes, only 
members of the trade union that is a party to a collective agreement are covered.  
Moreover, in many countries the state may extend the application of a collective 
agreement to additional employers and their employees, thus giving the collective 
agreement a status akin to legislation.  But in England collective agreements are 
presumed not to be legally enforceable contracts themselves.
49
  But they may be 
incorporated into individual employment contracts if suitable or apt for incorporation, 
either by an express agreement or by inference from the conduct of the parties; 
collective agreements cannot be extended. 
Other sources of employment law are unlikely to contain mandatory provisions.  
For example, the French Cour de cassation has held that customs do not represent 
mandatory provisions in the sense of Art.6(1) of the Rome Convention.
50
  Although an 
a priori exclusion of customs as a potential source of mandatory rules has been 
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criticised,
51
 this decision indicates that customs are unlikely to be of any importance 
under Art.8(1) Rome I. 
2.2.3. Situations where mandatory provisions apply 
Art.8(1) prescribes that the choice of law ‘cannot have the result of depriving’ the 
employee of the protection afforded to him by mandatory provisions of the objectively 
applicable law.  Mandatory provisions of the objectively applicable law should apply if 
they are more favourable for the employee than provisions of the chosen law.  
Conversely, if mandatory provisions of the objectively applicable law are less 
favourable, they should give way to provisions of the chosen law.  For example, if the 
notice period is in issue, whichever law prescribes a longer period should apply.
52
 
It is normally not so easy to determine which law is more favourable for the 
employee.  In the area of dismissal, for example, the two laws may not be in direct 
conflict, but may provide different rights and remedies in the same situation.  MORSE 
gives an example of two laws entitling the employee to different remedies for wrongful 
dismissal: one to compensation, the other to reinstatement.
53
  Art.8(1) says nothing 
about the employee being unable to cumulate benefits under both laws.  Since the 
cumulation of benefits (i.e. both compensation and reinstatement) would be most 
favourable for the employee, should Art.8(1) not entitle him to ‘double protection’?  
The answer must be negative.  If the employee were entitled to benefits under both 
laws, he would receive better protection than either law envisages.  Such an approach 
would expose the employer to excessive legal uncertainty and compliance costs.  There 
is no reason why the employee, just because he is engaged in international employment, 
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should enjoy double protection.  The employee should receive protection under the law 
that is more favourable for him.
54
  The problem of comparing the chosen law and the 
objectively applicable law is therefore central to Art.8(1). 
2.2.4. Comparing the chosen law and the objectively applicable law 
The key question is the level of abstraction at which this comparison should be 
performed.  Should the two laws be compared in general, issue by issue or at some other 
level of abstraction? 
A general comparison is inappropriate.
55
  It is arbitrary, even absurd, to say, for 
instance, that English law is more or less favourable for employees than French law.  
There are surely aspects in which English law is more favourable and vice versa.  
Furthermore, the courts should refrain, out of respect for other countries, from making 
such evaluations.  A general comparison of the Member States’ employment laws seems 
inconceivable for the CJEU. 
An issue-by-issue, analytical comparison also seems inappropriate.
56
  If the 
employee were entitled to the most favourable provisions of either the chosen law or the 
objectively applicable law regarding each and every issue, he might receive better 
protection than either law envisages.  Such an approach would expose the employer to 
excessive legal uncertainty and compliance costs.  There is no reason why the 
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employee, just because he is engaged in international employment, should be so 
favoured.  Moreover, both the chosen law and the objectively applicable law contain 
well-balanced and coherent provisions regarding matters such as dismissal, anti-
discrimination etc.  Allowing the employee to combine provisions of the two laws 
concerning such matters would destroy this balance and coherence.  It could also lead to 
logical inconsistencies. 
The undesirability of the analytical approach is illustrated by the French Cour de 
cassation decision in Mme Briant v Institut culturel autrichien.
57
  Ms Briant was 
employed, under a contract expressly subject to Austrian law, to work in France.  She 
was dismissed and received compensation under Austrian law.  Nevertheless, she 
commenced proceedings in France claiming 1) compensation for breach of the 
provisions of French law obliging the employer to summon the employee to a pre-
dismissal interview and to offer a ‘conversion agreement’ (la convention de conversion) 
in case of dismissal for economic reasons and 2) compensation for unlawful dismissal.  
The outcome depended on whether the provisions of the objectively applicable French 
law applied, which, in turn, depended on whether they were more favourable for the 
employee than the provisions of Austrian law.  The court held that the comparison 
should be made between the provisions of the two laws having the same object or 
relating to the same cause. 
First, the court held that the provisions of French law concerning pre-dismissal 
interview and ‘conversion agreement’ were more favourable for the employee because 
Austrian law contained no equivalent provisions.  Consequently, the employee was 
entitled to compensation for breach of those provisions.  Second, the court quashed the 
judgment of the lower instance court that did not apply the French provisions regarding 
compensation for dismissal without genuine and serious cause.  In the opinion of the 
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court, Austrian law was also less favourable for the employee in this respect because it 
did not contain equivalent provisions.  The provisions of Austrian law regarding 
compensation in lieu of notice and compensation for dismissal were incomparable 
because they dealt with different issues.  Ms Briant therefore had a valid claim under 
both French and Austrian laws.  Such an outcome was clearly excessively unforeseeable 
and costly for the employer. 
The correct approach must lie somewhere between the two extremes.  The 
comparison should be made between provisions relating to severable issues.
58
  In Mme 
Briant v Institut culturel autrichien such an issue would have been protection against 
dismissal.  The court should have compared in their entirety the Austrian and French 
provisions concerning dismissal that were applicable on the facts of the case (i.e. the 
comparison should not be performed in the abstract).  Apparently, Austrian law entitled 
the employee to a notice of dismissal of 5 months and compensation in the amount of 9 
monthly salaries; French law entitled the employee to a pre-dismissal interview, a 
‘conversion agreement’ and compensation in the amount of at least 6 monthly salaries.  
The court should have examined whether the employee would have been better off had 
the employer complied with the French provisions instead with the Austrian ones.
59
  
The employee’s opinion as to which law was more favourable should have been 
regarded as an important consideration.  Had the court found that the employee would 
not have been better off had the French provisions been complied with, it should have 
decided in the employer’s favour.  Conversely, it should have granted the employee the 
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remedies for breach of the relevant French provisions.  The benefits that the employee 
had in fact received would then have to be set-off against the benefits obtainable under 
French law. 
2.2.5. Role of the courts 
Art.8(1) says nothing about the role of the courts concerning the operation of the 
mechanism contained therein.  Do the courts have an active or passive role?  Given the 
regulatory function of Rome I, there is a good argument that the courts should be under 
a duty to determine of their own motion the content of the objectively applicable law, 
especially if it is a law of a Member State.
60
  But the issue of the role of the courts is 
closely related to that of pleading and proof of foreign law.  Being matters of procedure 
and evidence, these issues are currently outside the scope of Rome I.
61
  National 
approaches differ considerably. 
In England, foreign law is treated as a question of fact.  The courts apply foreign 
law only if a party successfully pleads and proves it.
62
 The Art.8(1) mechanism cannot 
operate unless either the chosen law or the objectively applicable law, or both, are 
foreign.  The two laws can be compared only if a party successfully pleads and proves 
the foreign law(s).  It is normally the employee who invokes mandatory provisions of 
the objectively applicable law; the employer normally relies on the chosen law.  If the 
objectively applicable law is foreign, the employee normally has to show that provisions 
of that law are applicable for being more favourable for him than those of the chosen 
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law.
63
  If the objectively applicable law is domestic, then the employer has to show that 
provisions of the chosen foreign law are applicable.
64
  The employee who disagrees has 
to respond to the employer’s pleading and proof of the chosen foreign law and its 
comparison with the domestic objectively applicable law.  Consequently, the operation 
of the Art.8(1) mechanism in both hypotheses largely depends on the employee’s 
awareness of it and his ability to plead and prove foreign law.  This, in turn, may 
depend on his ability to obtain costly legal advice of comparative employment law 
specialists or of employment lawyers from different jurisdictions. 
In France, the courts are not obliged to apply the relevant choice-of-law rules 
and establish the content of the foreign applicable law of their own motion where the 
parties have the free disposition of their rights.
65
  Since employment law is an area of 
law where the parties’ rights are considered to be waivable, at least after the dispute has 
arisen, it is upon the parties to plead and prove foreign law.
66
  In Germany, the courts 
must apply the relevant choice-of-law rule and establish the content of the foreign 
applicable law of their own motion.
67
 
The Art.8(1) mechanism is, at least in theory, more effective in Member States 
such as Germany where the courts have an active role than in Member States such as 
England whose courts are passive.  Since no EU-wide unification of the rules on 
pleading and proof of foreign law is currently in sight, notwithstanding strong 
arguments in favour of such unification, the effectiveness of the mechanism will 
continue to depend upon the differences in national laws.  But there is one, arguably 
uncontroversial, measure that could be implemented.  The court could be obliged, 
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whenever Art.8(1) applies, to ensure that the employee is aware of the existence and the 
operation of the mechanism, i.e. of the consequences of his failing to plead and prove 
foreign law.  Such an obligation would mirror that proposed in Art.24(2) of the proposal 
for the recast Brussels I concerning submission to jurisdiction of weaker parties.
68
  But 
such a provision would not resolve the problem of costs that employees incur in 
operating the Art.8(1) mechanism.  Trade unions could help in this respect. 
2.3. Conclusion 
The parties to an employment contract are indeed free to agree on any law to the extent 
that the agreement improves upon the mandatory minimum standard of protection set by 
the objectively applicable law. 
The Art.8(1) mechanism operates only if the parties choose a different law from 
the objectively applicable law.  Given that such choice-of-law agreements work solely 
in employees’ favour, one might wonder whether and why employers agree to them.  
Employers do agree to such choice-of-law agreements for various reasons.
69
  First, 
some employers are unaware of the existence and operation of the Art.8(1) mechanism 
and, therefore, of the consequences of choosing a law other than the objectively 
applicable law.  Second, international employment contracts frequently commence as 
domestic contracts.  Domestic contracts often contain choice-of-law clauses in favour of 
domestic law, whose purpose is merely declaratory.  Such contracts may be left 
unamended after the change of the objectively applicable law.  Third, in cases of 
permanent sending abroad the parties may choose the law of the country of origin.  
Fourth, employers may agree to choice of law to please their employees who may 
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expect such agreements or to give them an additional incentive.  Finally, employers may 
insert, in their employment contracts, choice-of-law clauses in favour of their own laws 
for psychological reasons.  When a dispute arises, the first thing an employee does is 
read the contract.  The employer may hope that, after the employee has seen a choice-
of-law clause in favour of the employer’s law, he will be discouraged from pursuing his 
claim altogether or at least on the basis of a non-chosen law. 
3. Applicable law in the absence of choice 
The rules of Rome I and Brussels I concerning employment use the same objective 
connecting factors, namely the habitual place of work and the engaging place of 
business.  Should these connecting factors be interpreted identically under the two 
instruments?  The following reasons speak in favour thereof: legal certainty; ease of 
application resulting from the established case-law; achieving coincidence of the forum 
and ius.  Indeed, the CJEU did so in Koelzsch
70
 and Voogsggerd.
71
  However, choice-of-
law rules and jurisdictional rules have different ways of achieving their respective 
objectives.  Whereas the former seek to achieve the objective of employee protection by 
upholding mandatory provisions of the law of the country that is sufficiently closely 
connected with the employment contract in question, legitimately interested in 
regulating it, and whose application the parties can reasonably foresee, the latter seek to 
accord employees a balanced jurisdictional preference.  Consequently, there may be 
situations where the connecting factors may have to be given different interpretation 
under the two instruments.
72
  For example, if the changes proposed in the previous 
chapter were adopted, employees who do not habitually perform their work in any 
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country would be able to commence proceedings in the courts for each place of work 
that has a sufficiently close connection with the dispute.  On the contrary, the rules of 
Rome I would always designate only one objectively applicable law.  The following 
text firstly examines the connecting factors used in Art.8, then the escape clause. 
3.1. Habitual place of work 
Art.8(2) prescribes that the employment contract is objectively governed by the law of 
the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his 
work in performance of the contract.  It further stipulates that the country where the 
work is habitually carried out will not be deemed to have changed if the employee is 
temporarily employed in another country.
73
 
The main problem is the determination of the habitual place of work where the 
employee works in more than one country.  The CJEU addressed this problem, in the 
context of the Brussels regime, in Mulox,
74
 Rutten
75
 and Weber.
76
  The wording 
‘country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his 
work’ in Art.8(2) incorporates this case-law into Rome I.77 
Whereas the examination of the connecting factors in the previous chapter 
focused on the CJEU case-law under the Brussels regime, the following text 
investigates how Art.8(2) applies to some of the factual patterns under which 
international employment relations arise.  It explores the habitual place of work in cases 
of sending abroad, intra-group transfer and ‘international occupations’.  Cases of 
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migrant workers, frontier workers and workers employed by foreign employers are not 
discussed, since such workers typically perform their work in one country and, 
consequently, the problem of determining the habitual place of work usually does not 
arise. 
3.1.1. Sendings abroad 
Employers often send their employees abroad, either temporarily, i.e. for the completion 
of a specific task or for a certain period of time, or permanently.  Employees may be 
posted to an employer’s foreign place of business, branch, subsidiary or affiliate.  
Similarly, employers may send their employees to foreign companies with which they 
have a cooperation agreement, a contract of ‘hiring-out’ of workers or a similar 
arrangement.  The sending may occur under an existing employment contract, which 
may contain a ‘mobility clause’ entitling the employer to send the employee abroad.  
Alternatively, the parties may amend the existing contract or conclude a new contract to 
set out the details of the sending abroad. 
The second sentence of Art.8(2) prescribes that the country where the work is 
habitually carried out will not be deemed to have changed if the employee is 
temporarily employed elsewhere.  Furthermore, the second sentence of Recital 36 states 
that the conclusion of a new employment contract with the original employer should not 
preclude the employee from being regarded as carrying out his work in another country 
temporarily.  The applicable law is therefore stable.  It does not change when the 
employee is temporarily sent abroad.  Four issues arise in this respect.  How to 
distinguish a temporary sending from a permanent one?  If there is a change of the 
habitual place of work, does the law of the country of the new habitual place of work 
also apply to disputes concerning previously performed work?  What about employment 
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beginning or ending with a sending abroad?  What about employees who are frequently 
sent from one country to another? 
There are two possible approaches to the first issue.  First, sendings shorter than 
a certain fixed time period may be regarded as temporary, whereas all other sendings 
may be regarded as permanent.  For example, Art.12(1) of the Regulation 883/2004 on 
the coordination of social security systems
78
 provides that postings of anticipated 
duration of up to 24 months are deemed temporary and do not lead to the change of the 
applicable social security legislation.  The drafters of Rome I have decided not to follow 
this approach.
79
  Instead, all relevant circumstances should be evaluated to determine 
whether a sending is temporary for the purposes of Rome I.  This approach is better, 
since it allows the most appropriate solution in each individual case, albeit at the 
expense of a degree of legal uncertainty and difficulty of application.
80
 
Are all the circumstances of the case of equal weight, or are some more 
important than the others?  Rome I accords particular importance to the parties’ 
intentions.  According to the first sentence of Recital 36, work carried out in another 
country should be regarded as temporary if the employee is expected to resume working 
in the country of origin after carrying out his tasks abroad.  If the parties intend the 
sending to be temporary (i.e. if there is animus revertendi on the employee’s part and 
animus retrahendi on the employer’s part)81 there is, in principle, no change of the 
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habitual place of work.  Otherwise there is.
82
  The parties’ intentions may be ascertained 
from the terms of the contract and other circumstances of the case.  Art.4 of the 
Directive 91/533/EEC on an employer’s obligation to inform employees of the 
conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship
83
 obliges employers to 
provide information regarding the posting to posted employees.  This information may 
be particularly useful for determining whether the posting is temporary.  But the parties’ 
intentions are not the only relevant factor.  In particular, the duration of the sending 
abroad must be considered.  Thus, if the employee has been working in a foreign 
country for a significant amount of time, he should be regarded as habitually working in 
that country even though he used to habitually work in the country of origin and the 
parties intended him to return there.  What amount of time is (in)significant in this 
respect depends on the circumstances of the case and is left to the courts to decide.
84
 
A difficulty arises where a dispute, brought after the habitual place of work has 
changed, concerns previously performed work.  Does the law of the country of the 
current or of the previous habitual place of work apply?  The best solution seems to be 
the application of the law of the country where the employee habitually worked when 
the facts giving rise to the dispute occurred.
85
  An employer who has fully complied 
with the applicable law should not be adversely affected by a change of the habitual 
place of work and the consequent change of the governing law. 
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Sometimes, employment begins or ends with a sending abroad.  According to 
Recital 36, work performed in another country is deemed temporary if the employee is 
expected to resume working in the country of origin after carrying out his tasks abroad.  
This wording suggests that the employee must have already worked in the country of 
origin before being sent abroad, and that he is expected to continue working there.  
Where employment begins with a temporary sending abroad, the first requirement is not 
met; where employment is expected to end with a temporary sending abroad, the second 
requirement is not met.  Nonetheless, Art.8(2) should be interpreted broadly and enable 
the application of the law of the country of origin in these situations.
86
 
Some employees are frequently sent from one country to another.  Construction 
workers, for example, may be sent from a building site in one country to a building site 
in another country immediately after the completion of the construction project.  
Managerial, advisory and specialist staff may be moved between countries where their 
employer is doing business.  Weber
87
 provides guidance.  The CJEU held that the 
relevant criterion for determining the habitual place of work in this type of case ‘is, in 
principle, the place where [the employee] spends most of his working time engaged on 
his employer’s business.’88  Therefore, an employee who is frequently sent from one 
country to another is habitually working in the country where he spends most of his 
working time, unless the circumstances of the case indicate otherwise. 
3.1.2. Intra-group transfers 
Workers employed by a member of a corporate group are often transferred within the 
group, especially if they are managerial, advisory or specialist staff.  Such transfers, 
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generally speaking, take three forms.
89
  First, the employee may be transferred to a 
foreign group member without entering into employment with that member.  This is 
merely a type of sending abroad discussed above.  Second, the employee may be 
transferred to, and enter into employment with, a foreign group member, while 
terminating his employment with the original employer.  Given that there is no overlap 
between the two employment relations, the habitual place of work under each should be 
determined separately and independently.
90
  Third, the employee may be transferred to, 
and enter into employment with, a foreign group member, while retaining his 
employment with the original employer.  The conclusion of the employment contract 
with the foreign group member may be mandated by the host country’s immigration and 
other legislation.  Such employment is usually limited in time or to a specific task.  The 
original employer frequently retains the right to revoke the employee. 
The third type of transfer raises the question of the relevance of the ‘local’ 
employment contract for establishing the habitual place of work under the ‘original’ 
employment contract and vice versa.  It will be remembered that the CJEU dealt with 
this kind of case in Pugliese
91
 in the context of the Brussels regime.  With regard to the 
choice-of-law rules, the second sentence of Recital 36 Rome I addresses this problem of 
‘double employment’.92  It states that the conclusion of a new contract with an employer 
belonging to the same group of companies as the original employer should not preclude 
the employee from being regarded as carrying out his work in another country 
temporarily.  Therefore, the habitual place of work under the ‘original’ and the ‘local’ 
contracts should be determined separately, by considering all the relevant 
circumstances.  Typically, a transfer to a foreign group member represents a temporary 
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sending abroad under the ‘original’ contract not resulting in the change of the habitual 
place of work.  The work under the ‘local’ contract is usually entirely performed in the 
host country, which should therefore be regarded as the country of the habitual place of 
work under that contract.  Exceptionally, the two contracts may have the same habitual 
place of work, for example when the transfer to a foreign group member represents a 
permanent sending abroad under the ‘original’ contract or when the ‘local’ contract is 
made solely for administrative purposes (e.g. obtaining a work permit).
93
 
Art.8(2)’s flexibility allows the most appropriate solution in each individual case 
of intra-group transfer of employees.
94
  Moreover, the solution laid down in Recital 36 
can be applied by analogy to other cases of ‘double employment’, such as where the 
employee concludes a ‘local’ employment contract with a company to which he was 
‘hired out’ by his employer.95 
3.1.3. ‘International occupations’ 
Some occupations are international by their very nature.  Commercial representatives 
covering territories of several countries normally maintain an office in one country from 
which they travel abroad and to which they return after each business trip.  International 
transport workers routinely cross national borders.  Offshore workers sometimes 
perform their work outside any country’s territorial waters.  Do such workers have a 
habitual place of work? 
The CJEU addressed the problem of determining the habitual place of work of 
commercial representatives in Mulox
96
 and Rutten.
97
  The Court held in Mulox that the 
habitual place of work was ‘the place where or from which the employee principally 
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discharges his obligations towards his employer’98 and in Rutten that the habitual place 
of work was ‘the place where the employee has established the effective centre of his 
working activities and where, or from which, he in fact performs the essential part of his 
duties vis-à-vis his employer.’99  In both cases, the location of the employee’s office 
was the crucial factor for determining the habitual place of work.  Since Art.8(2) 
incorporates this case-law,
100
 the law of the country where the commercial 
representative maintains his office typically governs his employment contract. 
The CJEU has dealt in two recent cases with the determination of the habitual 
place of work of international transport workers under the Rome Convention.  In 
Koelzsch
101
 the employee brought a dispute in Luxembourg against that Member State 
for the alleged breach of Art.6 of the Rome Convention by its judicial authorities.  Mr 
Koelzsch was a lorry driver domiciled in Germany who worked, under an employment 
contract subject to Luxembourg law, for a Luxembourg company.  The employer’s 
business consisted in transporting goods from Denmark to destinations situated mostly 
in Germany by means of lorries stationed in Germany.  Following his dismissal, Mr 
Koelzsch commenced proceedings in Luxembourg arguing that his dismissal was 
unlawful under the objectively applicable German law.  The Luxembourg courts 
disagreed and held that Mr Koelzsch’s employment was subject exclusively to 
Luxembourg law, under which the dismissal was lawful.  The employee then claimed 
damages against Luxembourg for maladministration on the part of its judicial 
authorities.  The Cour d’appel de Luxembourg asked the CJEU whether the 
Luxembourg courts’ interpretation of Art.6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention was correct. 
After endorsing its case-law under the Brussels regime, the CJEU held that the 
rule of the habitual place of work applied whenever ‘it is possible…to determine the 
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State with which the work has a significant connection’, and that this rule referred to 
‘the place in which or from which the employee actually carries out his activities and, in 
the absence of a centre of activities, to the place where he carries out the majority of his 
activities.’102  The Court gave a strong hint that Mr Koelzsch had his habitual place of 
work in Germany by listing the following factors as relevant for determining the 
habitual place of work: the place from which the employee carries out his transport 
tasks, receives instructions concerning his tasks and organises his work; the place where 
his work tools are situated; the places where the transport is principally carried out, 
where the goods are unloaded and the place to which the employee returns after 
completion of his tasks.
103
 
It will be remembered that Voogsgeerd
104
 concerned a seaman who concluded 
an employment contract with a Luxembourg company (Navimer) at the headquarters of 
the employer’s Belgian subsidiary (Naviglobe).  The contract was expressly subject to 
the law of Luxembourg.  Mr Voogsgeerd worked on board ships belonging to Navimer 
and received his salary from that company.  But he reported to, and received briefings 
and instructions from, Naviglobe in Belgium, where all of his voyages commenced and 
terminated.  Almost a year after his dismissal, Mr Voogsgeerd commenced proceedings 
in Belgium for payment in lieu of notice invoking Belgian employment law as the 
objectively applicable law under the rule of the habitual place of work.  Contrary to this, 
the defendants argued that Luxembourg law was solely applicable to the contract, since 
Mr Voogsgeerd had had no habitual place of work and the engaging place of business, 
Navimer, had been situated in Luxembourg.  The claim was time-barred under 
Luxembourg law.  After the lower instance courts had rejected his claims, Mr 
Voogsgeerd appealed to the Belgian Court of Cassation.  He claimed that Naviglobe 
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was the engaging place of business and that Belgian law was objectively applicable 
under the fall-back rule of the engaging place of business.  The court made a reference 
for preliminary ruling to the CJEU. 
The CJEU confirmed the preceding case-law and a very wide interpretation of 
the rule of the habitual place of work.  In particular, it stated that the country in which 
the employee habitually performed his work was the country where he ‘principally 
carries out his work’,105 i.e. the country ‘with which the work has a significant 
connection’106 or ‘in which or from which the employee actually carries out his working 
activities and, in the absence of a centre of activities...where he carries out the majority 
of his activities’.107  The Court suggested that the facts of the case indicated that Belgian 
law was objectively applicable under the rule of the habitual place of work.
108  
Moreover, and more importantly, the Court arguably laid down a general rule for 
international transport cases
 
that whenever the place from which the employee carried 
out his transport tasks or where he was obliged to report coincided with the place where 
he received instructions, that place had to be regarded as the habitual place of work.
109
 
Voogsgeerd put an end to the longstanding debate on whether a seaman’s 
employment contract is governed by the law of the flag or whether other criteria are 
more appropriate.  Many argued that, since seamen worked on ships which fell under 
the jurisdiction of the country whose flag they flew, employment contracts of seamen 
were, in principle, governed by the law of the flag.
110
  Others argued in favour of other 
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criteria, primarily the engaging place of business.
111
  The former solution seems 
inappropriate.  Saying that a British seaman who works on a ferry registered in the 
Bahamas and plying from a base in Portsmouth to the Channel Islands and Northern 
France habitually works in the Bahamas is clearly wrong.
112
  In other words, there is no 
guarantee that the country of the flag of the ship will be sufficiently closely connected 
with, and interested in regulating, the employment contract.  Moreover, this connecting 
factor is determined unilaterally by the employer.  In any event, this debate has now 
been resolved.  A seaman’s employment contract is, in principle, governed by the law of 
the country of the seaman’s permanent base, provided there is a significant connection 
between the work and the base.  Otherwise, the fall-back rule applies. 
A parallel debate existed with regard to employment contracts of air crew 
members.  Many academics, particularly those favouring the ship’s flag as the relevant 
connecting factor for employment contracts of seamen, argued in favour of the law of 
the aircraft’s registration.113  Others supported the immediate application of the fall-
back rule.
114
  The drafters of Rome I put an end to this particular debate.  According to 
the European Commission, the wording ‘country in which or, failing that, from which’ 
in Art.8(2) covers ‘personnel working on board aircraft, if there is a fixed base from 
which work is organised and where the personnel perform other obligations in relation 
to the employer (registration, safety checks).’115 
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Offshore workers usually work within a country’s territorial waters, although 
offshore installations may be positioned outside these waters, e.g. above a country’s 
continental shelf or even on the high seas.  Weber
116
 concerned an employee who 
worked on vessels and installations positioned above Dutch and Danish continental 
shelves.  The CJEU held that work performed on fixed or floating installations 
positioned on or above the part of the continental shelf adjacent to a Member State for 
the purposes of prospecting and exploiting its natural resources was regarded as work in 
the territory of that Member State.  With regard to work performed on installations on 
the high seas, there are essentially two possibilities.  The first is to regard the country of 
the flag or of the registration of the installation as the country of the habitual place of 
work.  The second is to regard such work as not being habitually performed in any 
country and to apply the fall-back rule.  Since the first solution is unlikely to meet the 
objectives of employee protection, the fall-back rule should apply.
117
 
3.2. Engaging place of business 
Art.8(3) prescribes that, absent a habitual place of work, the employment contract is 
governed by the law of the country where the place of business through which the 
employee was engaged is situated.
118
  In light of the CJEU case-law, it is clear that not 
many situations fall under Art.8(3).  One example is where the employee’s work is not 
carried out from a permanent base (e.g. an office), and the distribution of the working 
time spent in various places and the parties’ intentions do not establish a habitual place 
of work.  Another example is the case of an employee who maintains two or more 
permanent bases of equal importance in different countries.  Employees working 
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outside the territory of any country also come to mind,
119
 as do international transport 
workers who have a base in a particular country but not a significant connection with it.  
Cases of this kind are rare. 
In order to understand the rule of the engaging place of business, one has to 
determine what is meant, first, by the term ‘engaged’ and, second, by the term ‘place of 
business’.  The CJEU examined these issues in detail in Voogsgeerd.120 
There were two strands of academic opinion regarding the interpretation of the 
term ‘engaged’.  According to MANKOWSKI,121 this term relates to ‘organisational 
integration, internal structuring and internal directives’. 122 
‘Employment relations ordinarily are long-term agreements.  Hence, it would be 
very much preferable to employ a connecting factor that is linked with the living 
relation as such, not merely its starting point.  Organisational integration reflects 
this perfectly.  Its elements might be e.g. the monthly payment of wages and 
salaries, the accountancy work and the tax business, supervision and giving 
directives.’123 
However, national courts, supported by the majority of academics, have interpreted the 
term ‘engaged’ as referring to the conclusion of the employment contract or recruitment 
of employees.
124
  Voogsgeerd demonstrates why the former interpretation is 
inappropriate.  Here, the employee concluded the employment contract with, and 
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received salary from, the employer established in one country, but reported to, and 
received briefings and instructions from, a company from another country.  It would be 
hard, if not impossible, to find one place of business within which the employee was 
organisationally integrated in accordance with the criteria set out in the quotation above. 
It comes as no surprise that the CJEU held that the term ‘engaged’ referred to 
‘the conclusion of the contract or, in the case of a de facto employment relationship, to 
the creation of the employment relationship and not to the way in which the employee’s 
actual employment is carried out.’125  But it is not entirely clear whether the Court 
referred to the conclusion of the employment contract by a particular place of business 
or at a particular place of business.  The CJEU judgment and the Advocate General’s 
opinion provide support for both views.  In order to reduce the risk of abuse, it was 
stated that a place of business could be regarded as the ‘engaging’ place of business if it 
‘has been actively involved in the conclusion of the employment contract on the 
instructions of the employer, for example by taking part in contractual negotiations with 
the employee’.126  A place of business that has not been actively involved in the 
conclusion of the contract should be disregarded, and the rule of the engaging place of 
business should point to the place of business of the undertaking in whose name and on 
whose behalf the contract was concluded.
127
 
With regard to the interpretation of the term ‘place of business’, there were also 
several strands of opinion.  According to some, this term should be equated with the 
term ‘branch, agency or other establishment’ of Art.5(5) Brussels I.128  But according to 
MANKOWSKI, the term ‘place of business’ should have different meanings in different 
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contexts.
129
  ‘The main difficulty with instrumentalising the very same notion [i.e. the 
term ‘branch, agency or other establishment’] in the context of employment relations is 
that the notion has been developed for external business relations and not for the 
internal feature of employment agreements’.130  The majority of authors, however, have 
not taken a clear position in this regard.
131
 
While the Advocate General’s position in Voogsgeerd was clear, that of the 
CJEU was not.  The Advocate General expressly endorsed a parallel interpretation.
132
  
In her view, the term ‘place of business’ referred to an employer’s establishment, 
regardless of whether it possessed legal personality,
133
 over which the employer 
exercised actual control so that its actions were attributable to the employer,
134
 which 
possessed a sufficient degree of permanence,
135
 and which had been set up in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the country in which it had been 
established.
136
  The Court did not expressly endorse a parallel interpretation.  But it did 
arguably refer to the same four requirements laid down by the Advocate General by 
holding that the term ‘place of business’ covered every stable structure, including a 
subsidiary, branch or an office, regardless of whether it possessed legal personality,
137
 
provided that it had a sufficient degree of permanence,
138
 and that, in principle, it 
belonged to the undertaking which engaged the employee, i.e. formed an integral part of 
its structure.
139
  Assuming that the Advocate General was right in holding that the 
requirements she laid down mirrored the definition of the ancillary establishment of 
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Art.5(5) Brussels I, it can be concluded that the Court effectively also equated the 
definition of the term ‘place of business’ with that of ‘branch, agency or other 
establishment’. 
It will be examined now how the rule of the engaging place of business applies 
to the factual scenario furnished by Voogsgeerd itself.  Similar facts are provided by the 
famous Sayers case.
140
  The employer in Voogsgeerd was a Luxembourg company 
(Navimer).  The employment contract was concluded at the premises of a Belgian 
subsidiary (Naviglobe).  It is not known whether the subsidiary concluded the contract 
on behalf of the employer or whether it merely made its premises available for the 
conclusion of the contract by a representative of the employer.  It is also not known 
whether the subsidiary was involved in any other way (apart from making its premises 
available) in the conclusion of the contract. 
Both Navimer’s place of business in Luxembourg and Naviglobe’s place of 
business in Belgium meet the requirements of the term ‘place of business’.  Whether 
Navimer or Naviglobe is to be regarded as the engaging place of business thus depends 
on the interpretation of the term ‘engaged’.  As mentioned, it is not clear whether this 
term refers to the conclusion of the employment contract by or at a place of business.  In 
any event, it is necessary that the place of business was actively involved in the 
conclusion of the contract.  If Naviglobe concluded the employment contract on behalf 
of Navimer at its premises, it seems that the requirements of the term ‘engaged’ would 
clearly be met.  But if Naviglobe made its premises available for the conclusion of the 
contract by a representative of Navimer, the legal position is not as clear.  The former 
interpretation of the term ‘engaged’ (conclusion of the contract by a place of business) 
would point to Navimer as the ‘engaging’ place of business.  The latter interpretation 
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(conclusion of the contract at a place of business) would point to Naviglobe, provided it 
was actively involved in the conclusion of the contract.  The fact that Naviglobe made 
its premises available for the conclusion of the contract could, under some conditions, 
be enough for regarding it as being actively involved.  As the Court said: 
‘the purely transitory presence in a State of an agent of an undertaking from 
another State for the purpose of engaging employees cannot be regarded as 
constituting a place of business which connects the contract to that State… 
If, however, the same representative travels to a country in which the employer 
maintains a permanent establishment of his undertaking, it would be perfectly 
reasonable to suppose that that establishment constitutes [the engaging place of 
business]’.141 
However, it is not entirely clear whether, for an establishment to constitute the 
‘engaging’ place of business, the representative of the employer must regularly present 
himself at that establishment or whether a one-off recruitment would be enough.  The 
Advocate General stated that: 
‘The fact that a representative of a foreign employer regularly presents himself 
at that place in order to recruit workers for employment abroad could not…be 
regarded as sufficient.  If, however, the same representative travels to a country 
in which the employer maintains a permanent establishment of his undertaking, 
it would be perfectly reasonable to suppose that that establishment constitutes 
[the engaging place of business].’142 
One could argue that the Advocate General’s Opinion supports the proposition that the 
representative of the employer must regularly present himself at a place of business 
which made its premises available for the conclusion of the employment contract, in 
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order for that place of business to be regarded as the ‘engaging’ place of business.  But 
it seems that the requirement of regularity should not be introduced.  Its introduction 
would increase legal uncertainty and unforeseeability as it would open the question of 
what regular is.  Furthermore, it would contribute nothing to the achievement of the 
objective of employee protection.  The employer can always structure its business so as 
to regularly present itself at a particular place of business for the purpose of entering 
into employment contracts. 
 Given the ambiguities of the CJEU judgment and the Advocate General’s 
Opinion, it is uncertain whether the employer (Navimer) or the subsidiary (Naviglobe), 
or even both, should be regarded as the engaging place(s) of business.  In case the term 
‘engaged’ covers both the conclusion of the employment contract by and at a place of 
business, and assuming that the contract was concluded by a representative of Navimer 
at the premises of Naviglobe, and that Naviglobe was actively involved in the 
conclusion of the contract, the term ‘engaged’ would be satisfied in relation to both 
Navimer and Naviglobe.  Since there can be only one engaging place of business for the 
purposes of Rome I, the court would have to give preference to either Naviglobe or 
Navimer.  It is uncertain and unforeseeable which place of business would be given 
preference.  The objective of employee protection would have nothing to say in this 
regard.  The employer can always structure its business so as to conclude its 
employment contracts either by or at a particular place of business. 
 In conclusion, the CJEU has deprived the rule of the engaging place of business 
of almost any effect.  Yet the existence of this rule creates considerable legal 
uncertainty and unforeseeability.  The relationship between the primary rule of the 
habitual place of business and the fall-back rule is not entirely clear.  The meaning of 
the terms ‘engaged’ and ‘place of business’ is obscure.  Furthermore, there is no 
guarantee that the fall-back rule will point to the law of a country that is sufficiently 
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closely connected with, and interested in regulating, the employment contract.  Since 
engagement is within the employer’s sphere of control, this rule effectively enables the 
employer to unilaterally choose the applicable law.  These conclusions inevitably raise 
the question of whether the rule of the engaging place of business should be abolished 
in Rome I. 
If the analogous rule were abolished in Brussels I, as argued in the previous 
chapter, there would be an a priori reason for doing the same in Rome I for the sake of 
achieving and maintaining consistency between the two instruments.  There are also 
self-standing reasons for abolishing this rule.  Since it is particularly amenable to being 
displaced through the application of the escape clause,
143
 in cases where there is not a 
habitual place of work, the parties will often be in dispute not only over the 
interpretation of the connecting factor of the engaging place of business but also over 
the application of the escape clause.  The abolition of the fall-back rule would advance 
the goals of legal certainty and foreseeability, since the parties would not have to enter 
into dispute over its interpretation.  Furthermore, the number of appeals would be 
reduced and the efficiency of proceedings would be increased.  Whether a place of 
business is the ‘engaging place of business’ is a legal question.  Since the exact meaning 
of this concept is unclear, the trial court is likely to answer it wrongly, at least from the 
point of view of one of the parties.  The possibility of such an error of law often gives 
the losing party sufficient reason to lodge an appeal.  On the other hand, direct 
application of the principle of the closest connection would give the trial court a degree 
of discretion over the determination of the applicable law.  Unless the trial court 
committed a manifest error when determining the applicable law by direct application of 
the principle of the closest connection, the appeal court would be unlikely to 
intervene.
144
  Finally, the objective of employee protection would be advanced, since 
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employers could not (ab)use this connecting factor to evade protective legislation, and 
the courts would always have to determine and apply the law of the country with which 
the employment contract is most closely connected, and which is legitimately interested 
in regulating it. 
From a technical point of view, nothing precludes the abolition of the rule of the 
engaging place of business.  If it were abolished, the applicable law would be 
determined, absent a habitual place of work, by direct application of the principle of the 
closest connection.  This technique would not be much different from that used in the 
general rules of Rome I.  Many of these rules are based on the theory of the 
characteristic performance.
145
  But if the characteristic performance of a contract cannot 
be established, the applicable law is determined by direct application of the principle of 
the closest connection.
146
  If the fall-back rule were abolished, the location of the 
engaging place of business would still retain relevance as one of the factors to be 
considered under the principle of the closest connection. 
3.3. Escape clause 
Art.8(4) provides that where it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the 
contract is more closely connected with a country other than that indicated by Art.8(2) 
and 8(3), the law of that other country applies. 
The wording of this escape clause differs from that of Art.4(3), which allows 
departure from the general choice-of-law rules of Art.4(1) and 4(2) ‘where it is clear 
from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely 
connected with [another country]’.  Does the different wording imply that the rules of 
Art.8(2) and 8(3) can be departed from more easily than the general choice-of-law 
rules?  A highly contentious issue under the Rome Convention was the relationship 
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between the presumption of characteristic performance of Art.4(2) and the escape clause 
of Art.4(5), which is worded identically as Art.8(4) Rome I.  Two approaches were 
identified.  The first, ‘strong presumption’ approach, was pursued in the Netherlands 
and Scotland; the second, ‘weak presumption’ approach, was adopted in England and 
France.
147
  Faced with the lack of uniform interpretation and application, the drafters of 
Rome I have clarified, in Art.4(3), that the general choice-of-law rules can be departed 
from only exceptionally.  Although the escape clause of Art.8(4) retains the old 
wording, it should be applied in the same manner as that of Art.4(3). 
All the circumstances of the case should be considered under Art.8(4).  The 
case-law indicates that the relevant factors are, apart from the place of work and the 
engaging place of business, the nationality, domicile and residence of the parties, and, 
less importantly, the language of the contract, and the place and currency of payment of 
salary.
148
  The registration of the aircraft and the flag of the ship can also be taken into 
account, as well as the applicable tax and social security legislation or collective 
agreements. 
There is no guarantee that the law designated by Art.8(2) and 8(3) will contain 
high employment standards.  Can the escape clause be used to ensure the application of 
the law which, among the laws of the countries connected with an employment relation, 
affords the employee the best protection?  The answer must be negative.
149
  As 
discussed in section 3.2 of Chapter II, the protective task of PIL should not be to favour 
the employee over the employer.  It should consist in upholding the law of the country 
that is both sufficiently closely connected with, and legitimately interested in regulating, 
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the employment contract in question, and whose application the parties can reasonably 
foresee.  Can then these three factors be taken into account under the escape clause?  
Indisputably, the closeness of the connections between the employment contract and 
various countries, and thereby the foreseeability of applying their laws, are relevant 
factors.  What about the states’ legitimate interests in having their employment laws 
applied? 
The states’ legitimate interests also seem to be a relevant factor under the escape 
clause.  The wording of Art.8(4), which refers to ‘the circumstances as a whole’, is wide 
enough to allow taking those interests into consideration.  As discussed in section 1.4 of 
Chapter II, the states’ legitimate interests represent a reason for the existence of the 
special choice-of-law rules for employment contracts.  It would be unusual if those 
interests, although central to the idea of employee protection in PIL, were disregarded in 
the practical operation of the special choice-of-law rules.  Indeed, in Koelzsch the CJEU 
stated that, ‘Article 6 of the Rome Convention...must be understood as guaranteeing the 
applicability of the law of the State in which...the employee performs his economic and 
social duties and [where] the business and political environment affects employment 
activities.’150  The CJEU thereby indicated that employment law of the country in 
whose labour market the employee partakes, and which is presumably interested in 
regulating the employment contract, should be safeguarded.  The escape clause should 
enable this where Art.8(2) and 8(3) do not. 
3.4. Conclusion 
The choice-of-law rules for determining the objectively applicable law are flexible 
enough to accommodate various factual patterns under which international employment 
relations arise.  They take into account not only the connections of the contract with 
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various countries but also the states’ legitimate interests in the application of their 
employment laws.  But the rule of the engaging place of business leads to excessive 
legal uncertainty and unforeseeability, and does not support the objective of employee 
protection. 
Conclusions 
By and large, the rules of Rome I accord with the relevant considerations identified in 
section 3 of Chapter II.  The parties to an employment contract are free to agree on any 
law to the extent that the agreement improves upon the mandatory standard of 
protection set by the objectively applicable law.  The rules for determining the 
objectively applicable law are flexible enough and enable the application of the law of 
the country that is sufficiently closely connected with the employment contract in 
question, legitimately interested in regulating it, and whose application the parties can 
reasonably foresee.  However, the CJEU has deprived the rule of the engaging place of 
business of almost any effect.  For this reason, and because it leads to excessive legal 
uncertainty and unforeseeability and undermines the objective of employee protection, 
this rule should be abolished.  If that were done, the law applicable to the employment 
contract, absent a habitual place of work, would be determined by direct application of 
the principle of the closest connection. 
 This chapter has examined in detail the operation of Art.8 Rome I which lays 
down choice-of-law rules for employment contracts, which determine the law 
applicable to contractual claims.  But the majority of employment disputes concern 
statutory claims.  The following chapter explores the law applicable to statutory claims 
and, in particular, the relevance of Art.8 and Rome I in general in this respect. 
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VI STATUTORY CLAIMS* 
 
‘[Employment Rights Act 1996] 
contains no geographical limitation.  
Read literally, it applies to any 
individual who works anywhere in the 
world...  Nevertheless...some territorial 
limitations must be implied.’ 
LORD HOFFMANN
1
 
 
If an employee brings a claim based on the employer’s breach of a right granted to him 
by a statute forming part of English law and the employment relation involves a foreign 
element, the question arises whether the statute applies.  The traditional approach to this 
question was to look exclusively at the statute’s express or implied territorial scope.  
Only contractual and tortious claims traditionally triggered the application of choice-of-
law rules.  Statutory claims raised the problem of statutory construction.  But today the 
choice-of-law rules for all obligations in English law are of European origin and are 
contained (excluded matters aside) in Rome I and Rome II.  It is clear that if the 
employee advances a claim in contract or tort, the applicable law is determined by the 
choice-of-law rules of one of the two Regulations.  But what happens if the employee 
brings a statutory claim?  Must one be guided solely by what the statute says regarding 
its territorial reach?  Or does the application of the statute depend, at least partly, on the 
choice-of-law rules? 
                                                 
*An earlier version of this chapter was published in (2012) 75 MLR 722. 
1
 Lawson v Serco [2006] UKHL 3, [1]. 
 183 
English courts still adhere to the traditional approach, as evidenced by the 
leading House of Lords decision of Lawson v Serco
2
 and two recent Supreme Court 
cases.
3
  The conventional view is also upheld in academic literature.
4
  This chapter 
argues that the question of whether an employee can invoke a statutory right must not 
be treated exclusively as a matter of statutory construction, but should be answered 
primarily by reference to the choice-of-law rules.  The two Regulations lay down the 
choice-of-law rules for all obligations, and require a different approach to the 
application of statutory employment rights.  If the question is approached in this 
manner, there are two issues to be resolved.  The first is whether English law applies 
pursuant to the ‘European’ choice-of-law rules.  The second is whether there is a good 
reason not to apply the statute despite the fact that English law is applicable or whether 
there is a good reason to apply the statute despite the fact that English law is not 
applicable.  Arguably, such reasons rarely exist and the statute must normally be applied 
within the boundaries determined by the choice-of-law rules.  In other words, 
contractual and statutory claims seem to have been largely merged into a single 
category for the purposes of choice of law. 
The following section presents, drawing upon the work by MERRETT and 
SCOTT,
5
 the current state of the law with regard to the territorial scope of British 
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employment legislation.  It reveals the complex and often confusing nature of the 
traditional approach.  The second section proposes a different approach towards the 
statutory employment rights that gives priority to the choice-of-law rules for 
employment contracts for the determination of the territorial scope of employment 
legislation. 
1. Territorial scope of British employment legislation 
For the purpose of addressing the problem of territoriality, the rights that employment 
legislation confers upon employees may be divided into three types: statutory rights, 
contractual rights and EU-law derived rights.  The territorial scope of these different 
types of right is determined pursuant to different rules and principles. 
1.1. Statutory rights 
The most frequently invoked statutory rights are the right not to be unfairly dismissed 
conferred by s.94(1) ERA 1996 and the right not to be discriminated against conferred 
by the Equality Act 2010.  The determination of the territorial scope of these rights is 
problematic, since both ERA 1996 and EqA 2010 are silent on this issue.  On the other 
hand, there are statutes which express the territorial scope of the employment rights they 
confer, namely the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 and the Patents Act 1977.  The following text firstly 
examines the territorial scope of the right not to be unfairly dismissed and of the other 
rights conferred by ERA 1996, then of the employment rights conferred by EqA 2010, 
and finally presents the relevant provisions of the latter three statutes. 
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1.1.1. Employment Rights Act 1996 
ERA 1996 does not express its territorial scope.  S.204 provides: ‘For the purposes of 
this Act, it is immaterial whether the law which...governs any person’s employment is 
the law of the UK, or of a part of the UK, or not’.  The meaning of this provision is held 
to be that the determination of the territorial scope of ERA 1996 is entirely disconnected 
from the choice-of-law process.  This disconnection is well illustrated by two appellate 
decisions.  In Financial Times Ltd v Bishop
6
 the claimant argued that, as a corollary of 
the principle that a UK statute does not normally apply to a contract not governed by the 
law of some part of the UK, ERA 1996 should apply to an employment contract 
governed by English law.  The Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected this argument on 
the ground that the rights given by ERA 1996 were not contractual but statutory rights, 
and that s.204 provided that ‘for the purposes of ERA, whether the proper law of the 
contract is or is not the law of the UK or part of it is immaterial.’7  In Bleuse v MBT 
Transport Ltd
8
 the parties chose English law to govern their employment contract.  The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal confirmed that ‘s. 204...makes it plain that the proper law 
of the contract is of no materiality when considering the reach of the statutory rights.’9  
In other words, English courts regard the determination of the territorial scope of ERA 
1996 exclusively as a matter of statutory construction. 
Originally, ERA 1996 did express, in s.196, its territorial scope.  Most rights, 
including the right not to be unfairly dismissed, did not apply to employees who, under 
their employment contracts, ordinarily worked outside Britain.
10
  Certain rights had a 
different territorial reach.  The right to a statement of employment particulars and 
minimum period of notice applied whenever the contract was governed by English or 
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Scottish law.
11
  Certain rights concerning maternity and childbirth had no express 
territorial limitations.
12
  The rights on insolvency of a British employer did not apply to 
employees ordinarily working outside the European Communities, Norway or Iceland.
13
  
S.196 was repealed by s.32 of the Employment Relations Act 1999.  The purpose of the 
repeal was to extend ERA 1996 to employees temporarily working in Britain, thus 
implementing the Posted Workers Directive, and to employees who had been working 
for some years in Britain but were excluded from ERA 1996 because of the way the 
courts had interpreted s.196.
14
  In the ministerial view, for the Act to apply there had to 
be a ‘proper connection’ with the UK.15  The result of the repeal was considerable legal 
uncertainty which necessitated the intervention of the House of Lords in Lawson v 
Serco.
16
 
Lawson v Serco was comprised of three combined appeals.  The first case 
concerned Mr Lawson, a British national employed by a British company to work as a 
security supervisor on Ascension Island, a dependency of the British Overseas Territory 
of St Helena, where the employer provided services to a British military base.  The 
second case concerned Mr Botham, a British national employed by the Ministry of 
Defence to work at various military bases in Germany.  He was part of the civil 
components of British Forces in Germany and treated as resident in the UK for various 
purposes.  The third case concerned Mr Crofts who was employed as a pilot by a Hong 
Kong company which was a wholly owned subsidiary of, and provided aircrew to, a 
Hong Kong airline.  He was based at Heathrow and lived in the UK under the airline’s 
‘permanent basings policy’.  All three employees claimed they had been unfairly 
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dismissed.  The question before the House of Lords was whether they fell within the 
territorial scope of s.94(1) ERA 1996. 
LORD HOFFMANN, who gave the only substantive speech, stated that some 
territorial limitations had to be implied into ERA 1996, for otherwise this Act would 
have world-wide application.
17
  In his Lordship’s view, ‘the standard, normal or 
paradigm case’ of the application of s.94(1) was the employee working in Britain at the 
time of the dismissal, regardless of what the contemplated place of work was when the 
employment contract was made.
18
  With regard to peripatetic employees (e.g. airline 
pilots, international management consultants or salesmen), their work was considered to 
be performed in Britain if the employee was based in Britain at the time of the 
dismissal.
19
  This covered Mr Crofts’ case.20  With regard to expatriate employees, 
s.94(1) was, in principle, inapplicable.
21
  The fact that someone worked for a British-
based employer was not enough; nor was the fact that the employee was a British 
national recruited in Britain:  ‘Something more is necessary.’22  LORD HOFFMANN gave 
two examples of when that something more would be present: 1) an employee posted 
abroad for the purposes of a business carried on in Britain, such as a foreign 
correspondent on the staff of a British newspaper;
23
 and 2) an employee posted to an 
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extra-territorial British enclave abroad.
24
  The latter example covered Mr Lawson’s and 
Mr Botham’s cases.25  Moreover, LORD HOFFMANN admitted the possibility of other 
exceptional cases of expatriate employees with equally strong connections with Britain 
and British employment law. 
The Supreme Court recently held that Duncombe (No 2)
26
 was such an 
exceptional case.  This case concerned the employment, by the Secretary of State for 
Children, Schools and Families, of teachers to work in the European Schools.  These 
schools are established under a treaty between the EU and Member States to provide a 
distinctly European education to children of EU officials and employees.  Most of the 
teachers at the Schools are employed by Member States.  By virtue of regulations in 
force at the Schools, the teaching posts are subject to a maximum duration of 9 years (or 
exceptionally 10).  In the UK, it is the Secretary of State that employs teachers for the 
Schools under a series of fixed-term contracts.  After the completion of the 9-year 
period, the teachers are dismissed.  Mr Duncombe was a teacher employed to work at 
the School in Karlsruhe, Germany.  After having worked there for 9 years, he was 
dismissed.  His case was a test case for unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal and for 
a declaration as to permanent status as an employee brought by the teachers against the 
Secretary of State.  With regard to the unfair dismissal claim, the teachers were held to 
fall into the residual group of expatriate employees covered by s.94(1).  This depended 
on a combination of factors.
27
  First, the employer was not just British-based but the 
Government of the UK.  Second, the employment contracts were governed by English 
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law.  Third, the teachers were employed in international enclaves, having no particular 
connection with the countries where they happened to be situated and governed by an 
international  treaty.  Fourth, it would be anomalous if the teachers employed to work in 
the European Schools in England enjoyed different protection from the teachers 
employed to work in the Schools outside the UK.
28
 
It is important to note that the Supreme Court in Duncombe (No 2) departed 
from the traditional view that the determination of the territorial scope of ERA 1996 
was entirely disconnected from the choice-of-law process.  It held that the law 
governing the employment contract was a relevant consideration for establishing the 
territorial scope of the statutory right not to be unfairly dismissed.  According to LADY 
HALE, who delivered the only substantive judgment, ‘[the claimants] were employed 
under contracts governed by English law...  Although this factor is not mentioned in 
Lawson v Serco, it must be relevant to the expectation of each party as to the protection 
which the employee would enjoy.’29  Furthermore, LADY HALE stated that ‘[t]his very 
special combination of factors, and in particular the second [the fact that English law 
governed the employment contract] and third [the fact that the employees had virtually 
no connection with the place of work], distinguished these employees from “the directly 
employed labour”.’30  The potential implications of LADY HALE’s view regarding the 
importance of the governing law for the determination of the territorial scope of 
employment legislation will be examined in the second section of this chapter. 
In any event, Lawson v Serco left two questions open.  Were LORD HOFFMANN’s 
three categories (employees working in Britain, peripatetic employees, expatriate 
                                                 
28
 Ministry of Defence v Wallis [2011] EWCA Civ 231 (Wallis) is another case where the claimant 
employees were held to fall into the residual group of expatriate employees covered by s.94(1) (the 
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employees) exhaustive?  Were the Lawson v Serco principles relevant for determining 
the territorial scope of rights other than the right not to be unfairly dismissed? 
The Supreme Court addressed the first question in Ravat.
31
  Mr Ravat, a British 
national and resident, was employed by a British company, but worked in Libya for a 
German affiliate.  He worked on ‘a commuter or rotational basis’, i.e. continued to live 
in Britain and travelled to and from his home to work for short periods overseas.  He 
worked for 28 consecutive days in Libya, followed by 28 consecutive days at home.  In 
effect he was job sharing, working back-to-back with another employee on the same 
arrangement.  A feature of Mr Ravat’s commuter status, so he was told by the employer, 
was that the terms and conditions of employment were such as they would have been 
had he worked in Britain.  The employer assured him that he would continue to have the 
full protection of the UK law while working abroad.  Indeed, following his dismissal, 
Mr Ravat invoked the employer’s UK grievance procedure.  He also received a 
redundancy payment which was stated to have been paid in accordance with ERA 1996.  
But when Mr Ravat complained of unfair dismissal, the employer fought tooth and nail 
to show that he fell outside the territorial scope of employment legislation. 
The appellate history of this case will be considered, since it reveals the 
complexities and uncertainties surrounding the application of the Lawson v Serco 
principles.  Instead of starting with LORD HOFFMANN’s categories, the Employment 
Tribunal examined all the circumstances of the case to determine whether there was a 
‘substantial connection’ with Britain and British employment law.  It found that such a 
connection existed and that s.94(1) applied.  The Employment Appeal Tribunal held 
that LORD HOFFMANN’s categories were exhaustive.  In its view, Mr Ravat fell into the 
‘expatriate employees’ category but, as he was neither working for the purposes of a 
British business nor in a British enclave abroad, s.94(1) was inapplicable.  The Inner 
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House of the Court of Session, by a majority, reinstated the Employment Tribunal’s 
decision.  LORD BRODIE, dissenting, approved the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s 
reasoning.  The majority disagreed but for different reasons.  LORD OSBORNE held that 
LORD HOFFMANN’s categories were not exhaustive and that Mr Ravat did not fall into 
any of them because the ‘expatriate employees’ category was intended to cover 
someone who not only worked but also lived abroad, and accordingly could not include 
Mr Ravat.  In LORD OSBORNE’s opinion, the question was whether there was a ‘strong 
connection’ with Britain and British employment law.  He found that such a connection 
existed and that s.94(1) applied.  LORD CARLOWAY agreed with LORD BRODIE that 
LORD HOFFMANN’s categories were exhaustive.  But he held, like LORD OSBORNe, that 
Mr Ravat did not fall into the ‘expatriate employees’ category, since he lived in Britain.  
In LORD CARLOWAY’s opinion, Mr Ravat was more peripatetic than expatriate, and 
s.94(1) applied because his base was in Britain.
32
  Finally, the Supreme Court held that 
LORD HOFFMANN’s categories were not exhaustive and that Mr Ravat did not fall into 
any of them.  According to LORD HOPE, who gave the only substantive speech, ‘the 
starting point needs to be more precisely identified.  It is that the employment 
relationship must have a stronger connection with Great Britain than with the foreign 
country where the employee works.’33  But ‘[t]he case of those who are truly expatriate 
because they not only work but also live outside Great Britain requires an exceptionally 
strong connection with Great Britain and British employment law before an exception 
can be made for them.’34  Since the Supreme Court found that Mr Ravat’s employment 
had closer connection with Britain than with any other country, the appeal was 
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dismissed.  In particular, LORD HOPE confirmed LADY HALE’s view in Duncombe (No 
2) that the law governing the employment contract was a relevant consideration.
35
 
Lawson v Serco concerned the right not to be unfairly dismissed.  LORD 
HOFFMANN said there was no reason why all the rights conferred by ERA 1996 should 
have the same territorial scope.
36
  Undoubtedly, the Lawson v Serco principles will be 
relevant for most rights.  Thus, in Shekar v Satyam Computer Services Ltd
37
 and 
Bleuse
38
 the provisions concerning unlawful deductions from wages were held to have 
the same territorial scope as those concerning unfair dismissal.  The reason was that 
these provisions had the same express territorial scope under the repealed s.196.  
Similarly, the Employment Tribunal held in Van Winkelhof
39
 that the territorial scope of 
the provisions concerning whistleblowing should not be construed more narrowly than 
that of the provisions concerning unfair dismissal.  However, as mentioned above, 
certain rights under ERA 1996 had a different express territorial scope under the 
repealed s.196.  In the case of those rights, the courts are likely to modify the Lawson v 
Serco principles.
40
 
1.1.2. Equality Act 2010 
The main question regarding the territorial scope of the employment rights conferred by 
EqA 2010 is the relevance of Lawson v Serco.  The previous anti-discrimination 
legislation, which was consolidated, repealed and replaced by EqA 2010, applied in 
relation to employment ‘at an establishment in Great Britain’.  Employment was 
regarded as such if 1) the employee worked wholly or partly in Britain, or 2) the 
employee worked wholly outside Britain and the following three criteria were 
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36
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cumulatively fulfilled: a) the employer had a place of business at an establishment in 
Britain, b) the work was for the purposes of the business carried on at that establishment 
and c) the employee was ordinarily resident in Britain either at the time when he applied 
for or was offered employment or at any time during the course of the employment.
41
  
The courts have interpreted this test on several occasions.  The fulfilment of the 
prescribed criteria was to be determined on the basis of the facts existing at the time of 
the alleged discrimination, by taking into account the whole period of employment.
42
  
This was in line with Lawson v Serco.  Furthermore, the ‘work for the purposes of a 
British business’ criterion was held to be identical to the equivalent criterion for 
expatriate employees in Lawson v Serco.
43
  Finally, employees could claim under anti-
discrimination legislation if their work in Britain was not de minimis, even if they were 
not British-based.
44
  But according to Lawson v Serco, s.94(1) ERA 1996, in principle, 
does not apply to foreign-based employees.  Given that historically the rights conferred 
by anti-discrimination legislation and ERA 1996 had had somewhat different territorial 
scopes, it is to be expected that the Lawson v Serco principles will be modified in cases 
concerning EqA 2010.  Indeed, in Van Winkelhof 
45
 the Employment Tribunal regarded 
Lawson v Serco as the leading authority for determining the territorial scope of EqA 
2010.  But it also noted that, ‘If the Tribunal was deciding this under the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 the Tribunal would have had territorial jurisdiction as the 
Claimant satisfied s10(1)(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act as she worked partly in 
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Britain.  The principle behind the Equality Act cannot be to regress from this 
position.’46 
1.1.3. Other statutes 
NMWA 1998 applies to a worker who ‘is working, or ordinarily works, in the United 
Kingdom’.47  LORD HOFFMANN’s categories seem to largely correspond to the 
employees falling within the territorial scope of this Act.
48
 
Certain provisions of TULR(C)A 1992, principally concerning rights in relation 
to trade union membership and activities, do not apply where ‘under his contract of 
employment an employee works, or in the case of a prospective employee would 
ordinarily work, outside Great Britain’.49  Since the repealed s.196(2) ERA 1996 
contained an essentially identical test, the cases interpreting that section are relevant 
under TULR(C)A 1992.  The leading case is Wilson v Maynard Shipbuilding 
Consultants AB
50
 where the Court of Appeal introduced inter alia a rule that, to 
determine whether an employee ordinarily worked inside or outside Britain, the court 
had to consider where the parties had contemplated that the employee’s base would be 
at the time of contracting.  This focus on the terms of the contract, rather than its actual 
performance, led to the highly criticised decision in Carver,
51
 which precipitated the 
repeal of s.196 ERA 1996.  This case concerned an employee recruited in Saudi Arabia 
as a flight attendant.  After training in Jeddah, she was transferred to India for 4 years 
and then to London, which remained her base until she resigned from the employment 6 
years later.  The Court of Appeal found that the employee fell outside the territorial 
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 Cf Merrett (n4) [7.70] (the test under this Act is the same as under the previous anti-discrimination 
legislation). 
49
 s.285(1).  Similarly, the Right to Time Off for Study or Training Regulations 2001 apply to employees 
who ordinarily work in England and Wales: reg.1(2). 
50
 (n19). 
51
 (n14). 
 195 
reach of the right not to be unfairly dismissed because her contract had contemplated 
that she would be based in Saudi Arabia. 
The provisions of the Patents Act 1977 concerning employees’ inventions apply 
to an invention made by an employee if, at the time he made the invention, he was 
mainly employed in the UK; even if the employee was not mainly employed anywhere 
at the relevant time, or if his place of employment could not be determined, the Act 
applies if the employer had a place of business in the UK to which the employee was 
attached.
52
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that some employment statutes lay down special 
provisions concerning employment on ships.  For example, s.199(7) ERA 1996 
prescribes the conditions under which certain provisions of the Act apply to 
employment on board British registered ships.
53
  With regard to employment on board 
non-British registered ships, the Act applies in accordance with the Lawson v Serco 
principles.
54
  Furthermore, the territorial reach of the rights conferred by some 
employment statutes is extended to offshore workers working on the UK and foreign 
sectors of the continental shelf.
55
 
1.2. Contractual rights 
Certain rights conferred by employment legislation are classified as contractual.  The 
employee can invoke those rights if English law governs the employment contract.  
Two questions need to be considered.  First, why are the rules and principles concerning 
the territorial scope of the statutory rights and contractual rights conferred by 
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employment legislation different?  Second, how are the statutory rights to be 
distinguished from the contractual rights? 
The English common law of conflict of laws of obligations, which was partially 
repealed and replaced by the Rome Convention, and is nowadays completely 
superseded by Rome I and Rome II, provides an answer to the first question.  In the 
common law of conflict of laws, the choice-of-law rules, in principle, did not apply to 
statutory rights.  As BRIGGS explains,
56
 statutes are made by Parliament whereas the 
common law choice-of-law rules were made by judges.  In a parliamentary democracy, 
Parliament’s power to legislate could not be bound by such judge-made rules, nor could 
it be Parliament’s intention for its legislation to be bound by such rules.  Consequently, 
legislation applied whenever Parliament intended it to apply.  Sometimes, Parliament’s 
intention was expressed in the statute itself.  This was the case, for instance, with the 
repealed s.196 ERA 1996.  Where it was not, it was the courts’ task to find out ‘what 
Parliament may reasonably be supposed to have intended and attributing to Parliament a 
rational scheme.’57  If a right conferred by employment legislation was classified as 
contractual, it might reasonably be supposed that Parliament intended that right to be 
available whenever English law governed the employment contract.  But if a right was 
classified as statutory, Lawson v Serco shows that different considerations applied.  
Although the English choice-of-law rules for obligations are no longer judge-made, but 
rather come from the legislator sitting in Brussels, the old view is still very much alive. 
The differentiation between the statutory rights and contractual rights conferred 
by employment legislation is a not a straightforward task.  Generally speaking, the 
rights enacted in the form of compulsory terms in contracts, enforceable in ordinary 
contractual disputes, apply whenever English law governs the employment contract, 
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unless the legislation prescribes otherwise.  On the other hand, the rights enacted as 
free-standing claims apply only if the employee falls within their scope pursuant to the 
principles described in the previous section. 
For example, the common law gave employers, by virtue of the defence of 
common employment, a shield against vicarious liability for the torts committed against 
the claimant employee by his fellow employees in the course of employment.  S.1 of the 
Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 abolished such a defence and also rendered 
void any term in an employment contract giving such a defence.  As COLLINS 
convincingly argued,
58
 this section applies to all employment contracts governed by 
English law: 
‘The place where the work is done and the place of the accident must be 
irrelevant, because the section strikes at clauses in employment contracts ab 
initio and the place of employment, and a fortiori the place of the accident, may 
be matters only for speculation when the contract is made.’59 
Further support for this proposition may be found in the words of DENNING LJ (as he 
then was):
60
 ‘The doctrine of common employment was an irrational exception to the 
liability of an employer…  It has now been abolished by statute, and should be 
disregarded in the same way as if it had never been enunciated.  Statute law and 
common law should be integrated into one law.’  If s.1 of the 1948 Act and the common 
law are indeed integrated into one law, this section applies whenever English law 
governs the employment contract. 
The leading decision concerning the differentiation between the statutory rights 
and contractual rights conferred by employment legislation for the purpose of 
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establishing the legislation’s territorial reach is the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Duncombe v Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families.
61
  A question raised 
by this case was whether the rights granted by the Fixed-Term Employees (Prevention 
of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002 should be classified as statutory or 
contractual.  The defendant argued that these rights were statutory and that the claimant 
could invoke them only if the Lawson v Serco principles were satisfied.  In contrast, the 
claimant argued that the 2002 Regulations were a statutory part of English employment 
law, applicable to all contracts governed by English law.  In the claimant’s view, the 
2002 Regulations changed employment law by providing that, in the prescribed 
circumstances, a fixed-term contract transmuted into a permanent contract.  The 
performance of the contract abroad did not prevent that change in the law and that 
change in the contract from taking place.  The claimant found further support for his 
argument in the fact that the 2002 Regulations did not contain an express territorial 
limitation or a provision such as that contained in s.204 ERA 1996.  MUMMERY LJ 
accepted the claimant’s argument.  In his view, 
‘this is simply a case of an employment contract affected by a change in the law 
applying to all employment contracts that satisfy the prescribed conditions.  
Working in Great Britain is not one of the conditions.  This result does not 
infringe any territoriality principle, if what is sought to be enforced is a common 
law claim for breach of a contract governed by English law…’62 
Although the Supreme Court did not have to rule on this issue (because it found that the 
Lawson v Serco principles were satisfied), LADY HALE confirmed obiter this view by 
stating that ‘[t]he rights which workers have [under the 2002 Regulations] are 
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enforceable as part of the contractual arrangements between them and their 
employers’.63 
Further guidance for drawing the line between the rights conferred by 
employment legislation which apply whenever English law governs the employment 
contract and those which apply only if the Lawson v Serco principles are satisfied may 
be found in the repealed s.196 ERA 1996.  The right to a statement of employment 
particulars and minimum period of notice applied whenever the contract was governed 
by English or Scottish law.
64
  Arguably, this was because Parliament perceived these as 
contractual rights.  One may also refer to cases concerning domestic (as opposed to 
international) employment.  For example, in Barber v RJB Mining (UK) Ltd
65
 the 
Working Time Regulations 1998 were held to have imposed into employment contracts 
a right not to work more than 48 hours a week.  There is therefore a good argument that 
the 1998 Regulations affect a change in employment law applicable to all employment 
contracts governed by English law. 
1.3. EU law-derived rights 
Bleuse
66
 established a principle that the employment rights derived from EU law have a 
different territorial scope than purely domestic rights.  Mr Bleuse, a German national 
and resident, was employed by a UK company to work in mainland Europe.  The 
employment contract was expressly governed by English law.  Mr Bleuse invoked 
several rights, including the right not to be unfairly dismissed under ERA 1996 and the 
right to holiday pay under WTR 1998 which implemented the Working Time 
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Directive.
67
  Following Lawson v Serco, however, Mr Bleuse fell outside the territorial 
scope of the purely domestic right not to be unfairly dismissed.  With regard to the right 
to holiday pay, the Employment Appeal Tribunal referred to the fact that the CJEU had 
confirmed that the rights conferred by the Working Time Directive were sufficiently 
precise and clear to be capable of having direct effect.  Although directly effective EU 
law rights could not be pleaded against private defendants, the principle of harmonious 
interpretation gave indirect effect to such rights.  Consequently, the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal had to construe the 1998 Regulations in a manner which gave effect to 
the directly effective EU law rights.  The implied territorial limitations laid down in 
Lawson v Serco were disregarded and Mr Bleuse was held to fall within the territorial 
scope of the right to holiday pay. 
The Court of Appeal extended the Bleuse principle in two later decisions, 
although it should be noted that the defendant in these decisions was the State, not a 
private defendant.  In Wallis
68
 the court held that the directly effective EU law rights 
had to be given effect even if the employee fell outside the express territorial scope of 
the implementing legislation (Sex Discrimination Act 1975, implementing the Equal 
Treatment Directive,
69
 in this case).  In Duncombe v Secretary of State for Children, 
Schools and Families
70
 the Court of Appeal decided that the Bleuse principle applied 
even with regard to the rights derived from EU law which had no direct effect.  LADY 
HALE approved this decision obiter in the following words:  
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‘it would seem unlikely that, if the protection of European employment law is to 
be extended to workers wherever they are working in the area covered by 
European law, that protection should depend upon whether or not it gives rise to 
directly effective rights against organs of the state.  A way would have to be 
found of extending it to private as well as public employment.’71 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in Duncombe held that the principle of effectiveness 
in EU law required that even the territorial limitations of purely domestic rights, such as 
the right not to be unfairly dismissed, should be modified if necessary for the effective 
vindication of the directly effective EU law rights.  Thus, if a claim for unfair dismissal 
is the only effective remedy for the vindication of the right granted by the Fixed-Term 
Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002, which 
implemented the Directive on Fixed-Term Contracts,
72
 the employee should be 
accorded that remedy.  LADY HALE, however, did not address this issue.
73
 
In Bleuse, Wallis and Duncombe the employment contracts were governed by 
English law and contained no non-EU elements.  The situation is more complex if the 
employment contract is governed by a foreign law and particularly if it contains non-EU 
elements.  The fact that another Member State’s law governs the contract does not make 
a substantial difference.  English courts are obliged to construe the laws of other 
Member States in a manner which gives effect to EU law rights in appropriate 
circumstances.
74
  The crucial question is when those circumstances exist, i.e. when the 
employee falls within the territorial scope of EU law rights.  Clearly, if the contract 
contains no non-EU elements, the employee falls within the territorial scope of EU law 
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rights.
75
  But if the contract contains some non-EU elements, the answer is not 
straightforward.  The CJEU dealt, in Ingmar,
76
 with an analogous issue of the territorial 
scope of the Commercial Agents Directive.
77
  Here, the claimant, a UK-based 
commercial agent, operated in the UK and Ireland for the defendant, a Californian 
principal.  Californian law was expressly chosen by the parties.  The CJEU held that, in 
order ‘to protect, for all commercial agents, freedom of establishment and the operation 
of undistorted competition in the internal market’, the mandatory provisions of the 
Directive had to be applied ‘where the situation is closely connected with the 
Community, in particular where the commercial agent carries on his activity in the 
territory of a Member State’.78  It should be noted that, had Rome I been applied to 
determine the objectively applicable law, the law of the agent’s country, i.e. the law of a 
Member State, would have been applicable.
79
  There is no reason why an analogous test 
should not apply to EU law rights concerning employment.  Whether an employment 
situation is closely connected with the EU should primarily be determined pursuant to 
Art.8 Rome I.  Whenever the law of a Member State is the objectively applicable law, 
the employment situation should be regarded as having a strong enough connection with 
the EU, and English courts should construe the applicable law in a manner which gives 
effect to EU law rights.  But even if the objectively applicable law is not the law of a 
Member State, there may be circumstances, such as the performance of some of the 
work in a Member State, which establish a strong enough connection with the EU.
80
  In 
this situation, English courts should give effect to EU law rights regardless of whether 
the applicable law is the law of a Member State. 
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In conclusion, the determination of the territorial scope of the rights conferred 
by employment legislation is a difficult task.  The rules and principles for establishing 
the territorial scope differ depending on the nature and the source of the right and, 
moreover, are in the state of flux. 
2. The importance of choice of law 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Duncombe v Secretary of State for Children, 
Schools and Families
81
 raised two issues that will surely occupy the courts of this 
country in the future, namely the differentiation between the statutory and contractual 
rights conferred by employment legislation and the impact of EU law on the territorial 
scope of employment legislation.  In comparison, the Supreme Court’s decision 
addressing the problem of territoriality
82
 seems, at least at first sight, to be less 
interesting.  It only dealt with the application of the Lawson v Serco principles to an 
unusual factual scenario.  Although this decision departs from the traditional view that 
the determination of the territorial scope of the statutory rights conferred by 
employment legislation is entirely disconnected from the choice-of-law process, the 
immediate impact of this change of view should not be overestimated.  The fact that 
English law governs the employment contract is as of now only one of the factors 
relevant for the application of the Lawson v Serco principles.
83
  But the Supreme 
Court’s decision raises an important question.  Should the choice-of-law process have 
an even greater importance for determining the territorial scope of the statutory 
employment rights?  To answer this question, we must take a closer look at Lawson v 
Serco. 
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2.1. Lawson v Serco: a closer look 
LORD HOFFMANN commenced his speech in Lawson v Serco by stating that ‘[r]ead 
literally, [ERA 1996] applies to any individual who works under a contract of 
employment anywhere in the world’ and that ‘some territorial limitations must be 
implied’ because ‘[i]t is inconceivable that Parliament was intending to confer rights 
upon employees working in foreign countries and having no connection with Great 
Britain’.84  Clearly, Lawson v Serco was based on the assumption that ERA 1996 would 
have world-wide application unless some territorial limitations were implied into it.  
However, this assumption was erroneous.  It disregarded a basic principle of PIL of 
contract that ‘a statute does not normally apply to a contract unless it forms part of the 
governing law of the contract’.85  Therefore, ERA 1996 could have never claimed 
world-wide application, but rather applied, in principle, to employment contracts 
governed by English (or Scottish) law. 
One might point out that the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Financial Times 
Ltd v Bishop
86
 and Bleuse
87
 rejected this very argument for two reasons.  First, because 
s.204 ERA 1996 prescribes that, ‘For the purposes of this Act it is immaterial whether 
the law which (apart from this Act) governs any person’s employment is the law of the 
United Kingdom, or a part of the United Kingdom, or not.’  Second, because the choice-
of-law rules for employment contracts do not apply to statutory, but only to contractual 
rights.  However, neither of these counter-arguments can withstand closer scrutiny. 
A provision such as that contained in s.204 ERA 1996 was first introduced in 
s.9(2) of the Contracts of Employment Act 1963.  At that time, employment contracts 
were subject to the common law choice-of-law rules for contract.  Under those rules, if 
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an employment contract was governed by a foreign law, English law, including statute-
law, was inapplicable.  The purpose of s.9(2) of the 1963 Act was to give this Act ‘the 
character of a statute embodying a principle of public policy so as to exclude the 
application of foreign law...whenever this would infringe the policy of the Act’.88  This 
purpose could not have been achieved otherwise because English courts had been 
reluctant to derive public policy from statute-law, as opposed to case-law, unless 
expressly compelled to do so.
89
  In the same vein, the purpose of s.204 ERA 1996 is to 
impose the application of the Act where the application of a foreign law would infringe 
the Act’s policy.  One might argue that s.204 is also intended to preclude the application 
of the Act where English (or Scottish) law applies only by virtue of the parties’ 
agreement and there is no other relevant connection with Britain.  In other words, one 
might argue that the purpose of s.204 is to make ERA 1996 not only an ‘overriding’ but 
also a ‘self-limiting’ (or possibly a ’self-denying’) statute.90  However, regardless of the 
purpose which s.204 seeks to achieve, one thing is certain.  ERA 1996 was never 
intended to have, and indeed has never had, world-wide application. 
Lawson v Serco concerned the territorial scope of the statutory right not to be 
unfairly dismissed.  One might argue that the choice-of-law rules for contract, including 
the mentioned principle of PIL, do not apply to statutory rights, i.e. that it is exclusively 
the statute which defines the situations where the rights conferred by it apply.  Indeed, 
this was the position under the common law of conflict of laws.
91
  This view also 
formed the basis of the House of Lords decision in Lawson v Serco, as evidenced by the 
fact that LORD HOFFMAN’s speech made no reference to the choice-of-law rules, which 
at the time were contained in the Rome Convention.  In other words, LORD HOFFMAN 
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was of the view that the choice-of-law rules of the Rome Convention merely took the 
place of the preceding common law choice-of-law rules for contract and therefore 
applied only to contractual claims, without affecting the other two types of claims, 
namely statutory and tortious claims.  But this view could not have been correct, since 
the Rome Convention covered not only contractual but also statutory claims, and is 
undoubtedly incorrect nowadays when the choice-of-law rules for all obligations are 
contained in Rome I and Rome II.
92
 
The following text demonstrates that the choice-of-law rules of both the Rome 
Convention and Rome I cover statutory claims.  The Rome Convention applies ‘to 
contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of different 
countries.’93  Rome I applies ‘in situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual 
obligations in civil and commercial matters.’94  Rome II applies ‘in situations involving 
a conflict of laws, to non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters.’95  
Employment matters are undoubtedly ‘civil and commercial matters’.96  The respective 
scopes of the Rome Convention and the two Regulations depend on the classification of 
the relevant obligation, i.e. the defendant’s obligation forming the basis of the claim.  
Where the basis of the employee’s claim is the employer’s breach of statutory duty, it is 
the classification of this duty that is crucial.  Under the Rome Convention and the two 
Regulations, (non)contractual obligations are autonomous concepts, independent of any 
national law.
97
  The fact that a breach of statutory duty normally gives rise to tortious 
                                                 
92
 Rome I superseded the Rome Convention on 17 December 2009 in relation to all contracts concluded 
after this date: Arts.28, 29(2).  Rome II repealed and replaced, in matters falling within its scope, national 
choice-of-law rules on 11 January 2009 in relation to events giving rise to damage which occurred after 
its entry into force: Arts.31, 32. 
93
 Art.1(1). 
94
 Art.1(1). 
95
 Art.1(1). 
96
 Case 25/79 Sanicentral [1979] ECR 3423. 
97
 This is unambiguously stated in Rome II, Recital 11.  See also Rome Convention, Art.18; Rome I, 
Recital 7. 
 207 
liability in English substantive law
98
 is consequently not determinative.  At least until 
the CJEU has had the chance to rule on these concepts for the purposes of the choice-of-
law instruments, the classification of an obligation as (non)contractual should be done 
by reference to the CJEU case-law on the interpretation of Art.5(1) (special jurisdiction 
in ‘matters relating to a contract’) and 5(3) (special jurisdiction in ‘matters relating to 
tort, delict or quasi-delict’) of the Brussels Convention and Brussels I.99  In Kalfelis v 
Schröder
100
 the CJEU held that Art.5(3) of the Brussels Convention covered ‘all actions 
which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a 
“contract” within the meaning of Article 5(1)’.101  The concepts of ‘contract’ and ‘tort, 
delict or quasi-delict’ in the Brussels Convention and Brussels I are therefore mutually 
exclusive.  By analogy, if an obligation is classified as contractual for the purposes of 
the Rome Convention or Rome I, it cannot be concurrently classified as non-contractual 
for choice-of-law purposes.  The CJEU has broadly interpreted the concept of ‘contract’ 
within the meaning of Art.5(1) of the Brussels Convention and Brussels I.  Importantly 
for the present discussion, in Jakob Handte v TMCS
102
 the CJEU held that ‘the phrase 
”matters relating to a contract”...is not to be understood as covering a situation in which 
there is no obligation freely assumed by one party towards another.’103  Similarly, the 
Rome Convention and Rome I should not apply to obligations that are not freely 
assumed by one party towards another.  By entering into an employment contract, the 
parties freely assume obligations arising under the applicable employment legislation as 
legal incidents of the contract.  Such obligations should, therefore, be classified as 
contractual for the purposes of the Rome Convention and Rome I, and it is these 
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instruments that determine the applicable law whenever the basis of the employee’s 
claim is the employer’s breach of statutory duty. 
A recent CJEU decision in Koelzsch
104
 provides further support for this 
proposition.  Following his dismissal, Mr Koelzsch commenced proceedings against the 
employer for, among other things, breach of the provisions of the German statute 
concerning dismissal (Kündigungsschutzgesetz).  The CJEU had no doubts that the 
obligations imposed by the German statute were contractual for the purposes of the 
Rome Convention. 
In Lawson v Serco, therefore, LORD HOFFMANN started off with a wrong 
assumption that ERA 1996 would have world-wide application unless some territorial 
limitations were implied into it.  ERA 1996 could have never claimed world-wide 
application, since it applies, in principle, to employment contracts governed by English 
(or Scottish) law.  What his Lordship should have asked was whether there was a good 
reason to imply territorial limitations into ERA 1996 where this Act applied as part of 
the applicable English law or whether there was a good reason to apply ERA 1996 
where English law was not the applicable law.  Had the right question been asked, his 
Lordship would have had to lay down different principles for determining the territorial 
reach of ERA 1996, which principles would have had to take into account the governing 
law of the employment contract.  Before further dealing with these issues, the 
boundaries that the ‘European’ choice-of-law rules set for the application of 
employment legislation must be considered more closely. 
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2.2. ‘European’ choice-of-law rules and the boundaries within which 
British employment legislation applies 
With regard to the determination of the objectively applicable law, an English lawyer 
will find it hard to object to the connecting factors used by Rome I.  The rules for 
determining the objectively applicable law of Art.8 are based on essentially the same 
principles that LORD HOFFMANN expounded in Lawson v Serco and LADY HALE and 
LORD HOPE refined in Duncombe (No 2) and Ravat.  Art.8(2) lays down the rule that the 
applicable law is the law of the country ‘in which or, failing that, from which’ the 
employee habitually works.  According to LORD HOFFMANN, the standard case for the 
application of ERA 1996 is the employee working in Britain at the time of the 
dismissal.  ERA 1996 also applies to peripatetic employees based in Britain.  These two 
categories of employees are the same as those contemplated by Art.8(2).  Furthermore, 
LORD HOFFMANN held that, exceptionally, ERA 1996 could also apply to employees 
who neither worked nor were based in Britain provided there was a sufficiently strong 
connection between them and Britain and British employment law.  LORD HOPE 
confirmed that the relevant test was one of (exceptionally) strong connection.  
Similarly, Art.8(4) allows, by way of exception, departure from the choice-of-law rules 
of Art.8(2) and 8(3) in favour of the law of the country with which the employment 
contract is more closely connected.  One might argue that there is not such a close fit 
between Art.8 and the Lawson v Serco principles after all because Art.8(3) allows, 
where Art.8(2) is inapplicable, the application of the law of the country of the engaging 
place of business, whereas Lawson v Serco gives no significance to this connecting 
factor.
105
  But the CJEU has interpreted the connecting factor used in Art.8(2) so widely 
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that there are almost no situations falling under Art.8(3).  Consequently, whenever 
English law is objectively applicable, the employee will normally fall within the 
territorial scope of employment legislation. 
Art.9(2) Rome I allows the courts to apply domestic overriding mandatory 
provisions.  Overriding mandatory provisions are defined in Art.9(1) as ‘provisions the 
respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public 
interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such extent that they 
are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law 
otherwise applicable to the contract.’106 
As mentioned, s.204 ERA 1996 prescribes that, for the purposes of this Act, it is 
immaterial whether the proper law of the employment contract is or is not the law of the 
UK or part of it.  Some authors argue, and the courts implicitly accept, that the effect of 
this section is to turn all provisions of the Act into overriding mandatory provisions that 
apply to all situations falling within their scope regardless of the applicable law.  
Indeed, this is the position adopted by the authors of Dicey, Morris & Collins on the 
Conflict of Laws
107
 and by PLENDER and WILDERSPIN.
108
  They argue that Art.9(1) 
Rome I gives a country the freedom to decide for itself which provisions of its law are 
overridingly mandatory.  In their view, s.204 ERA 1996 establishes that all provisions 
of the Act are of this nature.  They go even further and argue that the provisions of all 
other pieces of employment legislation, even if they do not contain a provision such as 
that contained in s.204, are overriding mandatory provisions that apply to all situations 
falling within their express or implied territorial scope.  But this argument blurs the 
                                                                                                                                               
196 means that the courts are no longer rigidly confined to this single litmus test.’ (emphasis added).  If 
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difference between a provision’s overriding effect and its territorial scope.  It is possible 
that a provision is overridingly mandatory, but an employee falls outside its territorial 
scope.  Conversely, it is also possible that an employee falls within a provison’s 
territorial scope, but cannot rely on it, since it does not override the applicable law. 
British employment statutes cannot, in their entirety, be regarded as overriding 
mandatory provisions.  The CJEU decision in Commission v Luxembourg
109
 supports 
this proposition with regard to the situations falling within the scope of PWD.  Under 
Art.3(1) PWD, Member States must apply, regardless of the applicable law, provisions 
concerning 7 listed matters to undertakings established in other Members States which, 
in the framework of the transnational provision of services, post workers to their 
territory.  The following are the listed matters: maximum work periods and minimum 
rest periods, minimum paid annual holidays, minimum rates of pay, conditions of 
hiring-out of workers, health, safety and hygiene at work, protection of pregnant 
women, women who have recently given birth, children and young people, non-
discrimination.  Under Art.3(10) PWD, Member States may also apply ‘public policy 
provisions’ concerning non-listed matters.  Commission v Luxembourg dealt with a 
provision of a Luxembourg statute which provided that all laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions etc. concerning certain matters, some of which were not listed 
in Art.3(1), were ‘mandatory provisions falling under national public policy’.  The 
CJEU noted that: 
‘the classification of national provisions by a Member State as public-order 
legislation applies to national provisions compliance with which has been 
deemed to be so crucial for the protection of the political, social or economic 
order in the Member State concerned as to require compliance therewith by all 
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persons present on the national territory of that Member State and all legal 
relationships within that State.’110 
Furthermore, the CJEU stated that Art.3(10), as a derogation from the fundamental 
freedom to provide services and from the ‘exhaustive’ list of Art.3(1), had to be 
interpreted strictly and its scope could not be determined unilaterally by Member 
States.
111
  The Court then found that the provisions of Luxembourg law concerning non-
listed matters, despite the express statutory wording to the contrary, did not satisfy the 
Art.3(10) ‘public policy provisions’ test.  This decision shows that the provisions 
contained in Member States’ employment legislation concerning non-listed matters are 
highly unlikely to satisfy the Art.3(10) test, even if there is a provision which expressly 
prescribes that they are overridingly mandatory.  There is no other way in which such 
provisions can override the applicable law in situations falling within the scope of 
PWD.
112
 
Another question is whether the provisions contained in British employment 
legislation can override the applicable law in situations falling outside the scope of 
PWD.  It is possible (although far from certain), for three reasons, that the CJEU will 
impose limitations on the concept of ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ of Art.9(1) 
Rome I, which will make the provisions contained in employment legislation 
concerning matters not listed in Art.3(1) PWD highly unlikely to be regarded as 
overriding mandatory provisions.  First, in the view of the European Commission, PWD 
is an implementation of Art.9 Rome I.
113
  If so, provisions concerning 7 listed matters 
will be regarded as overridingly mandatory in the sense of Art.9(1).  Provisions 
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concerning other matters will be regarded as overridingly mandatory only if they satisfy 
the test of Art.9(1), i.e. if they are ‘crucial...for safeguarding...political, social or 
economic organisation’, which is the same test as the one of Art.3(10) PWD.  This 
position seems to be further supported by the wording of Recital 37 Rome I which states 
that ‘[c]onsiderations of public interest justify giving the courts of the Member States 
the possibility, in exceptional circumstances, of applying exceptions based 
on…overriding  mandatory provisions’.  Second, the definition of ‘overriding 
mandatory provisions’ in Art.9(1) is derived from the CJEU decision in Arblade and 
Leloup
114
 which concerned derogations from the fundamental freedom to provide 
services.  One might argue that the almost word-by-word transposition of the relevant 
part of the Arblade and Leloup decision into Art.9(1) suggests that the concept of 
‘overriding mandatory provisions’ is indeed narrow.115  Finally, an employee needs to 
invoke the concept of overriding mandatory provisions of Art.9(1) only when he falls 
within the territorial scope of a right conferred by British employment legislation, but 
neither English nor Scottish law is applicable.  This is presumably a rare occurrence 
given that the principles for determining the territorial scope of statutory rights 
conferred by employment legislation are essentially the same as those underlying Art.8 
Rome I.  Presumably, all such occurrences concern postings of workers to Britain.  But 
the vast majority of postings of workers to Britain fall within the scope of PWD and the 
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provisions contained in employment legislation concerning non-listed matters can then 
apply only if the test of Art.3(10) PWD is satisfied.  One might argue that allowing 
unrestricted application of such provisions in situations concerning other postings of 
workers to Britain would undermine the choice-of-law process, as well as run counter to 
the goals of legal certainty, predictability, uniformity of result and discouragement of 
forum shopping which underlie Rome I. 
So how likely are the provisions contained in British employment legislation 
concerning matters not listed in Art.3(1) PWD to satisfy the test of Art.9(1) Rome I?  
For example, unfair dismissal is not a listed matter although its importance for the 
political, social and economic organisation of a country is, without a doubt, great.  But it 
is not certain that the provisions concerning unfair dismissal of ERA 1996 rise to the 
standard of Art.9(1).  Until 6 April 2012, these provisions applied to the dismissal of 
employees who had been continuously employed for more than a year.
116
  But the 
qualifying period of employment has now been raised to two years.  The Office for 
National Statistics figures suggest that an extra 12% of employees have been denied the 
chance to claim unfair dismissal as a result of the change.
117
  Provisions which exclude 
such a large number of working population from their scope seem unlikely to be crucial 
for safeguarding political, social or economic organisation. 
Furthermore, one might argue that there is a link between the breadth of the 
personal scope of employment legislation and its overriding effect.  Many provisions 
contained in British employment legislation concerning matters listed in Art.3(1) PWD 
extend beyond ‘employees’, i.e. persons working under employment contracts, to 
encompass wider categories of persons.  Thus, provisions concerning working time and 
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minimum wage also cover ‘workers’.118  Provisions concerning anti-discrimination 
apply to ‘employment under a contract of employment, a contract of apprenticeship or a 
contract personally to do work’.119  Provisions concerning health and safety have the 
widest personal scope; they also extend to independent contractors.
120
  On the other 
hand, almost all of the provisions concerning non-listed matters apply only to 
‘employees’.  An explanation for this difference in personal scope is that the legal 
regulation primarily directed at the possible misuse of managerial authority is confined 
to contracts of employment because those contracts contain the implied terms of the 
requirement of loyalty and performance in good faith.
121
  But when legal regulation is 
directed primarily at the operation of the labour market, as in the case of working time, 
wages and anti-discrimination legislation, the personal scope is broader.
122
  A similar 
argument could be advanced with regard to the overriding effect of employment 
legislation.  If a provision primarily concerns the possible misuse of managerial 
authority, it should apply only if English (or Scottish) law governs the contract.  But if a 
provision is primarily concerned with the operation of the labour market, it could have 
an overriding effect.
123
  By way of comparison, the German Bundesarbeitsgericht has 
expressly held that the German provisions concerning unfair dismissal are not 
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overridingly mandatory, since they do not have the protection of public interests as their 
primary purpose, but rather the balancing out of the parties’ individual interests.124 
If the provisions concerning unfair dismissal of ERA 1996 do not satisfy the test 
of Art.9(1) Rome I, it will be difficult to find any provision contained in ERA 1996 or 
in any other piece of employment legislation concerning a non-listed matter which can 
do so.  Therefore, if the concept of ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ of Art.9(1) Rome 
I is limited to provisions which are ‘crucial...for safeguarding...political, social or 
economic organisation’ of a country, it is possible that the provisions contained in 
British employment legislation concerning matters not listed in Art.3(1) PWD, 
including unfair dismissal, will apply only if English (or Scottish law) governs the 
employment contract. 
2.3. Should the Lawson v Serco approach be abandoned? 
Had LORD HOFFMANN not started off with a wrong assumption in Lawson v Serco, 
namely that ERA 1996 would have world-wide application unless some territorial 
limitations were implied into it, his Lordship would have found it difficult to imply any 
territorial limitations into this Act.  The question before his Lordship would have been 
whether there was a good reason to imply territorial limitations where ERA 1996 
applied as part of the applicable English law.  Two types of cases should have been 
distinguished: those where English law was objectively applicable and those where 
English law was the chosen law. 
Before proceeding further, a preliminary issue must be addressed.  One might 
argue that the rules limiting the territorial scope of British employment legislation are to 
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be regarded as choice-of-law rules.  Their application would then be precluded 
whenever English law is applicable either because the Rome Convention and Rome I 
displace national choice-of-law rules in situations falling within their scope or because 
they exclude renvoi.
125
  The nature of such self-limiting rules was discussed in the past.  
Some saw them as choice-of-law rules,
126
 others as substantive law rules which 
prescribe a condition for the application of a right.
127
  Suffice it to say that nowadays in 
England the latter view is unanimously, and correctly, accepted.
128
  The rules limiting 
the territorial scope of employment legislation are therefore a creature of statutory 
construction and apply, like any other rule limiting the scope of employment legislation 
(e.g. qualifying period of employment), even when English law is the applicable law. 
So would there have been a good reason to imply territorial limitations into ERA 
1996 when the Act applied as part of the objectively applicable English law?  Given that 
the rules for determining the objectively applicable law for employment contracts of the 
Rome Convention and Rome I are based on essentially the same principles that the 
House of Lords laid down in Lawson v Serco and the Supreme Court refined in 
Duncombe (No 2) and Ravat, any implication of territorial limitations when English law 
was objectively applicable would have been hard to justify.  This would have been 
particularly so where the parties did not choose a law that was different from the 
objectively applicable English law.  The implication of territorial limitations in such 
situations could lead to a legal vacuum, i.e. to English law being the only applicable 
law, but the employee being unable to invoke any protective provisions of that law. 
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However, one might argue that ‘the general principle of construction...that 
legislation is prima facie territorial’129 at least precludes the application of ERA 1996 
where English law is only the chosen law and not also the objectively applicable law.  
But according to Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, if the ‘presumption 
that Parliament does not design its statutes to operate beyond the territorial limits of the 
United Kingdom...still exists, it is one which is easily rebutted.’130  There are good 
reasons why this ‘presumption’ should be rebutted in cases concerning employment 
legislation.  S.2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 expresses Parliament’s 
intention that all its legislation, past, present and future, must be ‘construed and have 
effect’ in accordance with EU law.  Since the territorial limitations of employment 
legislation are contrary to three objectives of Rome I, namely party autonomy, 
employee protection and legal certainty, Parliament must be presumed to have intended 
its employment legislation to apply, in principle, within the boundaries determined by 
the choice-of-law rules of Rome I.  Furthermore, one must bear in mind that the 
provisions of Rome I have direct effect in EU law.  The principle of effectiveness in EU 
law requires that all national provisions which preclude their effectiveness be modified 
or disregarded.  With regard to the Rome Convention, admittedly this instrument is not 
part of EU law and does not have direct effect.  Nevertheless, an English court mindful 
of its international character and of the desirability of achieving uniformity in its 
interpretation and application
131
 would have to take into consideration the objectives 
pursued by this instrument and refrain from implying the territorial limitations into 
employment legislation. 
                                                 
129
 Lawson v Serco (n1) [6]. 
130
 (n4) [1-038].  Also Dutson (n57) 675. 
131
 Rome Convention, Art.18. 
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First, party autonomy is the ‘cornerstone’ of the Rome Convention and Rome 
I.
132
  English law allows the parties to incorporate the provisions of ERA 1996 
concerning say unfair dismissal into their employment contract, which provisions are 
then enforceable in ordinary contractual disputes.  There does not seem to be a good 
reason why the parties should not be allowed to achieve the same result by means of a 
choice-of-law clause in favour of English law.  The Employment Appeal Tribunal tried 
to counter this argument in Financial Times Ltd v Bishop
133
 by holding that a 
‘Senegalese employee working in Peru for a Wisconsin corporation [should] not be 
enabled to bring proceedings in the Tribunals here to assert the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed simply because his contract of employment happened to provide that English 
law was the proper law of his contract.’  Leaving aside the point that English courts 
might not have international jurisdiction to hear the claim in such a case, it should be 
noted that no rational employee from Senegal working in Peru would agree with a 
rational employer from Wisconsin on the application of English law.  The more likely 
scenario is a choice-of-law clause in an employment contract between an Englishman 
and an English or a foreign company or between a foreigner and an English company.  
When such parties choose English law, they expect the whole of English law, including 
statute-law, to apply.  In particular, the legitimate expectations of English employees are 
not upheld if the choice of English law does not lead to the application of the statutory 
employment rights, which are the primary means of employee protection in this 
country.  Even the Supreme Court recognised this by stating, in Duncombe (No 2), that 
the fact that English law was chosen by the parties: 
‘must be relevant to the expectation of each party as to the protection which the 
employee would enjoy.  The law of unfair dismissal does not form part of the 
contractual terms and conditions of employment, but it was devised by 
                                                 
132
 Rome I, Recital 11. 
133
 (n6) [55]. 
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Parliament in order to fill a well-known gap in the protection offered by the 
common law to those whose contracts were ended.’134 
Moreover, a typical feature of the employment relation is the asymmetry of 
information.  The employer is more likely than the employee to know the law.  The 
employer may use this knowledge to its advantage when drafting standard form contract 
of employment.  As the law stands, the employer who is knowledgeable of the territorial 
limitations of the statutory employment rights and who employs employees to work 
abroad can, almost without any adverse consequences on its part, insert a choice-of-law 
clause in favour of English law.  On the other hand, the employee is unlikely to be 
knowledgeable of the problem of territoriality.  If he sees an English choice-of-law 
clause, he will assume that he is entitled to the protection of the whole of English law, 
including statute-law.  He might even be told so by his employer, as the employee in 
Ravat was.  Furthermore, an English employee might even accept a somewhat lower 
salary in return for the application of ‘his’ law.  In order to eradicate such adverse 
consequences of asymmetry of information, the whole of English law, including statute-
law, should, in principle, be applied whenever English law is chosen by the parties. 
Second, the territorial limitations preclude the operation of the protective 
mechanism of the Rome Convention and Rome I whenever English law is only the 
chosen law.  A way in which these instruments seek to achieve employee protection is 
by allowing the parties to choose a law that provides better protection than the 
objectively applicable law.  If English law is only the chosen law, the Lawson v Serco 
principles preclude the application of the statutory employment rights, the primary 
means of employee protection in this country.  Therefore, the territorial limitations 
undermine the objective of employee protection. 
                                                 
134
 (n3) [16].  See also Ravat (n3) [32]. 
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Third, the territorial limitations run afoul of the objective of legal certainty.  
Duncombe v Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families
135
 is the best proof 
of how uncertain it is to foresee the exact territorial scope of the rights conferred by 
employment legislation and the outcome of litigation.  It is expected that the questions 
of differentiation between statutory and contractual rights conferred by employment 
legislation and of impact of EU law on the territorial scope of employment legislation 
will continue to cause considerable legal uncertainly in the future. 
Finally, employment legislation of mainland European Member States is not, in 
principle, of strictly territorial application like most of British employment legislation.  
Thus, if the parties choose French or German law, employment legislation of these 
countries, in principle, applies even if French or German law is only the chosen law.
136
  
In these cases, employees are accorded the protection of the most favourable provisions 
found in French or German law and in the objectively applicable law.  The territorial 
limitations of the statutory rights conferred by British employment legislation, however, 
mean that these rights do not apply in analogous situations, i.e. when English (or 
Scottish) law is only the chosen law.  These territorial limitations thereby put British 
employers, who are more likely than employers from other Member States to agree on 
the application of English (or Scottish) law, in an unjustifiably better position in relation 
                                                 
135
 (n3) and (n61). 
136
 See e.g. Cour de cassation, SA CIEC v Piriou, 28 October 1997 [1998] Droit social 186, note M.-A. 
Moreau; Bundesarbeitsgericht, 21 January 1999 [1999] IPRspr No 46.  One might note that in Sayers v 
International Drilling Co NV [1971] 1 WLR 1176 the Court of Appeal found that a provision of Dutch 
law invalidating a clause in the contract of employment exempting the employer from liability for injury 
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between an ordinary contract and what is called an international contract of employment.  As far as an 
international contract is concerned the clause excluding the master's liability for negligence is effective.  
There was no explanation in the evidence of the Dutch lawyer as to what constitutes an international 
contract; nor any authority cited as to the effect of such a contract.  However, there was no cross-
examination and no evidence called on the part of the plaintiff on this issue.  The judge accordingly had 
no alternative other than to accept as he did the evidence of the Dutch lawyer.’  But according to P.M. 
North this was an erroneous conclusion as to Dutch law: ‘Reform, but not Revolution’ (1990-I) 220 
Recueil des Cours 9, 226, fn743, citing T.M. de Boer, Beyond Lex Loci Delicti: Conflicts Methodology 
and Multistate Torts in American Case Law (The Hague, 1987) 186. 
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to comparable employers from other Member States.  One wonders if this is in 
accordance with EU law. 
In conclusion, the Lawson v Serco approach should be abandoned for two 
reasons.  First, the principles that this case lays down are the same as those underlying 
the rules for determining the objectively applicable law for employment contracts of the 
Rome Convention and Rome I.  Second, the limitations of the territorial scope of 
employment legislation are contrary to the objectives pursued by these instruments, 
especially when English law is the chosen law.  It is not suggested here that the 
territorial limitations should be completely abolished.  If there are good reasons to limit 
the application of the provisions of a particular piece of employment legislation, e.g. 
health and safety legislation, to a particular territory, Parliament is free to do so.  
However, the territorial limitations should not be routinely implied into employment 
legislation. 
Conclusions 
In the common law of conflict of laws of employment, statutory claims were regarded 
as a different category from contractual and tortious claims.  The determination of the 
territorial scope of the statutory rights conferred by employment legislation forming part 
of English law was regarded as an issue entirely disconnected from the choice-of-law 
process.  The conventional view has been upheld by the House of Lords in Lawson v 
Serco and by the Supreme Court in recent cases. 
But Rome I, and to a certain extent the Rome Convention, have radically 
changed the law in this field.  First, since both of these instruments apply to statutory 
claims, employment legislation does not have world-wide application because it applies, 
in principle, to employment contracts governed by English (or Scottish) law.  Second, 
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there are no reasons to routinely impose territorial limitations into the statutory 
employment rights when English law is objectively applicable, since the rules for 
determining the objectively applicable law for employment contracts of the Rome 
Convention and Rome I are based on essentially the same principles that the House of 
Lords laid down in Lawson v Serco and the Supreme Court later refined.  Third, the 
territorial limitations of the statutory employment rights should be avoided as far as 
possible when English law is the chosen law.  Such territorial limitations are not only 
contrary to the objectives of party autonomy, employee protection and legal certainty 
pursued by the Rome Convention and Rome I but also put British employers who 
employ employees to work abroad in an unjustifiably better position in relation to 
comparable employers from other Member States.  Finally, it is possible that the 
concept of ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ of Art.9(1) Rome I will be limited to 
provisions which are ‘crucial...for safeguarding...political, social or economic 
organisation’ of a country, in which case the provisions contained in employment 
legislation will have overriding effect, i.e. apply when English law is not the law 
governing the employment contract, only if the stringent requirements of Art.9(1) are 
satisfied.  If so, it is possible that the provisions concerning unfair dismissal of ERA 
1996 will not be regarded as overriding mandatory provisions and will apply only if 
English (or Scottish) law governs the employment contract.  In other words, Rome I, 
and to a certain extent even the Rome Convention, seem to have in effect largely 
merged contractual and statutory claims into a single category for the purposes of PIL.  
Consequently, the approach pursued in Lawson v Serco is no longer correct, if it ever 
was, and should not be followed in the future.  The following chapter examines 
whether, and to what extent, Rome I impacts tortious claims. 
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VII TORTIOUS CLAIMS 
 
‘The plaintiff can advance his claim, as 
he wishes, either in contract or in tort; 
and no doubt he will, acting on advice, 
advance his claim on the basis which is 
most advantageous to him.’ 
GOFF LJ
1
 
 
In English employment law, employees can sometimes commence proceedings in tort.  
An employee may bring a claim for breach of the employer’s personal and non-
delegable duty of care or on the basis of the employer’s vicarious liability for the torts 
of employees committed in the course of employment.  In addition to being able to sue 
in tort in these two types of case, employees may also proceed in contract for breach of 
the employer’s implied duty to take reasonable care of their employees’ health and 
safety.
2
  Employees are not only free to choose the legal basis on which to advance their 
claims but also to frame them in both tort and contract and get the best of both worlds,
3
 
subject to the rule against double recovery.  Employers can also sometimes sue their 
employees on multiple bases.  For example, an employee owes duties in relation to the 
employer’s intangible assets, in particular its intellectual property including commercial 
know-how and goodwill; these duties are both implied in the contract and form part of a 
                                                 
1
 [1983] 1 WLR 1136 (CA), 1153. 
2
 Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555 (HL), 573 (‘It is trite law that a single act 
of negligence may give rise to a claim either in tort or for breach of a term express or implied in a 
contract’, per Lord Simmonds). 
3
 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL), 193-194 (‘the common law is not 
antipathetic to concurrent liability, and...there is no sound basis for a rule which automatically restricts the 
claimant to either a tortious or a contractual remedy’, per Lord Goff). 
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general set of obligations to refrain from breach of confidence.
4
  Similarly, during 
employment an employee owes duties not to compete with the employer’s interests or 
act negatively in relation to them.
5
  Breach of such duties can be conceptualised either 
as a breach of an implied contractual term or as a tort of conspiracy. 
Do the parties to an international employment contract have an analogous 
freedom in PIL and, if so, under what conditions?  In other words, can a party advance 
his claim either on a tortious or a contractual basis depending on whether he finds the 
law governing the tort (the lex delicti) or the law governing the contract (the lex 
contractus) more advantageous?  Can a party proceed on both bases and win the case if 
his claim succeeds under one of the governing laws?  This chapter first explores these 
and related questions and discusses the choice-of-law rules of Rome II.  It then 
examines the choice-of-law problems concerning contractual exemption clauses. 
1. Concurrent causes of action in choice of law 
The crux of the problem is best described by BRIGGS: does a claimant have, and should 
he have, ‘the freedom...to choose the choice of law rule which will dictate the result of 
the claim he advances against a defendant’?6  This question opens a host of other 
questions.  Which law decides whether such freedom is allowed?  Is this a matter of 
procedure, governed by the lex fori, or substance, governed by the law applicable to the 
merits (the lex causae)?  If it is a matter of substance, is it governed by the lex delicti or 
the lex contractus?  What if the lex delicti and the lex contractus are different laws that 
are in disagreement on whether the claimant is free to advance his claim on more than 
one basis or to frame the claim on multiple bases simultaneously?  Or do Rome II and 
                                                 
4
 M. Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford, 2003) 173-174. 
5
 ibid 174. 
6
 A. Briggs, ‘Choice of Choice of Law’ [2003] LMCLQ 12. 
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Rome I provide an autonomous solution?  Before answering these questions, the way in 
which the English common law of conflict of laws dealt with concurrence is sketched. 
1.1. The common law 
In relation to concurrence, the common law of conflict of laws mirrored substantive 
law.  The claimant was free to formulate his claim on any basis for which there was a 
separate choice-of-law category (contract, tort, equity etc.), plead only the facts 
necessary to establish the cause of action and, consequently, trigger the application of 
the corresponding choice-of-law rules.  This is supported by Matthews v Kuwait Bechtel 
Corp,
7
 Coupland v Arabian Gulf Oil Co,
8
 and Johnson v Coventry Churchill 
International Ltd.
9
  The claimants in these cases suffered injuries at work abroad and 
sued their employers in England.  According to SELLERS LJ in Matthews, ‘It is at the 
election of the workman in circumstances such as these whether...he will sue in contract 
or sue in tort.’10  The statement of GOFF LJ in Coupland cited in the introduction to this 
chapter is to the same effect.  The reason for pursuing the claim on one or the other 
basis may lie, for example, in the differences between the substantive rules of the lex 
delicti and the lex contractus (different limitation periods, different rules concerning 
damages etc.) or in the possibility of invoking different heads of jurisdiction under the 
English traditional rules.
11
  The claimant in Matthews was allowed to frame his claim in 
contract, whereas the claimants in Johnson and Coupland advanced their claims in tort. 
The claimant was also free to accumulate causes of action, i.e. to advance his 
claim on as many bases for which there was a separate choice-of-law category for 
                                                 
7
 [1959] 2 QB 57. 
8
 (n1). 
9
 [1992] 3 All ER 14 (QB). 
10
 (n7) 67. 
11
 Civil Procedure Rules, Practice Direction 6B, para.3.1 does not contain a special head of jurisdiction 
for employment matters.  Consequently, the basis on which the employment claim is advanced is crucial 
as it allows the claimant to rely on different heads of jurisdiction where the permission of the court is 
needed to serve the claim form on the defendant out of the jurisdiction. 
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breach of essentially one duty.  In Base Metal Trading Ltd v Shamurin
12
 the claimant 
company sued its director, who was also one of its corporators and employed by it as a 
trader, for causing it loss by performing his trading activities negligently or 
incompetently.  The claim was advanced on three bases: 1) for breach of the 
employment contract, 2) for breach of the common law duty of care, 3) for breach of the 
director’s equitable duty of care.  The court examined each cause of action independent 
of the others and found that the contractual and tortious causes of action were governed 
by a different law from that governing the equitable one.  The claim, however, failed 
under both governing laws.  Shamurin shows that the common law of conflict of laws 
permitted the claimant to advance his claim on multiple bases and to win the entire case 
if he was successful under at least one of them. 
With this background in mind, the following text explores how the European 
choice-of-law instruments deal with concurrence. 
1.2. Is concurrence a procedural issue? 
The question whether the claimant is free to choose the choice-of-law rule(s) in 
European PIL is one of classification.  Should it be regarded as a matter of procedure or 
substance?  Rome II and Rome I prescribe that they do not apply to evidence and 
procedure,
13
 but provide no guidance on how evidentiary or procedural matters are to be 
distinguished from substantive ones.  If the question were one of procedure, as some 
suggest,
14
 English courts could simply continue to follow the common law approach.  
To resolve this problem of classification, one must look into the origin of that approach. 
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 [2002] CLC 322 (QB); [2003] EWHC 2419; [2004] EWCA Civ 1316 (Shamurin). 
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 Rome II, Art.1(3); Rome I, Art.1(3). 
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 R. Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (Oxford, 2010) [5.34]-[5.35]; J. Hill and A. Chong, 
International Commercial Disputes: Commercial Conflict of Laws in English Courts (Oxford, 4
th
 ed, 
2010) [15.4.5].  See also European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Proposal 
of Rome II COM(2003) 427 final, 12-13. 
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According to WEIR,
15
 English law permits concurrence because the categories of 
contract and tort are not intrinsic to the common law.  Historically, English law was 
categorised by reference to procedural forms of action through which liability could be 
asserted.  ‘[T]he whole development of English law may be traced through decisions 
where the judges finally allowed another and better remedy alongside an existing one.’16  
The procedural forms were abolished in the mid-19
th
 century and replaced with 
substantive categories such as contract and tort.  Since it was not easy to reallocate to 
the categories of contract and tort the liabilities which had existed under the procedural 
forms, English lawyers struggled to classify various obligations that had been 
recognised.  Concurrent liability (i.e. the existence of essentially one duty in different 
branches of the law) was permitted, since the law had already been accustomed to 
concurrence of procedural forms. 
The common law of conflict of laws, presumably under the influence of the old 
thinking, continued to regard the nature and extent of remedies as procedural matters.
17
  
One might assume that, from the English viewpoint, the question whether concurrence 
is permitted in choice of law should, by analogy with the closely related issue of 
remedies, also be regarded as one of procedure.  However, Rome II expressly provides 
that ‘the existence, the nature, and the assessment of damage or the remedy claimed’ are 
matters of substance, governed by the lex causae.
18
  Consequently, the view that, for 
classification purposes, the issue of concurrence should be treated in the same way as 
the issue of remedies actually leads to the former being classified as substantive for the 
purposes of Rome II and Rome I. 
                                                 
15
 T. Weir, ‘Complex Liabilities’ in A. Tunc (ed), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law Vol 11 
(Tübingen, 1983-) Ch 12, [67]-[68]. 
16
 ibid [67]. 
17
 L. Collins (gen ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (London, 14
th
 ed, 2006) [7-006]–
[7-009]; J.J. Fawcett and J.M. Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law 
(Oxford, 14
th
 ed, 2008) 94-95. 
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 Art.15(c).  See also Rome I, Art.12(1)(c). 
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Anyway, the issue of concurrence must be treated as substantive on its own 
merit.  Two Commonwealth authorities are useful for drawing the line between 
substance and procedure in PIL.  In John Pfeiffer Pty v Rogerson
19
 the High Court of 
Australia stated that ‘matters that affect the existence, extent or enforceability of the 
rights or duties of the parties to an action are matters that, on their face, appear to be 
concerned with issues of substance.’  In Tolofson v Jensen20 the Supreme Court of 
Canada stated that ‘the purpose of the substantive/procedural classification is to 
determine which rules will make the machinery of the forum court run smoothly as 
distinguished from those determinative of the rights of both parties.’  Rules concerning 
concurrence do not deal with ‘the running of the machinery of the forum court’.  The 
‘machinery’ will ‘run’ the same regardless of whether the claimant advances his claim 
in tort, contract, or on both bases.  But the ‘existence, extent or enforceability of rights 
or duties of the parties’ may differ depending on which path the claimant follows. 
By way of comparison, the issue of concurrence is regarded as substantive in 
mainland Europe.  For example, concurrence is not allowed in France where the rule of 
non cumul des responsabilités is adopted.
21
  Contractual liability prevails primarily for 
two reasons.
22
  First, Arts.1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code provide for delictual liability 
in the event that any fault causes damage of any kind; if concurrence were allowed, 
almost all breaches of contract would also be treated as delict.  Second, Art.1384(1) of 
the Civil Code would then introduce strict liability into the law of contract every time a 
contractor or his property was damaged by a thing under his counter-party’s control.  In 
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 (2000) 203 CLR 503, [104], cited with approval in Dicey, Morris and Collins (n17) [7-003] and A. 
Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Oxford, 2008) 
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Weir (n15) [52]-[57]. 
22
 Weir ibid [54]. 
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Germany, concurrence is, in principle, allowed.
23
  Its introduction was actually 
necessary:
24
 damages for pain and suffering were not available in contract suit and it 
would have been intolerable to give such damages to a pedestrian and not to a 
passenger; the absence of any provision for positive breach of contract made it 
necessary for contractors to be able to sue each other in delict.  It is clear that the French 
and German rules concerning concurrence reflect the balance struck between the 
constituent parts of the law of obligations in these countries.  They do not concern 
procedure. 
Furthermore, the objectives of legal certainty, predictability, uniformity of result 
and discouragement of forum shopping which underlie Rome II and Rome I also require 
a substantive classification.  Suppose an Englishman, habitually working for an English 
employer in Belgium where he is also habitually resident, suffers injury at work in 
France and commences proceedings in England.  If English courts always followed the 
English view on concurrence as a rule of the lex fori, the employee would be permitted 
to advance his claim in either contract or tort, or both.  It is likely that, on these facts, 
the lex delicti would be French and the lex contractus Belgian law.
25
  If the employee’s 
claim succeeded under one of the governing laws, he would win the case.  But the 
problem is that neither Belgian nor French law allows concurrence.  The application of 
the English rules on concurrence in English proceedings would undermine the 
mentioned objectives of the two Regulations given that Belgian and French courts 
would allow the claimant to sue only in contract.  Furthermore, as Shamurin
26
 shows, a 
procedural classification could put defendant employees in a precarious position.  
Employees should be protected from having to defend their cases under several 
applicable laws for the alleged breach of essentially one duty. 
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 Beale and others (n21) 114-115; Weir ibid [58]-[66]. 
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 Weir ibid [63]. 
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 See text accompanying n69 below. 
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 (n12). 
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Therefore, the issue of concurrence should be classified as substantive, and the 
rules concerning concurrence should apply only as part of the lex causae.  This is in 
accordance with the broad sphere of application that the two Regulations give to the law 
governing the merits
27
 and the trend of limiting the category of procedure by broadening 
the scope of the lex causae. 
1.3. Rome II and Rome I: an autonomous solution? 
Choice-of-law rules for all obligations in England are today of EU law origin, contained 
in Rome II and Rome I.  The reluctance of the CJEU to allow the application of the 
rules of the English common law of conflict of laws in matters covered by EU PIL is 
notorious.
28
  The CJEU would certainly not allow the application of the English rules 
concerning concurrence in situations falling within the scope of the two Regulations.  
As BRIGGS puts it, ‘it is though a metric choice of law rule has replaced one calibrated 
in imperial units of measurement’.29 
Do Rome II and Rome I permit concurrence?  The answer depends on whether a 
claim for compensation (or other remedies) for damage caused either by an event or an 
act of the defendant or a person for whom the defendant is vicariously liable that gives 
rise to the defendant’s concurrent liability in more than one branch of substantive law 
can simultaneously trigger the application of the choice-of-law rules of both 
Regulations.  If so, concurrence is permitted. 
The scope of application of Rome II and Rome I was examined in section 2.1 of 
the previous chapter.  It will be remembered that the respective scopes of the two 
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 Rome II, Art.15; Rome I, Art.12. 
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 Case C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-1383 (the traditional English doctrine of forum non 
conveniens has no role to play under the Brussels regime); Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-
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regime). 
29
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Regulations depend on the classification of the defendant’s obligation forming the basis 
of the claim.  (Non)contractual obligations are autonomous concepts under the two 
Regulations.  By analogy with the CJEU case-law under the Brussels regime, which 
may be used to interpret analogous concepts in the choice-of-law instruments, the 
concepts of contractual and non-contractual obligations are mutually exclusive.  If an 
obligation is classified as contractual for the purposes of Rome I, it cannot be 
simultaneously classified as non-contractual for the purposes of Rome II.
30
  The concept 
of ‘contract’ within the meaning of Art.5(1) of the Brussels Convention and Brussels I 
has been interpreted broadly: ‘the phrase ”matters relating to a contract”...is not to be 
understood as covering a situation in which there is no obligation freely assumed by one 
party towards another.’31  Similarly, Rome I should not apply to obligations that are not 
‘freely assumed’ by one party towards another.  Rome II applies in these situations. 
What is the relevant obligation whose classification determines which set of 
choice-of-law rules applies?  It must be stressed in this respect that the issue of 
concurrence arises where breach of essentially one duty (e.g. employer’s duty to 
compensate the employee for certain injuries suffered in the course of employment or 
employee’s duty to compensate the employer for performing his working activities 
negligently) gives rise to the defendant’s concurrent liability in more than one branch of 
substantive law.  In English employment law and in the common law of conflict of 
laws, unlike in some mainland European countries, the claimant can formulate his claim 
on any basis for which there is a separate substantive or choice-of-law category and 
plead only the facts necessary to establish the cause of action.  Therefore, by pleading 
certain facts and by framing his claim in a certain way, the claimant can achieve the 
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application of the desirable substantive law and choice-of-law rules.  Can claimants do 
the same in European PIL? 
In the context of the Brussels regime the answer is no.  The special jurisdictional 
rules of Brussels I apply ‘in matters relating to individual contracts of employment’.32  
Regardless of the facts the claimant pleads and the way he frames his claim, the special 
jurisdictional rules are engaged if the employment contract is legally relevant to the 
claim.  Thus, a claim against an employee for conspiracy to harm the employer’s 
business by soliciting fellow employees is a matter relating to the employment 
contract.
33
  But claims for breaches of copyright and misuse of confidential information 
against a former employee who obtained the employer’s design drawings by bribing a 
fellow employee for the purpose of facilitating unlawful competition against the 
employer are not.
34
  A parallel can be made with the case-law concerning the 
application, in borderline cases, of Art.5(1) (special jurisdiction in ‘matters relating to a 
contract’) and 5(3) (special jurisdiction in ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-
delict’) of the Brussels Convention and Brussels I.  Art.5(1) applies whenever a claim is 
based on an obligation which arises between contracting parties and which can be 
framed in contractual terms even if the claimant frames his claim in tort and pleads the 
facts accordingly.
35
  One might therefore say that it is the essence of the defendant’s 
duty giving rise to concurrent liability in substantive law that is being classified, not the 
various expressions of that duty in substantive law.  If the duty exists because there is a 
contract between the parties, if it is a corollary of the contract, the jurisdictional rules 
for tort do not apply. 
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Is there a parallelism in this respect between the jurisdictional and choice-of-law 
rules in employment cases?  The leading authority is a pre-Rome II and Rome I case of 
Shamurin.
36
  It will be remembered that the claimant advanced his claim on three 
grounds: for breach of contract and breach of the common law and equitable duties of 
care.  Pursuant to the Rome Convention, the contract was governed by Russian law 
which imposed no liability on the defendant.  The claimant attempted to circumvent this 
by advancing his claim on two additional bases and arguing that the tortious and 
equitable causes of action were governed by English law.  The court therefore had to 
deal with the classification of the common law and equitable duties.  The defendant 
argued that, although imposed ex lege in English substantive law, those duties should be 
regarded as contractual for the purposes of the Rome Convention because he, as a 
director and an employee of the claimant company, had voluntarily assumed 
responsibility.  The court disagreed.  According to TUCKEY LJ: 
‘a contractual obligation is by its very nature one which is voluntarily assumed 
by agreement.  Terms may be implied into that agreement, but that is because 
they are necessary to make what has been agreed work and so this does not 
undermine the fact that the agreement is consensual.  There is nothing 
consensual about the imposition of a tortious or equitable duty of care.  It arises 
from a voluntary assumption of responsibility, but that is a state of affairs which 
is not dependant on agreement.’37 
The Court of Appeal therefore chose not to follow at the level of choice of law 
the autonomous standards of classification relevant for the purposes of the European 
jurisdictional rules.  Instead of determining whether the defendant’s duty was 
essentially of consensual or non-consensual nature, the court focused on classifying, for 
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EWHC 2419 (Comm), [35], per Tomlinson J. 
 235 
choice-of-law purposes, the various expressions of that duty in English employment 
law, being the law under which the tortious and equitable causes of action were 
advanced.  The court justified the application of different standards of classification 
under the jurisdictional and choice-of-law rules on the ground that the objectives of the 
Brussels regime and the Rome Convention are not identical.
38
  The CJEU has striven, so 
far as possible, to avoid fragmentation of jurisdiction, i.e. situations where a number of 
courts have jurisdiction in respect of one and the same matter.  Since this concern is 
absent in choice of law, the application of multiple laws in the case of breach of 
essentially one duty did not trouble the Court of Appeal. 
The reasoning of the court is echoed in the manner some English academics 
approach the problem of classification.  Although an autonomous classification of the 
concept of (non)contractual obligations for the purposes of Rome II and Rome I is 
beyond doubt,
39
 an argument has nevertheless been advanced that the scene for 
classification is set by the law(s) under which the claim is made.  According to 
RUSHWORTH and SCOTT: 
‘[Rome II] looks to the events out of which [non-contractual] obligations arise…  
Since the Regulation focuses on obligations and the events out of which they 
arise, these provide the data for characterization…  [S]uch data must include an 
obligation’s nature, incidents and the constitutive elements of the event from 
which it arises.  It is submitted that the only law that can provide this data is the 
law by reference to which the claimant pleads his claim.’40 
Applied to the facts of Shamurin, this approach would lead to English law supplying the 
data for the choice-of-law classification of the alleged tortious and equitable duties and 
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to Russian law doing the same in relation to the contractual cause of action.  Since, 
according to TUCKEY LJ, ‘[t]here is nothing consensual about the imposition of a 
tortious or equitable duty of care’ in English law, the data provided by English law (i.e. 
non-contractual nature of tortious and equitable duties; irrelevance of consent) would 
lead to the employee’s alleged breach of essentially one duty not to perform his working 
activities negligently triggering the application of both Rome II and Rome I.
41
 
But this line of reasoning is not compelling.  Statutory employment duties, for 
example, are also neither express nor implied contract terms but are imposed by law and 
ordinarily cannot be derogated from.  If the reasoning of TUCKEY LJ were followed, 
statutory employment duties would have to be classified as non-contractual obligations 
and, as such, fall within the scope of Rome II.  But the preceding chapter shows that 
statutory employment duties are to be classified as contractual in European PIL.  
Furthermore, the claim in Shamurin was essentially based on breach of the defendant’s 
obligation to perform his trading activities with reasonable skill and care.  It happened 
that that obligation existed in more than one branch of the law of obligations (contract, 
tort, equity) in one of the laws (English) closely connected with the parties’ relationship.  
But this obligation flowed directly from the contractual relationships (employee-
employer and director-company) between the parties.  Had there been no contractual 
relationships, the obligation would have never existed.  By entering into the contracts, 
Mr Shamurin freely assumed liability for performing his trading activities negligently, 
regardless of the classification of this duty in the laws connected with the parties’ 
relationship.  There is therefore a strong argument that the obligation was ‘freely 
assumed’ and should have been classified as contractual for the purposes of the Rome 
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Convention.
42
  If so, the claim should have been determined exclusively by reference to 
the lex contractus.  It is only if that law had allowed concurrence that the claimant could 
have advanced his claim on multiple bases.  But even then, only one law, the lex 
contractus, would have governed the entire claim.  Finally, it is important to note that 
under Russian law, which as the lex contractus was another law closely connected with 
the parties’ relationship, the defendant owed only a contractual duty to the claimant.  
But, following the way in which the claimant framed his claim, the Court of Appeal 
classified the alleged tortious and equitable duties exclusively on the basis of data 
provided by English law.  If classification at choice of law level were to depend on the 
facts the claimant chooses to plead and the way he frames his claim, many objectives of 
Rome II and Rome I, e.g. legal certainty, predictability, uniformity of result and 
employee protection, would be undermined.  The claimant, i.e. the way he presents the 
case, would be accorded an undue advantage over the defendant and his viewpoint.  The 
better approach is to develop purely autonomous criteria for determining which set of 
choice-of-law rules applies in a situation giving rise to concurrent liability in 
substantive law. 
How should other duties of the parties to an employment contract giving rise to 
concurrent liability in English substantive law be classified for choice-of-law purposes?  
It seems that the employer’s personal and non-delegable duty of care should be 
classified as a contractual obligation.  This duty flows directly from the employment 
relationship.  If there is no employment relationship, this duty does not exist.  By 
entering into an employment contract, the employer freely assumes liability for breach 
of this duty.
43
  The employer’s vicarious liability for the tort committed against the 
employee by a fellow employee in the course of employment sometimes does not 
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coincide with the employer’s direct liability, but rather flows entirely from the 
relationship between the employer and the tortfeasor and would arise even if there was 
no pre-existing relationship between the injured employee and the employer.  It seems 
that this duty should be classified as tortious for choice-of-law purposes.
44
  
Furthermore, it seems that a claim against an employee for conspiracy to harm the 
employer’s business by soliciting fellow employees should be classified as contractual.  
But claims for breaches of copyright and misuse of confidential information against a 
former employee who obtained the employer’s design drawings by bribing a fellow 
employee should not. 
On the contrary, some authors who also accept that Rome II and Rome I are 
mutually exclusive reach the conclusion that situations giving rise to concurrent liability 
in substantive law always trigger the application of Rome II.  According to Cheshire, 
North & Fawcett: Private International Law,
45
 a tortious classification should be 
adopted as it fits in much better with the terms of Rome II.  ‘The Regulation envisages 
that there can be a tortious obligation where the parties have a pre-existing contractual 
relationship [Art.4(3)] and that there can be a tortious obligation to which there is a 
contractual defence [Art.15(b)].’46  But this argument is not persuasive.  It implies that, 
if it were not accepted, there would be little scope for the application of the provisions 
of Arts.4(3) and 15(b) Rome II.  However, there are many situations where these 
provisions would be applicable if Rome I is accorded a wide field of application.  The 
preceding paragraph provides two examples (employer’s vicarious liability and 
employee’s liability for breaches of copyright and misuse of confidential information 
for obtaining the employer’s design drawings through bribe) where the first provision 
would apply.  With regard to the second provision, it actually prescribes that the lex 
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delicti governs ‘the grounds for exemption of liability, any limitation of liability and 
any division of liability’.  Clearly, this provision has a wide field of application even if 
the majority of situations concerning concurrent causes of action fall within the scope of 
Rome I.  Furthermore, there are many situations involving tortious obligations to which 
there is a contractual defence falling within the scope of Rome II, e.g. where the 
tortfeasor and the victim enter ex post into a contract constituting waiver or release from 
tortious liability. 
In sum, there is a good argument that Rome II and Rome I do not permit 
concurrence in choice of law.  Cases which in substantive law may be framed either in 
contract or in tort, or both, seem to fall within the scope of either one or the other 
Regulation.  However, until it is definitely resolved by the CJEU, the issue of 
concurrence in PIL will remain a source of legal uncertainty.  Apart from BRIGGS,
47
 
YEO
48
 and the authors of Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law
49
 and 
Chitty on Contracts,
50
 the leading English authors are of the view that Rome II and 
Rome I permit concurrence.  The following text examines the views in favour of 
concurrent causes of action in choice of law. 
1.4. Views in favour of concurrence 
If one were to accept that concurrence is permitted in choice of law, one would have to 
deal with situations where the lex delicti and the lex contractus are different laws 
holding conflicting views as to whether and when concurrence is permitted.  Suppose a 
Frenchman, habitually working for a French employer in England, suffers injury at 
work in France.  It is possible that, on these facts, the lex delicti would be French and 
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the lex contractus English law.
51
  Concurrence is allowed in England but not in France.  
Which law decides whether the claimant may advance his claim on multiple bases: the 
lex delicti, the lex contractus, or maybe both laws? 
There are several possible solutions to this problem:
52
 to prefer the view of the 
lex contractus; to prefer the view of the lex delicti; a sui generis solution which consists 
in applying the view common to the lex delicti and the lex contractus or, if the views of 
the two laws differ, applying the view of the lex fori.  If one were to accept that 
concurrence is permitted in choice of law, one should also accept that the various causes 
of action can lead to the application of two different laws to essentially one claim.  The 
first two solutions should be rejected as they exclude a priori one of the governing 
laws.
53
  The sui generis solution is also untenable for three reasons.
54
  First, this solution 
is difficult to apply as it requires the determination of the governing laws and their 
views concerning concurrence.  This is a very complex, time consuming and expensive 
exercise, particularly inappropriate for employment disputes.  Second, this solution 
works well in easy cases, i.e. when the views of the two governing laws coincide.  But 
in more complex cases this solution imposes the view of the lex fori.  If the lex fori is a 
lex causae, this solution unjustifiably excludes a priori the other governing law.  If the 
lex fori is not a lex causae, this solution imposes the application of the forum’s 
substantive provisions.  But the only situation where Rome II and Rome I allow the 
application of the forum’s substantive provisions where the lex fori is not a lex causae is 
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where those provisions are overidingly mandatory.
55
  No one has ever suggested, nor 
would such a view be defensible, that the rules concerning concurrence are rules ‘the 
respect for which is regarded as crucial...for safeguarding public interests [of the 
forum].’56  Third, the sui generis solution does not accord with the Regulations’ 
objectives of legal certainty, predictability, uniformity of result, discouragement of 
forum shopping and employee protection.
57
 
Finally, one might say that there is no reason not to allow concurrence in choice 
of law because the choice-of-law rules of Rome II anyway lead to the unity of the 
applicable law.
58
  According to Art.4 the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation 
arising out of a tort is the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of 
the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the 
country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occurred.
59
  There 
is also an exception to this rule.  Where the person claimed to be liable and the person 
sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time 
when the damage occurs, the law of that country applies.
60
  Both rules may be displaced 
by the operation of the escape clause which allows the application of the law of another 
country that is manifestly more closely connected with the tort.  ‘A manifestly closer 
connection with another country might be based in particular on a pre-existing 
relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with a 
tort/delict in question.’61  Furthermore, the parties are free to choose the lex delicti after 
the event giving rise to the damage occurred.
62
  Presumably, ex post choices of law are 
very rare in employment cases and the law governing torts arising in the course of 
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employment is ordinarily determined by Art.4.  It is also worth mentioning that, in 
assessing the conduct of the person claimed to be liable, account may be taken of the 
rules of safety and conduct in force at the place and time of the event giving rise to 
liability.
63
  Thus, regardless of the lex delicti, the rules of safety and health at work of 
the country where the employee suffered injury may be referred to in order to determine 
the tortfeasor’s negligence.64 
The escape clause of Art.4(3) contains a so-called accessory choice-of-law rule.  
The notion of the accessory choice-of-law rule was developed in German and Swiss 
academic opinion and jurisprudence, where it is referred to as akzessorische 
Anknüpfung.
65
  According to NYGH, 
‘It proceeds on the principle that where a specific relationship exists between the 
parties regulating their rights and obligations towards each other (such as one 
based on contract...), and in the course of carrying out the obligations of that 
relationship an obligation based on the general law (such as one arising out of 
the law of delict) is infringed, the claims arising out of the breach of the general 
duty should be subject to the same law as that which governs the existing 
relationship.’66 
It comes as no surprise that such a rule was devised in Germany and Switzerland 
given that concurrence is permitted in the substantive laws of those countries.  Before 
the advent of the European choice-of-law instruments the problem of classification in 
Germany was, and in Switzerland still is, in principle, resolved by applying the lex fori.  
Consequently, if the claimant brought a claim in a German or Swiss court that could be 
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framed, alternatively or simultaneously, on multiple bases in the law of obligations of 
those countries, he was also permitted to advance his claim on multiple bases in PIL.  
This could have resulted in the claim being governed by different laws.  The accessory 
choice-of-law rule was devised to avoid this highly undesirable outcome and to promote 
the unity of the applicable law, certainty and predictability, meet the reasonable 
expectations of the parties and avoid favouring claimants.
67
  The following two 
conditions had to be met for this rule to apply: 1) there had to exist at the time of the 
commission of the tort a pre-existing legal relationship between the parties; 2) there had 
to be a close connection between the tort and the pre-existing relationship, and the 
conduct complained of had to be seen to operate in the legal setting of the pre-existing 
relationship.
68
  
Indeed, it may seem at first sight that the issue of concurrence need not be 
resolved at the stage of deciding whether Rome II or Rome I applies because Art.4 
Rome II anyway leads to the application of one law, the lex contractus.  This view, 
however, greatly undermines the complexity of both the relationship between the two 
Regulations and the problem of concurrence, especially in employment disputes, as the 
following three points demonstrate. 
First, the determination of whether Rome II or Rome I applies is a mandatory 
first step in determining the applicable law.  This step must be conducted by reference 
to the relevant CJEU case-law on the interpretation of the Brussels regime.  As 
discussed, this case-law supports the view that concurrence is not permitted in European 
PIL. 
Second, even if concurrence were permitted, the escape clause of Art.4(3) Rome 
II would not lead to the unity of the applicable law in all situations involving 
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concurrence where the application of a single law would be desirable.  The choice-of-
law rules of Art.4(1) and 4(2) may be displaced only if the tort is manifestly more 
closely connected with another country.  The word ‘manifestly’ is there to ensure that 
the displacement occurs only exceptionally.
69
  Not all situations involving concurrence 
would be exceptional.  Suppose an Englishman, habitually working for an English 
employer in the Netherlands where he is also habitually resident, suffers injury at work 
in France.  Furthermore, suppose the contract is solely governed by Dutch law.  Which 
law would be the lex delicti?  According to Art.4(1), the applicable law would be 
French.  Art.4(2) applies only if the parties have their habitual residences in the same 
country.  Would the escape clause of Art.4(3) lead to the application of Dutch law?  The 
Netherlands would be more closely connected with the tort than France.  But would it 
be manifestly more closely connected?  This would be unlikely given that the tort would 
also have a close connection with England: both the employer and the employee are 
English; the employee might also be socially insured in the UK where he might suffer 
indirect consequences of his injury.  If the tort were held not to be manifestly more 
closely connected with the Netherlands, the result would be that the lex delicti and the 
lex contractus would be two different laws holding conflicting views as to whether 
concurrence is permitted.  Somewhat ironically, the lex delicti, French law, would not 
permit concurrence. 
Third, Rome I prescribes that the parties to an employment contract are free to 
choose the applicable law and that the choice cannot deprive the employee of the 
protection afforded to him by mandatory provisions of the objectively applicable law.
70
  
The escape clause of Art.4(3) Rome II is incapable of dealing with situations where the 
tort is closely connected with an employment contract whose objectively applicable law 
and the chosen law differ.  Suppose an Englishman, habitually working for an English 
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employer in the Netherlands under a contract governed by Dutch law as the objectively 
applicable law and by English law as the chosen law, suffers injury at work in France.  
According to Art.4(1), French law would govern the tort.  Could the escape clause lead 
to the application of Dutch or English law?  Arguably, the tort would be more closely 
connected with both the Netherlands and England than France, but would it be 
manifestly more closely connected with any of the former two countries?  The European 
Commission seems to argue that, in this situation, the escape clause could lead to the 
tort being simultaneously governed by both leges contracti.
71
  But this interpretation is 
not supported by the wording of the escape clause which allows the application of the 
law of ‘a country’ (singular) that is manifestly more closely connected with the tort.  
Furthermore, since Rome II would not allow the parties to an employment contract to 
choose the lex delicti before the event giving rise to the damage has occurred,
72
 there is 
a good argument that the choice-of-law clause in an employment contract should not 
have any effect on the determination of the lex delicti.
73
  If the tort were held not to be 
manifestly more closely connected with either the Netherlands or England, the result 
would be that essentially one claim for compensation (or other remedies) would have 
three different governing laws (two leges contracti and one lex delicti).  This is 
unacceptable. 
The existence of the accessory choice-of-law rule in Art.4(3) Rome II does not 
necessarily mean that concurrence is permitted in choice of law.  Rather, that rule 
should be regarded as being there to deal with situations which, on a proper construction 
of Rome II and Rome I, fall within the scope of Rome II and which involve a pre-
existing legal relationship between the parties that is closely connected with the tort.  
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An example is where the employer is alleged to be vicariously liable for the tort 
committed against the employee by a fellow employee in the course of employment that 
does not coincide with the employer’s direct liability.  Where the claimant employee is 
one of several victims of the tort, the case for applying the lex contractus to the tort is 
relatively weak (i.e. the law of the place of injury is more likely to govern the claims of 
all the injured).  But if the claimant employee is the only victim of the tort, the case for 
applying the escape clause is strong.  If the employment contract is governed by two 
laws, there is a good argument that the chosen law should be disregarded, unless the law 
applicable to the employment contract is chosen after the event giving rise to the 
damage has occurred.
74
  If both the objectively applicable law and the chosen law are to 
be taken into consideration and they differ, it is highly unlikely that the escape clause 
will be applied, since it is highly unlikely that the tort in this situation will be manifestly 
more closely connected to a country other than that to which the choice-of-law rules of 
Arts.4(1) and 4(2) Rome II point. 
1.5. Conclusion 
The application of one law in situations involving concurrent causes of action is a 
worthy objective and the two Regulations should be interpreted in a way which achieves 
that. 
‘It is...important not to perceive concurrent liabilities as an isolated problem but 
rather as the outcome of the historical evolution of a legal system and part of the 
interplay between its numerous components...  The way each legal order 
organises relations between various liability regimes intrinsically corresponds to 
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the way it organises these regimes.  Preserving this integrity lies in the best 
interests of private international law and...in the interests of justice...’75 
The unity of the applicable law can be consistently achieved only if Rome II and Rome 
I are regarded as not permitting concurrence in choice of law.  But even if concurrence 
is permitted, the application of the escape clause of Art.4(3) Rome II will in many cases 
lead to the unity of the applicable law.  The escape clause, however, inadequately deals 
with cases where the employment contract is simultaneously governed by two laws.  An 
amendment of Art.4(3) catering for this possibility is necessary. 
2. Contractual exemption clauses 
Interaction between contract and tort in PIL causes considerable problems regarding 
exemption clauses.  The following text shows how these problems were dealt with in 
the English common law of conflict of laws and how they are to be addressed today. 
2.1. The common law 
In the common law of conflict of laws, if the claimant advanced his claim in contract, 
both the claim and the exemption clause were governed by the lex contractus.  What if 
the claimant advanced his claim in tort and the defendant relied on the exemption clause 
as a defence?  A similar question arose where a contract was relied upon by the 
defendant as a tort defence
76
 and where the parties entered ex post into a contract 
constituting waiver or release from tortious liability. 
The leading case is Sayers.
77
  After having suffered injury at work by the 
negligence of a fellow employee in Nigeria, Mr Sayers brought an action in tort against 
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 Szepelak (n58) 403. 
76
 Galaxias Steamship Co Ltd v Panagos Christofis (1948) 81 Ll L Rep 499 (KB). 
77
 [1971] 1 WLR 1176 (CA). 
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his Dutch employer in England.  The employer invoked a clause in the employment 
contract whereby Mr Sayers accepted the employer’s compensation programme as his 
exclusive remedy in case of injury.  The court had to decide whether this exemption 
clause represented a good defence to the claim.  The majority, SALMON and STAMP LJJ, 
disregarded the complexities of the issue before them and made a decision by reference 
to the lex contractus only.
78
  LORD DENNING, on the other hand, held that the claim in 
tort was governed by ‘the proper law of the tort’ and that the exemption clause was 
governed by the proper law of the contract.
79
  But, in his Lordship’s view, two systems 
of law could not be applied to essentially one issue; one system of law, the so-called 
‘proper law of the issue’, was to be applied to both claim and defence.80  Although they 
employed different choice-of-law rules, all the members of the Court of Appeal decided 
the case by reference to the same law, Dutch, under which the exemption clause was a 
good defence.  Consequently, the provisions of the English statute, the Law Reform 
(Personal Injuries) Act 1948, which abolished the defence of common employment and 
rendered void any term in an employment contract giving such a defence, was 
inapplicable. 
Another important case is Brodin v A/R Seljan.
81
  The claimant’s husband was a 
seaman, employed by a Norwegian employer under a contract governed by Norwegian 
law, who died after he had been injured at work by a fellow employee in Scotland.  The 
claimant brought an action in tort in Scotland and the employer invoked an exemption 
clause.  The claimant argued that the exemption clause was void by virtue of s.1(3) of 
the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948.  LORD KISSEN held that Scottish law 
applied as the lex delicti and furthermore that a contract was unenforceable in Scotland 
                                                 
78
 See also Coupland v Arabian Gulf Oil Co (n1) 1153 (‘the contract is only relevant to the claim in tort in 
so far as it does, on its true construction in accordance with the proper law of the contract, have the effect 
of excluding or restricting the tortious claim’, per Lord Goff LJ). 
79
 (n77) 1180. 
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 ibid 1181. 
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 1973 SLT 198 (Court of Session). 
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if it required doing what was expressly forbidden by a statute which was binding on the 
Scottish courts. 
The use of exemption clauses as a tort defence caused considerable legal 
uncertainty in the common law of conflict of laws.  In Sayers and Brodin, four judges 
came up with three different solutions: two preferred the lex contractus, one preferred 
the lex delicti and one invented a sui generis solution which consisted in applying the 
proper law of the issue.  Moreover, the majority of English academics rejected all of 
these solutions.
82
  It is the prevailing view among English academics that both the lex 
contractus and the lex delicti should have been applied, but each in its own sphere of 
application.  The lex delicti governed the tort, including the issue of whether an 
exemption clause was available as a defence to a tortious claim; the lex contractus 
decided whether the exemption clause was valid.
83
  But which choice-of-law rules 
determined the lex contractus: those of the forum or of the lex delicti?  According to one 
view, the choice-of-law rules of the lex delicti should be applied because, to know 
whether an exemption clause was a good defence under the lex delicti, it was important 
to know whether under that country’s law, including its PIL, the clause was a good 
defence.
84
  A pragmatic view favoured the choice-of-law rules of the forum.
85
  The 
solution favoured by English academics has been criticised for leading to the 
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application of two laws to essentially one issue of whether the exemption clause had the 
effect of limiting or excluding tortious liability.
86
 
2.2. Rome II and Rome I 
If it is accepted, as suggested in section 1 of this chapter, that Rome II and Rome I do 
not permit concurrent causes of action, exemption clauses would rarely raise problems 
in choice of law.  Since most employment claims would trigger the application of Rome 
I, the lex contractus would govern both the issue of whether an exemption clause is 
available as a defence to the claim and the issue of validity of the exemption clause.  
Furthermore, even in relation to claims which would trigger the application of Rome II, 
the escape clause of Art.4(3) would normally lead to the application of the lex 
contractus to the tortious claim.  Problems would arise in the rare situations where the 
claimant advances a claim triggering the application of Rome II and where the lex 
delicti is not the law governing the employment contract.  Such situations would occur 
much more frequently if it is accepted that Rome II and Rome I permit concurrence. 
In all situations where the lex delicti and the lex contractus differ, the problem 
arises of determining the law that decides whether an exemption clause is a good 
defence to the tortious claim.  Art.15(b) Rome II prescribes that the lex delicti governs 
‘the grounds for exemption of liability any limitation of liability and any division of 
liability’.  The issue of whether an exemption clause is available as a defence to a 
tortious claim therefore undoubtedly falls to be decided under the lex delicti.  What 
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 Briggs (n6) 33-34: ‘if one understands an exclusion clause not as furnishing a defence to accrued 
liability, but as a provision by which the parties...modify the duty of care which might otherwise have 
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about the issue of validity of the exemption clause?  One might argue, relying on the 
prevailing view among English academics under the common law, that that issue must 
be decided under the law governing the contract in which the exemption clause is 
contained.  But the better view which avoids the unwelcome result of having two laws 
governing the issue of whether the exemption clause has the effect of limiting or 
excluding tortious liability is to subject this issue in its entirety to the lex delicti.  The 
support for this view can be found in the fact that this solution is adopted in Art.8(2) of 
the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents which served as 
the template for Art.15 Rome II.
87
 
In any event, the two Regulations safeguard the application of the overriding 
mandatory provisions of the forum.
88
  There is a good argument for applying s.1(3) of 
the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 whenever the injury occurs in the UK.  
According to Art.3(1) of the Posted Workers Directive, which is regarded as the 
implementation of Art.9 Rome I, the provisions concerning health, safety and hygiene at 
work are considered to be overriding mandatory provisions.  Since the 1948 Act is 
concerned with health and safety at work, its provisions can override the applicable law 
whenever the injury occurs in England (or Scotland).
89
 
Conclusions 
The borderland between contract and tort in PIL has traditionally been a field fraught 
with legal uncertainty.  With regard to concurrent causes of action, English courts 
simply transposed the rules of domestic law into the common law of conflict of laws.  
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Even after the advent of the Rome Convention, English courts continued to apply those 
rules.  Today it is certain that the solution to the problem of concurrence is found 
exclusively in Rome II and Rome I, but it is less certain what the solution is.  With 
regard to contractual exemption clauses, the common law of conflict of laws failed to 
produce a clear solution.  Similarly, there are doubts with regard to the solution under 
Rome II and Rome I. 
This chapter is premised on the idea that a claimant who brings a claim for 
compensation (or other remedies) for damage caused by an event or an act which give 
rise to the defendant’s concurrent liability in more than one branch of substantive law 
brings essentially one claim which should be decided under one governing law.  
Concurrent liability which is accepted in many legal systems represents the outcome of 
the evolution of those systems and reflects the way in which they organise various 
liability regimes.  Concurrent liability is therefore a category of substantive law, and 
should be confined to substantive law.  The relationship between Rome II and Rome I is 
such that concurrence does not seem to be permitted in choice of law.  But even if it is 
permitted, the unity of the applicable law will in many cases be achieved through the 
operation of the escape clause of Art.4(3) Rome II.  Since the escape clause is an 
imperfect mechanism for achieving unity of the applicable law, it is preferable if the 
problem of concurrence is nipped in the bud at the stage of deciding which of the two 
Regulations applies.  Moreover, the escape clause inadequately deals with cases where 
the employment contract is simultaneously governed by two laws.  An amendment of 
Art.4(3) catering for this possibility is necessary.  Whenever there is unity of the 
applicable law, contractual exemption clauses do not produce any particular problems in 
choice of law.  Otherwise, the issue whether an exemption clause is a good defence to a 
tortious claim should be governed by the lex delicti. 
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The fact that the problem of concurrence is (largely) eliminated in choice of law 
either through the application of Rome I to many traditionally perceived tortious claims 
or through the operation of the escape clause of Art.4(3) Rome II is yet another example 
of the extent of the changes that European PIL of employment has introduced in English 
law.  Just like statutory claims, the tortious claims have also been largely merged with 
contractual claims into one type of claim for choice-of-law purposes. 
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VIII POSTING OF WORKERS IN EUROPE 
 
‘Jacques Chirac, the French president, 
has branded the proposal "unacceptable".  
Gerhard Schröder, the German 
chancellor, wants to prevent it "under all 
circumstances".  Even Charlie 
McCreevy, the European Union internal 
market commissioner whose officials 
drafted the initiative, warns it will 
"simply not fly".  On Saturday, some 
50,000 protesters are due to march 
through Brussels to vent their fury at 
what they describe as the "Frankenstein 
directive".’ 
Financial Times, 15 March 2005
1
 
 
Shortly before this Brussels march, a protest taking place in Sweden also filled the 
headlines.
2
  Between November 2004 and February 2005, Swedish workers, holding 
banners proclaiming ‘Swedish law in Sweden’, blockaded a construction site in a 
Stockholm suburb.  They demonstrated against the employment on the site of low-wage 
Latvian workers.  The blockade was so effective that it caused the withdrawal from 
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 ‘Barriers to cross-border expansion are prohibitive to many companies yet the services directive drafted 
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2
 The described events form the factual background of Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767. 
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Sweden of the Latvian company supplying the workers and bankruptcy of its Swedish 
affiliate.  Similar events occurred in the UK a few years later.  In the early spring of 
2009, at the time of deep recession and rising unemployment, hundreds of workers 
gathered at the Lindsey oil refinery in Lincolnshire.
3
  They staged a wildcat strike in 
response to the decision of an Italian firm performing construction work at the refinery 
to use around 300 of its Italian and Portuguese workforce to fulfil the construction 
contract.  The slogan of the strike was ‘British jobs for British workers’.  The protest 
spread quickly across the UK, with several thousand demonstrators gathering at other 
places in support of the striking refinery workers.  At the height of the protest, the 
foreign workers had to be held on their floating accommodation in Grimsby harbour for 
their own safety.  The dispute was resolved by reaching an agreement to hire 102 
‘British workers’ at the construction site. 
One may wonder what the failure of the ‘Frankenstein directive’ and the protests 
held under the mottos ‘Swedish law in Sweden’ and ‘British jobs for British workers’ 
have to do with PIL?  The answer is that European PIL of employment was in the centre 
of the legal background of these events. 
In European PIL of employment, statutory and tortious claims are largely 
merged with contractual claims into a single category.  Under Art.8 Rome I, the law 
applicable to an employment contract is stable.  The governing law does not change 
when the employee is temporarily employed abroad.  The chosen law changes only if 
the parties agree that it will.  With regard to the objectively applicable law, Art.8(2), 
which lays down a choice-of-law rule based on the connecting factor of the habitual 
place of work, is explicit: ‘The country where the work is habitually carried out [and 
thus the objectively applicable law] shall not be deemed to have changed if [the 
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employee] is temporarily employed in another country’.  Recital 36 clarifies that ‘work 
carried out in another country should be regarded as temporary if the employee is 
expected to resume working in the country of origin after carrying out his tasks abroad.’  
Even if the objectively applicable law is the law of the country of the engaging place of 
business or the law of another country more closely connected with the employment 
contract, the applicable law does not change merely because the employee is 
temporarily employed abroad.  In other words, Art.8 lays down a kind of a country of 
origin rule.  The law of the employee’s ‘country of origin’ (i.e. the law of the country of 
the habitual place of work or, if none, the law of the country of the engaging place of 
business or, by way of exception, the law of another more closely connected country) 
objectively applies even if the employee temporarily works abroad.  Similarly, under 
Brussels I, a temporary posting abroad neither deprives the courts competent under this 
instrument of their jurisdiction nor confers jurisdiction on the courts of the country 
where the employee is temporarily posted. 
Rome I and Brussels I complement Art.56(1) TFEU (ex Art.49(1) TEC) which 
guarantees the free movement of services within the EU.  The freedom to provide 
services entails the right of a service provider established in one Member State to move 
freely with all its workers who it lawfully employs in that country to another Member 
State for the purpose of providing services there.
4
  Whenever an out-of-state service 
provider posts its workforce to the host Member State, the rules of the two Regulations 
support its freedom to provide services.  The service provider is guaranteed that the law 
governing the employment contracts it has with its workers and the courts having 
jurisdiction over disputes concerning those contracts will not change with the temporary 
posting of workers abroad.  Service providers are more likely to venture across borders 
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if they are accorded legal certainty, foreseeability and an assurance they will not have to 
bear the cost of adapting to the employment standards of each country to which they 
temporarily post workers.  In addition to benefiting service providers, the rules of the 
two Regulations also benefit, to a certain extent, posted workers.  Apart from granting 
them legal certainty and foreseeability, these rules guarantee the application of the law 
and jurisdiction of the courts of their country of origin, with which they are ordinarily 
most closely connected and familiar.  The interests of that country are also protected 
because its law remains applicable and its courts retain jurisdiction notwithstanding 
temporary postings abroad. 
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, in practice the rules of the two 
Regulations especially benefit service providers from Member States with relatively 
low levels of terms and conditions of employment, in particular from the newly joined 
ex-Communist countries.  Low cost per unit of labour is a comparative advantage that 
such service providers enjoy over service providers from Member States with relatively 
high employment standards.  Since such service providers bear relatively low labour 
costs, they can undercut service providers from other Member States, especially in 
labour-intensive industries such as construction, transport and agency work.  Workers 
from Member States with relatively low employment standards also indirectly benefit 
from the increased ability of their employers to win services contracts abroad.  The 
interests of those countries are also advanced because the increased competitiveness of 
their service providers leads to more employment and revenue. 
But the joint effect of the rules of Rome I and Brussels I and the Treaty 
provisions on the freedom to provide services, namely the ability of service providers 
from Member States with relatively low employment standards to profit from their 
comparative advantage, is often perceived as ‘unfair competition’ and ‘social dumping’ 
258 
 
in Member States with relatively high employment standards.  Workers, trade unions 
and service providers (but not service receivers) from the latter Member States often 
exert political pressure on their governments to impose local employment standards on 
out-of-state service providers, as seemingly permitted by Art.9 (‘overriding mandatory 
provisions’) Rome I, in order to achieve a level playing field between local and posted 
workers and local and out-of-state service providers.  An example of such pressure is 
the Brussels march against the European Commission’s proposal of the Directive on 
services in the internal market,
5
 also known as the ‘Bolkestein’ directive.6  The 
proposed Directive aimed at opening up the European market of services by eliminating 
the obstacles to the freedom of establishment of service providers and the free 
movement of services in the EU.  The latter goal was to be achieved by strengthening 
the country of origin principle, according to which a service provider was subject only 
to the law of the country in which it was established.  Although the proposed Directive 
contained a derogation from the country of origin principle, safeguarding the application 
of some of the host Member State employment standards to posted workers,
7
 the 
opponents of the proposal feared that it would lead to ‘social dumping’.  The 
controversies surrounding the proposed Directive were such that they contributed 
significantly to the negative outcomes of the French and Dutch referenda on the 
European Constitution.
8
  The Services Directive that was eventually adopted
9
 is a 
watered-down measure which expressly provides that it does not affect labour law and 
social security legislation of Member States.
10
  Furthermore, as the Laval and Lindsey 
oil refinery disputes demonstrate, workers and unions can exert pressure directly, by 
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means of industrial action, on out-of-state service providers to comply with local 
employment standards.  Incidentally, the imposition of local employment standards can 
benefit posted workers as they can invoke the most favourable of the employment 
standards set by either the home or the host country. 
But the imposition of the host Member State employment standards on service 
providers from other Member States represents a restriction or obstacle to their freedom 
to provide services.  A service provider that has to comply with the employment 
standards of the home and each and every of the host countries is exposed to substantial 
compliance costs that might deter it from venturing abroad.  That service provider is in 
a disadvantageous position in comparison to local service providers that have to comply 
only with local employment standards.  Furthermore, although posted workers can 
sometimes benefit from the imposition of the host Member State employment standards, 
their position is ambiguous.  If relatively low labour costs are behind their employers 
winning foreign contracts, the imposition of local employment standards could annul 
their employers’ comparative advantage and lead to the loss of jobs. 
The CJEU has on a number of occasions dealt with complicated issues 
concerning the compatibility with fundamental Treaty freedoms of the imposition of the 
host Member State employment standards on out-of-state service providers.  PWD 
attempts to strike a proper balance between the competing interests involved.  The 
question where the balance should lie has a prominent place in the contemporary 
academic debate.
11
  The focus of this chapter is on the role that PIL plays in the context 
of posting of workers. 
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The following section outlines PWD and examines the balance that is currently 
struck between the competing interests.  The way in which the CJEU has been tilting 
the balance in favour of the interests of the internal market over those of host Member 
States is described.  Wherever the proper balance may be, the rules of PIL come into 
play when posted workers attempt to enforce, through labour litigation, the host 
Member State employment standards that can be imposed on out-of-state service 
providers.  To assess the potential importance of ‘private’ enforcement of the relevant 
host Member State standards, and thereby of PIL in the context of posting of workers, 
the second section examines the current state of (in)effectiveness of the other two ways 
of enforcing the relevant standards, namely ‘public’ and ‘collective’ enforcement.  
Finally, the implementation of PWD in England is explored from a PIL perspective, in 
particular from the standpoint of posting of workers to England and posting of workers 
from England.  The aim is to determine how European PIL of employment deals with 
one of the most pressing social issues of European integration. 
1. Posted Workers Directive: at the crossroad of competing interests 
Originally, the project of European integration was one of an economic nature, aimed at 
establishing a common market based on four fundamental economic freedoms and 
competition policy.  Member States retained almost exclusive competence in the social 
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field.
12
  This was reflected in the very name of the European Economic Community.  
Over time, the European institutions acquired a degree of competence in the social 
sphere.  Nevertheless, social issues remain largely the concern of individual Member 
States.  This is reflected in Art.153(5) TFEU (ex Art.137(5) TEC) which rules out EU 
legislation over some of the most important labour law issues such as pay, collective 
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, as well as in the lack of EU legislation concerning 
many important issues such as unfair dismissal. 
The optimum rate of economic growth achieved by economic integration was to 
lead to the general improvement of living and working conditions in Europe.
13
  But 
economic liberalisation proved to possess a great potential for undermining national 
labour law systems.  If service providers from Member States with relatively low levels 
of terms and conditions of employment could easily win contracts in Member States 
with relatively high employment standards by relying on the lower labour costs in their 
home countries, the latter Member States’ employment standards would be put under 
strain.  Whilst the project of European integration was confined to countries with 
similar levels of labour protection, this potential remained hidden.  But with the 
accession of firstly Southern and then the former Communist countries to the EC, the 
potential of economic liberalisation for producing socially negative effects in the 
affluent countries came to light. 
 At first, the understanding was that a worker who moved from one Member 
State to another for the purpose of performing a services contract that his employer had 
won in the latter Member State exercised his own freedom of movement, today 
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guaranteed by Art.45 TFEU (ex Art.39 TEC).
14
  Since Art.45(2) TFEU provides that 
‘Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on 
nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, 
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment’, host Member States were 
thought to be able to apply their employment standards to foreign workers posted to 
their territory just as they applied those standards to local workers. 
But in Rush Portuguesa
15
 the CJEU adopted a different view.  Here, a 
Portuguese company entered into a subcontract with a French company for the carrying 
out of construction works in France.  It employed its own Portuguese workers who, 
according to the transitional arrangements for Portuguese accession to the Community, 
were treated as third country nationals.  The French authorities imposed certain 
conditions on the employment of such workers in France.  But the CJEU held that the 
provisions of the Treaty: 
‘preclude a Member State from prohibiting a person providing services 
established in another Member State from moving freely on its territory with all 
his staff and preclude that Member State from making the movement of staff in 
question subject to restrictions such as a condition as to engagement in situ or an 
obligation to obtain a work permit.’16 
Subsequent cases confirmed that the freedom to provide services entails the right of a 
service provider established in one Member State to move freely with all its workers 
who it lawfully employs in that country (regardless of whether they themselves, on the 
basis of their nationality, have the right to free movement under the Treaty) to another 
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Member State for the purpose of providing services there.
17
  Furthermore, the CJEU 
explicitly held in Finalarte that the Treaty provisions on the free movement of workers 
do not apply to workers employed by a business established in one Member State who 
are temporarily sent to another Member State to provide services there.
18
  The reason is 
that posted workers do not, in any way, seek access to the labour market in the latter 
Member State if they return to their country of origin or residence after completion of 
their work.
19
  The importance of Rush Portuguesa and Finalarte is immense.  After 
those decisions, the imposition of the host Member State employment standards, which 
necessarily burdens out-of-state service providers, was seen as a restriction or obstacle 
to the free movement of services.  In order to be lawful, such restrictions had to be 
justified. 
At first, the CJEU showed considerable deference towards the interests of host 
Member States.  In Rush Portuguesa, it stated obiter that: 
‘Community law does not preclude Member States from extending their 
legislation, or collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of 
industry, to any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their 
territory, no matter in which country the employer is established; nor does 
Community law prohibit Member States from enforcing those rules by 
appropriate means.’20 
The Court offered no explanation or reasoning for this sweeping statement.  Encouraged 
by this dictum, many Member States and candidate countries, net importers of posted 
workers, sought to protect their labour law systems by enacting or strengthening 
                                                 
17
 See Vander Elst (n4). 
18
 Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 [2001] ECR I-7831, [21]-
[23]; cf Joined Cases C-307/09 to C-309/09 Vicoplus [2011] ECR 00000 (posted agency workers in 
certain circumstances fall under the Treaty provisions on the free movement of workers). 
19
 ibid [22]. 
20
 (n4) [18]. 
264 
 
legislation which imposed local employment standards on out-of-state service 
providers.  The German Posting of Workers Act (Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz) of 
1996 is one example.  The adoption of this act was justified by the following reasons: 
protection of the national construction industry against unfair competition; reduction of 
unemployment in the domestic construction industry; avoidance of a breakdown of the 
national collective bargaining system; and, somewhat incidentally, the safeguarding of 
suitable working conditions for posted workers.
21
  Other examples include the French, 
Dutch, Austrian and Luxembourg acts of the early 1990s.
22
 
 The Commission’s response to Rush Portuguesa and the posted workers acts 
was PWD.  The Directive seeks to coordinate the laws of Member States regarding the 
local employment standards that are applicable to out-of-state service providers.
23
  It 
pursues multiple objectives.
24
  On the one hand, it safeguards the interests of host 
Member States to protect their labour law systems by imposing certain local 
employment standards on foreign service providers.
25
  It also aims to protect posted 
workers by entitling them to certain host Member State employment standards where 
those standards are more favourable for them than the equivalent standards of their 
country of origin.
26
  However, PWD seems to be primarily concerned with harnessing 
the wide-ranging regulatory freedom that Rush Portuguesa apparently gave host 
Member States by limiting local employment standards that could be imposed on out-
of-state service providers, thus supporting the free movement of services.  The primacy 
of this objective is reflected in the Treaty bases used for the adoption of the Directive, 
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the equivalent of Arts.53(1) and 62 TFEU referring to the Treaty chapter on the free 
movement of services, not the social policy provisions. 
 PWD applies to service providers established in a Member State which, in the 
framework of the transnational provision of services, post workers to the territory of 
another Member State.
27
  The Directive does not apply to all postings of workers, but 
only in the following three situations: 1) the service provider posts workers on its 
account and under its direction, under a contract concluded with the service receiver 
operating in the host country; 2) the service provider, a member of a corporate group, 
posts workers to an establishment or an undertaking owned by the group in the host 
country; 3) the service provider, an employment agency, hires out a worker to an end-
user established or operating in the host country.
28
  In all three situations, there has to be 
an employment relationship between the service provider and posted workers during the 
period of posting.
29
  Non-EU service providers must not be given more favourable 
treatment than service providers from Member States.
30
  For the purposes of PWD, a 
‘posted’ worker is a worker who, for a limited period, carries out his work in the 
territory of a Member State other than the Member State in which he normally works.
31
  
This provision should be interpreted in line with the concept of ‘temporary sending’ 
under Rome I.  If an employee’s sending is temporary for the purposes of Art.8(2) 
Rome I, that employee should be regarded as carrying out his work, for a limited period, 
in a country other than the country in which he normally works for the purposes of 
PWD.  The scope of the Directive is further limited to ‘workers’, as defined by the law 
of the host Member State.
32
  The Directive also contains a number of derogations.
33
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With regard to the range of the host Member State employment standards 
imposed on out-of-state service providers, PWD distinguishes between those that must 
and those that may be imposed.  According to Art.3(1), the local standards that must be 
afforded posted workers, regardless of the law applicable to the employment contract 
(the so-called ‘nucleus’ of mandatory rules for minimum protection or ‘hard core’ of 
protective rules),
34
 concern the following 7 matters: 
 maximum work periods and minimum rest periods; 
 minimum paid annual holidays; 
 minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates;35 
 conditions of hiring-out of workers, in particular the supply of workers 
by employment agencies; 
 health, safety and hygiene at work; 
 protection of pregnant women, women who have recently given birth, 
children and young people; 
 non-discrimination. 
The reason these particular matters are listed, and not also for example unfair dismissal 
or redundancy, is that the employment standards pertaining to the listed matters are of 
‘immediate interest during the period of posting’.36  Pursuant to the first indent of 
Art.3(10), host Member States may also impose, in compliance with the Treaty and on a 
basis of equality of treatment between the host Member State and out-of-state service 
providers, employment standards concerning non-listed matters ‘in the case of public 
policy provisions’. 
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Regarding the sources of the relevant host Member State employment standards, 
PWD distinguishes between those set legislatively and those set collectively.  With 
regard to the former category, the Directive allows the application of the standards set 
‘by law, regulation or administrative provision’.37  With regard to the latter category, the 
key questions are which types of collectively set standards can be imposed on out-of-
state service providers and in which sectors of the economy.  The Directive attempts to 
accommodate various traditions of collective standard setting existing in the EU.  On 
the one hand, it mandates the application of the standards set by ‘collective agreements 
or arbitration awards which have been declared universally applicable’,38 i.e. ‘collective 
agreements or arbitration awards which must be observed by all undertakings in the 
geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned’.39  This accommodates 
the interests of countries such as France and Germany that provide for the extension of 
application (also known as the erga omnes effect) of collectively set standards.  On the 
other hand, Member States that do not have a system for declaring collective 
agreements or arbitration awards to be of universal application may, ‘if they so decide’, 
impose, on a basis of equality of treatment, employment standards set by ‘collective 
agreements or arbitration awards which are generally applicable to all similar 
undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned’ or 
‘collective agreements which have been concluded by the most representative 
employers’ and labour organisations at national level and which are applied throughout 
national territory’.40  These provisions essentially cater for the interests of countries 
such as Denmark and Sweden that have neither legislatively set standards concerning 
some of the listed matters, most importantly the minimum wage, nor a system for 
extending the application of collectively set standards.  The provisions concerning the 
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imposition of collectively set standards apply only to the building sector.
41
  In other 
sectors, collectively set standards may be imposed only in accordance with the Treaty 
and on a basis of equality of treatment.
42
 
Two issues have proven to be particularly problematic in the interpretation and 
application of PWD.
43
  The first concerns the host Member State employment standards 
that may be imposed on out-of-state service providers; the second concerns the 
application of collectively set standards. 
Many Member States took advantage of the possibility afforded by the first 
indent of Art.3(10) by proclaiming all or much of their employment legislation to be of 
public policy nature.  As discussed in section 2.2 of Chapter VI, the CJEU decision in 
Commission v Luxembourg
44
 shows that such an extension of the host Member State 
employment standards is unlawful.  Here, the CJEU adopted an extremely narrow 
interpretation of the concept of ‘public policy provisions’ of Art.3(10) that had been 
favoured by the Commission.  In its Communication of July 2003,
45
 the Commission 
stated that this concept referred to ‘mandatory rules from which there can be no 
derogation and which, by their nature and objective, meet the overriding reasons in the 
public interest.  These might include, in particular, the prohibition of forced labour or 
the involvement of public authorities in monitoring compliance with legislation on 
working conditions’.46  Furthermore, the Commission referred to the CJEU case-law on 
the concept of public policy in the context of free movement of persons.  According to 
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the Commission, ‘recourse to the concept of public policy must be justified on 
overriding general interest grounds, must presuppose the existence of a genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society and must 
be in accordance with the general principles of law’.47  It is unlikely that many 
employment law provisions concerning non-listed matters, if any, can satisfy this test.
48
  
Certainly, none of the challenged provisions of Luxembourg law met this standard.  In 
effect, in Commission v Luxembourg the CJEU held that the host Member State’s 
‘nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection’ or the ‘hard core of clearly 
defined protective rules’49 set not only the floor but also the ceiling of protection for 
posted workers.  The Court adopted the same view in Rüffert, a case concerning social 
clauses in public contracts.
50
 
As mentioned, some countries have neither legislatively set standards 
concerning some of the listed matters nor a system for extending the application of 
collectively set standards.  The second subparagraph of Art.3(8) PWD provides that 
such countries may, ‘if they so decide’, impose on out-of-state service providers 
employment standards laid down by collective agreements which satisfy the 
requirements of general applicability or of the representative status of the collective 
partners.  When implementing the Directive, Sweden introduced legislation laying 
down employment standards concerning all of the listed matters apart from the 
                                                 
47
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minimum wage.  With regard to wages, Sweden did not avail itself of the second 
subparagraph of Art.3(8), but instead relied on the suitability and effectiveness of its 
existing model of industrial relations.
51
  In Sweden, trade unions are responsible for 
safeguarding the level of wages and working conditions.  Most employers and their 
employees are covered by collective agreements.  An employer not belonging to an 
employers’ organisation is expected to enter into an ‘application agreement’ in which it 
undertakes to comply with the terms and conditions of employment laid down in the 
collective agreement covering the profession or industry concerned.  Sectoral collective 
agreements, in principle, do not regulate wages.  Instead, the level of wages is left to be 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis at the level of each workplace, having regard to the 
qualifications and tasks of the employees concerned.  If an employer who is not a 
member of any employers’ organisation refuses to enter into an ‘application agreement’, 
unions will force it to do so by means of primary and secondary industrial action.  The 
existence of an extensive right to undertake industrial action against recalcitrant 
employers is of crucial importance for the functioning of the Swedish model of 
industrial relations.  Out-of-state service providers, who ordinarily do not belong to a 
Swedish employers’ organisation, were similarly expected to enter into an ‘application 
agreement’ with the relevant union and to negotiate the level of wages of posted 
workers on a case-by-case basis at the workplace level.  But Laval
52
 disclosed not only 
the shortcomings of the Swedish implementation of PWD but also raised several 
general questions regarding collective standard setting in the context of posting of 
workers. 
Laval, a Latvian company, posted its Latvian workers to Sweden in connection 
with a construction contract that its Swedish affiliate had won there.  The contract 
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concerned the renovation of a school in a Stockholm suburb.  Employment standards, 
and in particular the level of wages, are considerably lower in Latvia than in Sweden.  
The ability to undercut local competitors was a reason for the Laval group winning the 
contract.  After Laval had refused to negotiate and enter into collective agreements with 
the major Swedish construction union and to pay Swedish wages to its Latvian workers, 
the union organised a blockade of all Laval’s construction sites in Sweden.  A sympathy 
industrial action was also taken by the electricians’ union.  The industrial action was 
unusually effective.  It forced the Latvian company to withdraw from Sweden and to 
file for bankruptcy of its Swedish affiliate.  The Latvian company brought proceedings 
in Sweden seeking remedies for the violation by the unions of its freedom to provide 
services.  The Swedish court referred a series of questions to the CJEU on issues 
concerning PWD and EC law. 
The CJEU identified several problems with the Swedish implementation of 
PWD.  First, Sweden had not made use of the possibility provided for in the second 
subparagraph of Art.3(8) because ‘recourse to...[that] possibility requires...that the 
Member State must so decide’.53  Since Sweden had not referred, in the implementing 
legislation or elsewhere, to any collective agreement meeting the necessary 
requirements, provisions contained in any such agreement could not be imposed on the 
Latvian service provider.  Furthermore, the Directive did not allow the imposition of the 
running wage on out-of-state service providers, only the minimum wage.
54
  
Consequently, foreign service providers could not be required to enter into negotiations 
on the level of wages for each workplace on a case-by-case basis.
55
  Third, where 
employment standards concerning the listed matters were laid down in the 
implementing legislation, out-of-state service providers could not be required to comply 
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with more favourable collectively set standards.
56
  Art.3(7), which provides that 
Art.3(1)-(6) PWD ‘shall not prevent application of terms and conditions of employment 
which are more favourable to workers’, did not allow host Member States to impose 
terms and conditions of employment concerning the listed matters that went beyond the 
mandatory minimum laid down in legislation.
57
  What Art.3(7) did allow was the 
application of more favourable terms and conditions of employment contained in the 
law applicable to the employment contract or voluntarily accepted by the service 
provider in the employment contract or a collective agreement.
58
  Finally, collectively 
set standards concerning non-listed matters could not be imposed on out-of-state service 
providers since such standards, formulated without State authorities having had recourse 
to the first indent of Art.3(10), could not be regarded as ‘public policy provisions’.59 
Laval raises a more general question of whether, where there is a system for 
declaring collective agreements to be of universal application or where the host Member 
State avails itself of the second subparagraph of Art.3(8), the imposition of collectively 
set standards which go above legislatively set standards is lawful.  On the one hand, 
Art.3(1) prescribes that, as regards the building sector, Member States shall ensure the 
application of the relevant standards set by collective agreements which have been 
declared universally applicable.  Furthermore, Art.3(1) refers to Art.3(8) which, with 
regard to countries that do not have a system for declaring collective agreements to be 
of universal application, provides for the application of the relevant standards set by 
collective agreements meeting the requirements of general applicability or of the 
representative status of the collective partners.  On the other hand, the statements in 
Laval to the effect that out-of-state service providers cannot be required to comply with 
more favourable collectively set standards in situations where there are legislatively set 
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standards suggests a different conclusion.
60
  The EFTA Court addressed this question in 
STX Norway Offshore AS v Norway.
61
  The provisions concerning minimum normal 
working hours contained in a universally applicable collective agreement were held to 
precede those laid down in legislation.
62  Another general question raised by Laval is 
whether the ‘public policy provisions’ test of Art.3(10) can be used as a basis for 
imposing collectively set standards concerning non-listed matters.  Since both the 
extension of the application of a collective agreement and the decision to impose 
standards set by a collective agreement which satisfies the requirements of general 
applicability or of the representative status of the collective partners imply state 
involvement, Laval would suggest that this is possible.  However, in light of 
Commission v Luxembourg,
63
 this seems to be only a theoretical possibility since 
collective agreements do not deal with ‘genuine and sufficiently serious threats 
affecting fundamental interests of society’.  Similarly, it also appears that the possibility 
provided by the second indent of Art.3(10) of imposing collectively set standards in 
sectors other than building is largely theoretical.
64
 
To sum up, EU law has always allowed the imposition of some host Member 
State employment standards on out-of-state service providers.  But the range and type of 
standards that can be imposed have been curtailed over time.  The evolution of the law 
in this field from the perception that posted workers fall within the Treaty provisions on 
the free movement of workers, via the CJEU decisions in Rush Portuguesa and 
Finalarte and the adoption of PWD, to the recent decisions in Commission v 
Luxembourg, Laval and Rüffert, shows a clear pattern.  The interests of the internal 
market prevail over those of host Member States. 
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2. Enforcing the Directive 
Although there is a trend of curtailing the range and type of employment standards that 
can be imposed on out-of-state service providers, PWD continues to safeguard some of 
the host Member State standards.  Wherever the proper balance of the competing 
interests may be, the objectives of the law in this field cannot be achieved unless there is 
an effective mechanism for enforcing the relevant local standards.  There are essentially 
three ways of enforcing those standards, namely ‘public’, ‘collective’ and ‘private’ 
enforcement.  ‘Public’ enforcement refers to the monitoring and enforcement of the 
relevant standards by public authorities, primarily labour inspectorates and immigration 
authorities.  ‘Collective’ enforcement refers to the monitoring and enforcement by trade 
unions.  In theory, both the host and home Member State public authorities and unions 
could have a role to play.  However, given that a Directive’s objective is the protection 
of the host Member State labour law systems, it is logical that it is the host Member 
State actors that are interested in, and bear the burden of, enforcing the relevant 
standards. The home Member State actors do not have an interest in enforcing the host 
Member State standards because they benefit from the free movement of services.  
‘Private’ enforcement refers to the enforcement of the relevant standards through labour 
litigation.  It is in relation to this third possible way of enforcement that the rules of PIL 
come into play.  In order to assess the role that PIL has in the context of posting of 
workers, it is necessary to determine the relative importance of private enforcement of 
the relevant standards.  This, in turn, requires an examination of the current state of 
(in)effectiveness of both public and collective enforcement. 
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2.1. (In)effectiveness of public enforcement 
Generally speaking, public enforcement of labour standards is an ineffective mechanism 
for achieving compliance.  It has been reported, for example, that an average UK 
employer will get inspected for compliance with the minimum wage regulation once 
every 330 years.
65
  The analysis of the CJEU case-law shows that public enforcement of 
PWD also lacks effectiveness. 
The CJEU has dealt on a number of occasions with monitoring and enforcement 
measures undertaken by the host Member State public authorities.
66
  Many host 
Member States used to or still require out-of-state service providers to do one or more 
of the following: to obtain work permits or visas for posted workers who are third 
country nationals, to submit a prior declaration concerning the posting to the host 
Member State authorities, to be represented in the host Member State, to keep labour 
and social documents concerning the posting in the host Member State and in 
accordance with the law of the host Member State.  A measure of this kind represents a 
restriction on the free movement of services since it is ‘liable to prohibit, impede or 
render less attractive the provision of services to the extent that it involves expenses and 
additional administrative and economic burdens’.67  In order to be lawful, such a 
measure must comply with the Treaty by satisfying several conditions.
68
  It must not 
discriminate against out-of-state service providers.  It must be justified on the ground of 
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overriding reasons in the public interest, such as the social protection of posted workers.  
That interest must not be accorded the same or essentially similar protection to that 
accorded by the provisions to which the service provider is subject in the home Member 
State.  The measure must also be proportionate to the objective pursued, i.e. appropriate 
for securing it and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.  Many of the 
measures that host Member States used to or still impose on out-of-state service 
providers fail to meet the required conditions. 
 Many host Member States used to require out-of-state service providers to 
obtain a prior authorisation for posting workers who are not EU nationals.  It will be 
remembered that in Rush Portuguesa
69
 a Portuguese company used its Portuguese 
workers, who were treated as third country nationals, to perform services in France.  
The CJEU held that the Treaty precluded France from imposing on out-of-state service 
providers conditions relating to the recruitment of manpower in situ or the obtaining of 
work permits.  Similarly, in Vander Elst
70
 a Belgian service provider lawfully employed 
third country nationals in Belgium.  It posted those workers to France.  The Court found 
that French authorities could not require the service provider to obtain and pay for work 
permits for those workers.
71
  In several subsequent cases,
72
 the Court held that the 
following measures would, in a less restrictive but as effective manner as a prior 
authorisation, give the host Member State authorities a guarantee that posted workers 
were lawfully employed in the home Member State: ‘an obligation imposed on a 
service-providing undertaking to report beforehand to the local authorities on the 
presence of one or more deployed workers, the anticipated duration of their presence 
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and the provision or provisions of services justifying the deployment’73 and an 
obligation to provide the host Member State authorities ‘with information showing that 
the situation of the workers concerned is lawful as regards matters such as residence, 
work permit and social coverage’ in the home Member State.74 
Indeed, one of the most common measures imposed on out-of-state service 
providers is a general requirement to submit a prior declaration concerning the posting 
to the host Member State authorities.  Dos Santos Palhota
75
 indicates that such a 
requirement is lawful, provided it is not overly burdensome for out-of-state service 
providers.  Here, the CJEU found that Belgian legislation which provided that the 
posting could not take place before the competent authorities had received a prior 
declaration and issued a registration number to the service provider was not in 
accordance with the Treaty.  But had the posting not been so conditioned, the obligation 
to make a prior declaration would have been lawful.  Many Member States impose such 
declaratory requirements on out-of-state service providers, usually coupled with a 
criminal or administrative fine as the penalty for infringement.  But the van 
Hoek/Houwerzijl study on the implementation and application of PWD demonstrates 
that fines are rarely imposed in practice and, furthermore, that the fines which have been 
imposed are rarely enforced either locally or abroad.
76
  This brings into question the 
effectiveness of prior declarations. 
With regard to the service provider’s representation in the host Member State, 
the CJEU has held that the requirement to maintain a registered office or a branch office 
in the host Member State constitutes ‘the very negation of the fundamental freedom to 
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provide services’.77  Similarly, host Member States cannot require out-of-state service 
providers to appoint a local representative to retain the relevant labour and social 
documents after the posting has come to an end.
78
  All host Member States can do is 
require out-of-state service providers to appoint a posted worker to act as the link 
between them and the host Member State authorities for the duration of the posting.
79
 
In Arblade and Leloup
80
 the CJEU addressed the issue of keeping and drawing 
up of labour and social documents.  The Court held that the host Member State could 
require the relevant documents to be kept on site, or at least in an accessible and clearly 
identified place in that country, and be available to the local authorities where this was 
necessary for monitoring local employment standards, in particular where there was no 
organised system for cooperation or exchanges of information between Member States 
as envisaged by Art.4 PWD.
81
  Furthermore, the Court found that an out-of-state service 
provider could not be required to draw up the relevant documents pursuant to the local 
record keeping requirements where the documents kept in accordance with the home 
Member State law were adequate to enable the monitoring of local standards.
82
  It is 
only if the respective rules of the home and host Member State differed to such an 
extent that the monitoring of local standards could not be carried out on the basis of the 
documents drawn up in accordance with the law of the home country that an out-of-state 
service provider could be required to comply with the local record keeping 
requirements.
83
  Consequently, before obliging an out-of-state service provider to draw 
up the documents in accordance with the local requirements and to keep them locally, 
the host Member State authorities should verify that the protection of posted workers 
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was not sufficiently safeguarded by the production, within a reasonable time, of 
originals or copes of the documents kept in the home Member State or, failing that, by 
keeping the originals or copies of those document available in the host Member State.
84
  
Where the conditions for requiring an out-of-state service provider to keep the relevant 
documents in the host Member State were met, the host Member State could also 
require the translation of those documents into the local language.
85
  The case-law also 
shows that foreign service providers cannot be required to retain the relevant documents 
in the host Member State after the termination of the posting,
86
 but can be required to 
send the copies of the relevant documents to the host Member State authorities at the 
end of, or after, the posting period.
87
 
If the host Member State authorities find out that an out-of-state service provider 
has not complied with the relevant local employment standards, they should not act 
before they have assessed the effect of their actions on the service provider’s freedom to 
provide services.  Just because PWD allows the imposition of certain local standards on 
foreign service providers, it does not relieve the host Member State authorities from 
ensuring that their actions accord with the Treaty, i.e. that they are non-discriminatory, 
justified and proportionate.
88
  Unless the enforcement of the relevant standards confers a 
genuine benefit on the posted workers by significantly adding to their social protection, 
the host Member State authorities will violate the Treaty.
89
  The Treaty will also be 
breached if the public authorities’ actions are disproportionate.90  These requirements 
impose a heavy burden on the host Member State authorities since they require them to 
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communicate with the corresponding home Member States authorities,
91
 to examine 
employment legislation of foreign countries, whose up-to-date version may only be 
available in a foreign language, and compare it to their own legislation. 
To sum up, the restrictions which the Treaty, as interpreted by the CJEU, 
imposes on the host Member State authorities when monitoring and enforcing the 
relevant local employment standards render public enforcement of those standards 
largely ineffective.  The authorities cannot act until they have established that an out-of-
state service provider has failed to comply with the relevant standards.  The main source 
of information are prior declarations which out-of-state service providers may be 
required to submit to the host Member State authorities.  However, fines for breaching 
the obligation to submit a prior declaration are rare and hard to enforce, and therefore 
not much of a deterrent in practice.  Indeed, as the van Hoek/Houwerzijl study confirms, 
service providers often ‘”forget” to notify’.92  Another source of information are labour 
and social documents which out-of-state service providers may be required to keep in 
host Member States for the duration of the posting.  But if an out-of-state service 
provider fails to submit a prior declaration to the host Member State authorities, those 
authorities may be ignorant of the fact that the posting is taking place and thus unable to 
inspect in situ the relevant documents for the purpose of monitoring the relevant 
standards.  After the posting has come to an end, the relevant documents can be 
obtained only from abroad following the cooperation and exchange of information 
mechanism between Member States, whose shortcomings are well documented.
93
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Finally, even if the host Member State authorities manage to find out that an out-of-state 
service provider has breached the relevant local standards, they can act only if they 
ensure that their actions are non-discriminative, genuinely benefit posted workers and 
proportionate.  The obligations to communicate with the corresponding home Member 
States authorities in order to determine the content of foreign employment legislation, 
often available only in a foreign language, and to compare it with local legislation 
impose significant practical barriers to the effective public enforcement of the relevant 
local standards.  Indeed, the Commission has acknowledged that public enforcement is 
the Directive’s Achilles heel.94  The Commission’s threat to commence infringement 
proceedings against any Member State whose public enforcement measures are 
perceived as breaching the Treaty and PWD
95
 disincentivises Member States from 
attempting to increase the effectiveness of public enforcement. 
2.2. (In)effectiveness of collective enforcement 
The CJEU has dealt with collective enforcement of the host Member State employment 
standards in two recent cases.  In Laval
96
 Swedish trade unions attempted to enforce, by 
means of industrial action, Swedish collectively set standards against a Latvian service 
provider.  The service provider brought proceedings against the unions in Sweden 
claiming they had violated its freedom to provide services.  The CJEU held that the 
Treaty provisions on the free movement of services had a horizontal direct effect against 
the unions.
97
  Since the industrial action aimed at forcing an out-of-state service 
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provider to comply with the host Member State collectively set standards is liable to 
make the provision of services ‘less attractive or more difficult’,98 it represents a 
restriction of the fundamental Treaty freedom.  In order to be lawful, the industrial 
action has to be non-discriminatory, justified and proportionate.  Otherwise, the union is 
liable for any damage caused to the service provider.  Since the imposition of the 
Swedish collectively set standards in Laval was not in accordance with PWD, the 
industrial action aimed at enforcing those standards could not be justified.  After the 
CJEU had decided that the Swedish unions had violated the Latvian service provider’s 
fundamental freedom, the Swedish courts ordered the unions to pay damages and 
litigation costs.
99
 
 The other relevant case is Viking.
100
  Viking, a Finish company, owned a ferry 
registered in Finland, manned with a predominantly Finish crew, plying between 
Finland and Estonia.  Viking decided to re-register the vessel in Estonia in order to 
benefit from lower labour costs in that country.
101
  The International Transport 
Workers’ Federation (‘ITF’) has a policy of combating the use of flags of convenience.  
It issued a call to its members to boycott the Finish company.  Following this, Viking 
commenced proceedings in England against the ITF and its affiliate, the Finnish 
Seamen’s Union, seeking an injunction to stop the boycott.  The claim was based on the 
violation of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by Art.49 TFEU (ex Art.43 TEC).  
English courts had jurisdiction over the ITF, as an English domiciliary, under Art.2 and 
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over the Finnish union, as a co-defendant, under Art.6(1) Brussels I.  The Court of 
Appeal referred a question to the CJEU whether the actions of the ITF and the Finish 
union violated Viking’s fundamental freedom.  The CJEU held firstly that the freedom 
of establishment had a horizontal direct effect against the unions.
102
  Consequently, the 
industrial action would have been lawful only if it had been non-discriminatory, 
justified and proportionate.  In contrast to Laval, the CJEU in Viking did not decide 
whether the unions had in fact violated the Treaty.  Since Viking was eventually 
settled,
103
 English courts did not have an opportunity to decide on the lawfulness of the 
industrial action and potential liability of the unions. 
 Laval and Viking demonstrate the ineffectiveness of collective enforcement of 
the host Member State employment standards.  Although in both cases the CJEU 
recognised that the right to take collective action was a fundamental right which formed 
an integral part of the general principles of Community law,
104
 it nevertheless 
subordinated this right to the fundamental Treaty freedoms.  Somewhat paradoxically, 
the more an industrial action is effective, the more it will restrict the fundamental Treaty 
freedoms, and the less likely it will meet the requirement of proportionality.
105
  Given 
the trend of declining union strength in Member States, it comes as no surprise that 
unions refrain from engaging in industrial action which potentially violates the Treaty.  
With regard to the UK, it has been noted that, ‘Anecdotal evidence following Viking and 
Laval suggests that employee representatives interpret the judgments as having a 
chilling effect on industrial action.’106  Even the ILO Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations expressed, in its 2010 Report, 
                                                 
102
 Viking (n100) [55] and [66]. 
103
 ‘Finnish Shipping Group Settles Case Over Cheap Labour’, Financial Times, 4 March 2008. 
104
 Viking (n100) [44]; Laval (n2) [91]. 
105
 Davies (n11) 141-145; Kilpatrick (n11) 18-19. 
106
 R. O’Donoghue and B. Carr, ‘Dealing with Viking and Laval: From Theory to Practice’ (2008-2009) 
11 CYELS 123, 162.  Also K. Apps, ‘Damages Claims against Trade Unions after Viking and Laval’ 
(2009) 34 ELR 141. 
284 
 
‘serious concern’ about the practical limitations on the effective exercise of the right to 
strike – enshrined in ILO Convention No 87 of 9 July 1948 concerning freedom of 
association and protection of the right to organise – imposed by the CJEU decisions.107 
2.3. Conclusion 
Because of the restrictions imposed by the Treaty and the CJEU case-law on the host 
Member State authorities and trade unions, both public and collective enforcement of 
the host Member State employment standards that can be imposed on out-of-state 
service providers are largely ineffective.  This further supports the conclusion that, in 
the context of posting of workers, the interests of the internal market prevail over those 
of host Member States.  The European Commission has proposed the adoption of two 
instruments, the Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within 
the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services
108
 and 
the Directive on the enforcement of PWD,
109
 aimed at remedying some of the perceived 
problems concerning enforcement.  The effect of these initiatives remains to be seen.  In 
any event, given the current state of ineffectiveness of public and collective 
enforcement, private enforcement of the relevant standards, and thereby PIL, could play 
a crucial role in the context of posting of workers.  But even if the situation with regard 
to public and collective enforcement improves, following the likely adoption of the two 
proposed instruments, the potential importance of private enforcement of the relevant 
standards will remain.  The following section examines whether European PIL of 
employment is able to adequately perform this role. 
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3. Private enforcement of the Directive in England 
England is a net receiver of posted workers.  This section therefore firstly deals with 
issues concerning the posting of workers to this country.  English workers are also being 
posted abroad in the framework of the transnational provision of services.  A question 
then arises if an English posted worker can commence proceedings in England for 
breach of the relevant host Member State employment standards. 
3.1. A receiving perspective 
The UK did not pass specific legislation to implement PWD.  Instead, the UK has 
sought to comply with the Directive by amending its existing employment legislation to 
ensure that posted workers fall within its territorial reach.  S.196 of the Employment 
Rights Act 1996 used to contain express territorial limitations.  Most rights conferred by 
the Act did not apply to employees who, under their employment contracts, ordinarily 
worked outside Britain.
110
  Since posted workers by definition ordinarily work outside 
Britain, they fell outside the scope of those rights.  S.196 was repealed in 1999.
111
  The 
void left by the repeal was filled by the House of Lords in Lawson v Serco.
112
  
According to LORD HOFFMANN, employees working in Britain are one of the categories 
covered by ERA 1996.  Since posted workers work in Britain, albeit temporarily, ERA 
1996 applies to them.  The position in relation to anti-discrimination legislation is 
similar.  Express territorial limitations used to exclude those who worked ‘wholly or 
mainly outside Great Britain’.  This was altered by the Equal Opportunities 
(Employment Legislation) (Territorial Limits) Regulations 1999 to allow those who 
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worked partly in Britain to rely on anti-discrimination legislation.
113
  The Equality Act 
2010 is silent with regard to its territorial reach.  The Government’s Explanatory Notice 
to the Bill for the Act states that, ‘As far as territorial application is concerned...the Bill 
leaves it to tribunals to determine whether the law applies, depending on for example 
the connection between the employment relationship and Great Britain.’  In Van 
Winkelhof
114
 Lawson v Serco was regarded as the leading authority for determining the 
territorial scope of EqA 2010.  Similarly, the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 
applies to a worker who ‘is working...in the United Kingdom’.115  With regard to the 
EU-law derived rights (e.g. rights granted by the Working Time Regulations 1998), they 
apply to all employees working anywhere in Europe, including those posted from 
another Member State to England. 
Several issues remain open.  First, it is not entirely clear what ‘working in 
Britain’ means.  Of what duration and nature should a worker’s work in Britain be 
before they can be regarded as falling within the scope of ERA 1996 and other pieces of 
employment legislation? 
One view is that there is a difference between workers posted to Britain who fall 
within the scope of PWD and other workers posted to Britain.
116
  According to this 
view, the repeal of s.196 ERA 1996 did not change the law in relation to posted workers 
falling outside the scope of the Directive, namely workers posted by non-EU employers.  
Such posted workers come within the territorial reach of ERA 1996 only if they 
ordinarily work in Britain.  With regard to posted workers falling within the scope of 
the Directive, they can invoke the rights granted by ERA 1996 even if they ordinarily 
work outside Britain.  But such an interpretation of LORD HOFFMANN’s ‘employees 
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working in Britain’ category is not supported by the wording of PWD.  According to 
Art.1(4) PWD, undertakings established outside the EU must not be given a more 
favourable treatment than undertakings established in a Member State.  If non-EU 
employers posting workers to Britain did not have to comply with ERA 1996 when their 
workers ordinarily worked outside Britain, they would be put in a more favourable 
position in comparison to Member State employers that have to comply with ERA 1996 
in comparable situations.  Since such result would contravene Art.1(4) PWD, it must be 
avoided. 
One of the most contentious issues in drafting PWD was whether postings of 
short duration should be excluded from its scope.  The initial proposal of the Directive 
provided for the exemption of all postings not exceeding three months.
117
  The 1993 
proposal reduced the period to one month.
118
  Since these provisions did not find their 
way into the final version of the Directive, this instrument applies, in principle, to all 
covered postings from day one.  There is one compulsory exception from this rule: in 
the case of initial assembly and/or first installation of goods where this is an integral 
part of a contract for the supply of goods and necessary for taking the goods supplied 
into use, the host country standards concerning minimum paid annual holidays and 
minimum rates of pay do not apply if the period of posting does not exceed eight days 
and if the case does not concern the building sector.
119
  PWD also allows host Member 
States to partly exempt certain other categories of posting from the scope of the 
Directive, namely postings not exceeding one month
120
 and postings concerning ‘non-
significant’ amount of work.121  But given it is in the interest of host Member States to 
impose their employment standards whenever possible, it comes as no surprise that the 
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optional exceptions are seldom implemented.
122
  In particular, the UK has not made use 
of this possibility.  Consequently, the employment standards set out in ERA 1996 and 
other pieces of employment legislation which, pursuant to PWD, must be imposed on 
out-of-state service providers apply from day one.  Of course, an employee must satisfy 
the qualifying period of employment in order to be able to rely on employment 
legislation.  But both work in and outside the UK should be taken into account for this 
purpose. 
The application of British employment legislation, in its entirety and from day 
one, to posted workers brings into question the compliance with PWD and the Treaty of 
the UK’s method of implementation of this instrument.  The total repeal of s.196 ERA 
1996 was justified as being necessary for implementing the Directive.
123
  But PWD only 
obliges host Member States to impose on out-of-state service providers employment 
standards concerning matters listed in Art.3(1).  Indeed, in relation to those standards, 
the existence of s.196 would have prevented the proper implementation of the Directive.  
However, many provisions of ERA 1996, including those concerning unfair dismissal 
and redundancy, do not concern a listed matter.  The UK was therefore not obliged to 
repeal s.196 in its entirety.  Since the first indent of Art.3(10) PWD allows host Member 
States to impose standards concerning non-listed matters ‘in the case of public policy 
provisions’, the total repeal of s.196 effectively gave all provisions of ERA 1996 
concerning non-listed matters such public policy status.  Similarly, the existence in 
other pieces of British employment legislation of provisions which do not concern a 
listed matter, but which extend their application to workers posted from other Member 
States, implies recourse to Art.3(10).  But in light of Commission v Luxembourg,
124
 such 
an extensive territorial reach of the employment legislation must be seen as being 
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contrary to both PWD and the Treaty provisions on the free movement of services.
125
  
Furthermore, as discussed in section 2.2 of Chapter VI, it is possible, although far from 
certain, that giving a public policy status to provisions concerning non-listed matters 
might also contravene Art.9(1) (‘mandatory overriding provisions’) Rome I.  If so, both 
PWD and Rome I would require provisions contained in British employment legislation 
concerning non-listed matters to be applied only in situations where English (or 
Scottish) law governs the employment contract. 
But if Art.9(1) Rome I does not prevent the overriding application of provisions 
concerning non-listed matters, an interesting situation would arise.  PWD and the Treaty 
would preclude the imposition of such provisions on service providers established in 
other Member States, whereas Art.9 Rome I would allow the imposition of such 
provisions on non-EU service providers.  In that case, a difference in treatment between 
Member State and non-EU service providers would arise to the detriment of the latter. 
Another issue is whether employment standards set by English collective 
agreements can be imposed on out-of-state service providers.  Since the UK does not 
have a system for declaring collective agreements to be of universal application, only 
standards set by collective agreements that meet the requirements of general 
applicability or of the representative status of the collective partners could be imposed.  
Laval
126
 shows that a country can make use of the possibility provided for in the second 
subparagraph of Art.3(8) PWD only if it expressly so decides.  Since the UK has not 
referred in its legislation or elsewhere to any collective agreement meeting the 
necessary requirements, English collectively set standards cannot be imposed on out-of-
state service providers. 
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Finally, there is a question of whether workers posted to England can effectively 
enforce the relevant employment standards before English courts.  Do English courts 
have international jurisdiction to hear and decide such cases?  Defendants in 
employment disputes who are domiciled in the EU and those domiciled outside the EU 
fall under different jurisdictional regimes.  English courts can assume jurisdiction over 
an employer domiciled in a Member State pursuant to the rules of Brussels I.
127
  But this 
Regulation does not prejudice the application of the jurisdictional rules contained in 
other Community instruments, such as PWD, and in national legislation harmonised 
pursuant to such instruments.
128
  Jurisdiction over employers domiciled outside the EU 
is governed by national jurisdictional rules. 
The rules of jurisdiction in employment matters of Brussels I have been 
examined in Chapter IV.  Member State employers usually fall under the jurisdiction of 
the courts of their domicile or the courts for the habitual place of work.  Other 
jurisdictional bases (engaging place of business; ancillary establishments; consent) 
seldom apply and would in any event rarely give jurisdiction to the courts of the host 
Member State.  In cases of posting of workers to England, the competent courts are 
therefore by definition foreign courts.  However, Art.5(2) PWD states that Member 
States must ensure that adequate procedures are available to workers and/or their 
representatives for the enforcement of obligations under this Directive.  Furthermore, 
Art.6 PWD provides that, in order to enforce the right to the terms and conditions of 
employment guaranteed by Art.3, judicial proceedings may be instituted in the Member 
State in whose territory the worker is or was posted.  Art.6 has not been specifically 
implemented in the UK.  Nevertheless, there are jurisdictional rules in England which 
posted workers can invoke.  Employment standards which, pursuant to Art.3 PWD, 
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must be accorded workers posted to England are contained in legislation.  Statutory 
claims concerning breach of employment legislation can only be brought before 
employment tribunals.
129
  Jurisdiction of employment tribunals in England is set out in 
reg.19(1) of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) 
Regulations 2004.  Under reg.19, employment tribunals have jurisdiction to deal with 
proceedings where the employer resides or carries on business in England and Wales.  
Pervez v Macquaire Bank Ltd
130
 shows that whenever an employee falls within the 
scope of employment legislation, the requirements of reg.19 are satisfied.
131
  In cases of 
posting of workers falling within the scope of PWD, reg.19 of the 2004 Regulations 
should be regarded as effectively implementing Art.6 PWD. 
The 2004 Regulations also set out the jurisdiction of employment tribunals over 
non-EU employers for breach of statutory rights conferred by employment legislation.  
As mentioned, there is a possibility that workers posted to England by such employers, 
which do not fall within the scope of PWD, are in a somewhat different legal position 
than workers posted to England by Member State employers.  It is possible, although far 
from certain, that the definition of overriding mandatory provisions under Art.9(1) 
Rome I is not as narrow as the definition of ‘public policy provisions’ under Art.3(10) 
PWD.  If so, the provisions contained in British employment legislation which do not 
concern a listed matter and therefore do not satisfy the test of Art.3(10) PWD might 
nevertheless satisfy the requirements of Art.9(1) Rome I and as such be applied against 
non-EU employers.  If so, employment tribunals would have jurisdiction over statutory 
claims for breach of employment standards concerning non-listed matters brought by 
workers posted by non-EU employers, but not over the same types of claim brought by 
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workers posted by Member State employers.  The possibility of this outcome is yet 
another evidence that PWD is primarily concerned with advancing the interests of the 
internal market, not the interests of posted workers or host Member States. 
In any event, the van Hoek/Houwerzijl study demonstrates that posted workers 
rarely commence proceedings in host Member States: ‘In all the receiving Member 
States it seems that the right to take legal action has at present hardly been or has never 
been used by posted workers...’132  There are several possible explanations for this.  
First, posted workers might not be aware of their rights.  Second, postings usually do 
not last long enough for posted workers to become integrated in the host Member State.  
The host Member State courts usually remain remote and unfamiliar venues for posted 
workers.  Third, many posted workers work in the building, transport, agency work and 
other relatively low-skilled, low-wage sectors.  Such workers experience particular 
difficulties accessing the host Member State courts due to financial, linguistic, cultural 
and similar barriers.  Fourth, the judgment of the host Member State courts would 
usually have to be recognised and enforced in the home Member State which is a major 
disincentive for posted workers.  This problem, however, does not arise where the host 
Member State imposes an obligation on service receivers to act as guarantors in respect 
of the local employment standards, in particular minimum remuneration, accorded 
posted workers.
133
  Fifth, the terms and conditions of employment of senior posted 
workers (managers, consultants, professionals etc.), who are more likely to have 
financial means to pursue litigation in the host Member State, normally exceed 
minimum host Member State employment standards, in particular concerning wages.  
In order to overcome some of these difficulties, several Member States allow 
representative workers’ and employers’ organisations to commence legal proceedings, 
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independent of posted workers.
134
  But the van Hoek/Houwerzijl study shows that this 
measure is also largely ineffective.
135
  Consequently, in order for private enforcement of 
the relevant host Member State employment standards to be a true alternative to public 
and collective enforcement, it is imperative that posted workers are able to commence 
and pursue effective proceedings in home Member States. 
3.2. A sending perspective 
English posted workers can commence proceedings for breach of the relevant host 
Member State employment standards in the host Member State.  The following text 
examines whether they can also effectively enforce those standards before English 
courts. 
In a typical posting scenario, the courts of the posted worker’s country of origin 
have jurisdiction over disputes concerning his employment contract.  English posted 
workers therefore do not have a problem commencing proceedings in England.  But can 
they pursue effective proceedings in England?  Typically, a posted worker’s 
employment contract is governed by the law of his country of origin.  The effectiveness 
of proceedings before English courts therefore primarily depends on their ability to 
apply the relevant host Member State employment standards where the law of the host 
Member State is not applicable.  According to Davies, ‘The consequence [of PWD] for 
the home State government is that the Directive will require it to ensure its labour courts 
do apply the law of the host State in appropriate circumstances.’136  But this conclusion 
does not seem to be supported by the wording of PWD.  The only two provisions of the 
Directive relevant in this respect are contained in Arts.5(2) and 6, mentioned above.  
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But neither of these provisions requires home Member States to lend their courts for the 
enforcement of the relevant host Member State standards.  Art.6 expressly obliges only 
host Member States to enable the institution before their courts of proceedings for the 
enforcement of the terms and conditions of employment guaranteed by Art.3.  Similarly, 
Art.3(1) seems to require only host Member States to ensure that the relevant 
employment standards are imposed on out-of-state service providers: ‘Member States 
shall ensure that...[foreign service providers] guarantee workers posted to their territory 
the terms and conditions of employment covering the [listed matters].’  Therefore, as 
long as host Member States enable posted workers to enforce the relevant local 
standards before their courts, as required by Art.6, it seems that Member States will 
have fulfilled their Art.5(2) duty. 
Does Rome I provide English courts with a basis for applying the relevant host 
Member State employment standards?  It should be noted in this respect that Davies 
primarily based his conclusion quoted above on Art.7(1) of the Rome Convention.
137
  
This Article provided that: 
When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given 
to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has 
a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those 
rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. 
Although the UK, at the time of acceding to the Convention, reserved the right not to 
apply Art.7(1),
138
 it was considered that PWD overrode such reservations in the case of 
employment contracts by ‘[identifying] the relevant mandatory rules in the context of 
employment contracts and [requiring] the home State courts to apply them.’139  But this 
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argument is not relevant any more since Art.7(1) of the Rome Convention as such has 
not found its way into Rome I. 
Admittedly, Art.9(3) Rome I allows the application of the overriding mandatory 
provisions of the law which is neither the lex fori nor the lex causae.  But the wording 
of this Article is highly restrictive: 
Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the 
country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been 
performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory provisions render the 
performance of the contract unlawful. 
The host Member State is clearly the country of performance of the obligations arising 
out of the posted worker’s employment contract.  As demonstrated in section 2.2 of 
Chapter VI, provisions concerning the matters listed in Art.3(1) or satisfying the test of 
Art.3(10) PWD represent ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ for the purposes of Rome I.  
Therefore, home Member State courts ‘may give effect’ to the relevant host Member 
State standards, provided that their violation renders the performance of the contract 
‘unlawful’.  It is not entirely clear what ‘unlawful’ means in this context.  If it is read as 
‘illegal’, as seems to be the prevailing academic opinion,140 there will be virtually no 
situations in which the home Member State courts will be able to apply the relevant host 
Member State standards.  If the work carried out in the host Member State contravenes 
the local provisions concerning maximum work periods and minimum rest periods, 
minimum rates of pay etc, the performance of the contract will ordinarily not be illegal.  
Breach of the relevant employment standards usually entitles the employee to 
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appropriate remedies (compensation, the right to refuse to carry out work until the 
relevant standards are complied with etc.), without rendering the performance of the 
contract illegal.  At least in English law, illegality occurs if the work violates 
immigration, taxation, and social security rules.
141
  But since these rules do not concern 
‘civil and commercial matters’, they are outside the scope of Rome I142 and thus cannot 
be applied under Art.9(3). 
 Finally, it will be remembered that British legislation which is derived from EU 
law has a different territorial scope than purely domestic legislation.
143
  Given that 
PWD is an EU law instrument, the question arises of whether English courts can rely on 
the Bleuse
144
 line of cases to apply the relevant host Member State employment 
standards?  Since PWD does not oblige home Member States to enforce the host 
Member State standards, the answer is negative, as confirmed in Bullen v Club 
Cantabrica Coach & Air Holidays Ltd.
145
 
 The inability of posted workers to commence effective proceedings for the 
enforcement of the relevant host Member State employment standards in their country 
of origin further supports the conclusion that the European regime of posting of workers 
is primarily concerned with advancing the interests of the internal market, not of posted 
workers or host Member States.  If European PIL of employment is to contribute to the 
fulfillment of the social goals of the EU, posted workers must be able to commence and 
pursue effective proceedings in home Member States.  To achieve this, a provision like 
the one in Art.7(1) of the Rome Convention could be reintroduced in Rome I.  Since 
this is highly unlikely,
146
 a realistic solution is to amend PWD by introducing a 
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provision that would oblige home Member States to lend their courts for the 
enforcement of the relevant host Member State standards. 
Conclusions 
Since its inception, EU law has had to balance the competing interests of the internal 
market and the host Member States’ interests in the social sphere.  It is in the area of 
posting of workers in Europe that these considerations have clashed with particular 
force.  The analysis of various aspects of the regulation of posting of workers in Europe 
shows a clear pattern of favouring the interests of the internal market over those of host 
Member States and posted workers.  First, whilst guaranteeing the freedom to provide 
services, EU law has always allowed host Member States to impose some of their 
employment standards on out-of-state service providers.  Recently, however, the CJEU 
has significantly curtailed the range and type of local standards that can be imposed, 
thereby endangering the existing model of industrial relations of certain Member States 
such as Sweden.  Second, whilst consistently holding that ‘Community law [does not] 
prohibit [host] Member States from enforcing [the relevant local standards] by 
appropriate means’,147 the CJEU has imposed restrictions on the host Member State 
authorities and trade unions which undermine the effectiveness of both public and 
collective enforcement of those standards.  This state of affairs gives private 
enforcement of those standards, and thereby the rules of PIL, a potentially crucial role.  
The European Commission has proposed the adoption of two instruments which should 
remedy some of the perceived problems concerning public and collective enforcement.  
But even if these initiatives achieve their objectives, the potential importance of private 
enforcement of the relevant standards will remain. 
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Posted workers have the option of commencing proceeding in host Member 
States for breach of the relevant local employment standards.  But posted workers rarely 
do so due to their often precarious socio-economic position, ignorance of the posting of 
workers regime and the temporary nature of posting.  In order for private enforcement 
of the relevant host Member State standards to be a true alternative to public and 
collective enforcement, posted workers must be able to commence and pursue effective 
proceedings in home Member States.  Although the home Member State courts have 
jurisdiction over disputes concerning the posting of workers abroad, neither PWD nor 
Art.9(3) Rome I seems to allow these courts to apply the relevant host Member State 
standards.  An amendment of PWD which would oblige home Member State courts to 
do this is desirable.  But as things stand, by not enabling posted workers to effectively 
enforce the relevant host Member State standards in their home countries, European PIL 
of employment fails to protect the interests of both host Member States and posted 
workers, thereby furthering, as far as possible, those of the internal market.
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IX CONCLUSION 
 
The development of European PIL has revolutionised the understanding of PIL in 
Europe.
1
  The features of this process are said to be federalisation of PIL rules in EU 
regulations, (quasi-)constitutionalisation of European PIL, and methodological 
pluralisation, which leads to a bifurcation of intra-EU and external conflicts and to a 
conflict of two choice-of-law methods, one grounded in traditional thinking, the other 
based on specific EU-law reasoning.  The findings of this dissertation support, and can 
be explained in terms of, those observations. 
 Federalisation of PIL is more than a codification of PIL rules in EU regulations.  
It implies a shift in the traditional rules and perceptions in individual Member States, 
and in the objectives pursued by this field of law. 
English common law of conflict of laws of employment provides a good 
example of the changes brought about in a Member State by the European regime.  As 
section 1 of Chapter VI shows, statutory employment claims in England do not 
traditionally trigger the application of choice-of-law rules.  The question of whether an 
employment statute applies is considered to be one of statutory construction.  When 
interpreting the territorial scope of a statute, English courts are exclusively concerned 
with protecting their own regulatory objectives and employment standards.  If an 
employee falls outside the territorial reach of employment legislation, in other words if 
the English regulatory objectives and employment standards are not concerned, the 
employee cannot claim under that legislation.  The fact that the employment contract is 
solely governed by English law and that, consequently, the employee cannot rely on 
employment legislation of any other country or that the employee finds himself in a 
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legal vacuum by simultaneously falling outside the scope of employment legislation of 
foreign countries that are closely connected with the employment contract is 
traditionally regarded as irrelevant.  But section 2 of Chapter VI demonstrates that 
Rome I, and to a certain extent the Rome Convention, have radically changed the law in 
this field by largely merging contractual and statutory claims into one type of claim for 
choice-of-law purposes.  Similarly, Chapter VII shows that Rome II and Rome I do not 
seem to allow English courts to adhere to the traditional approach to tortious 
employment claims which allowed concurrence of contractual and tortious causes of 
action and, consequently, the application of two laws to essentially one claim.  Claims 
traditionally perceived as tortious seem to have been largely merged with contractual 
and statutory claims for the purposes of choice of law.  Even if not, the law governing 
such claims will in practice ordinarily be determined pursuant to choice-of-law rules for 
contract by virtue of the accessory choice-of-law rule contained in the escape clause of 
Art.4 Rome II.  By effectively largely merging the three types of employment claim into 
one category, the European choice-of-law instruments determine situations in which the 
whole of English law applies (or does not apply) to an international employment 
dispute.  Moreover, the Brussels regime, with its special rules of jurisdiction in 
employment matters explored in detail in Chapter IV, has supplanted, in the cases 
falling within its scope, the traditional jurisdictional rules which are based on widely 
different notions. 
The arguments advanced with regard to the English common law of conflict of 
laws of employment can be transposed to other fields of English law where the 
problems of the territorial scope of statutes and concurrence of contractual and other 
causes of action arise.  An obvious example is the territorial scope of consumer 
protection legislation.  English courts still approach the question of whether a consumer 
can claim under a consumer protection statute (e.g. Consumer Credit Act 1974) as an 
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issue of statutory construction.
2
  But, following the line of arguments put forward in 
Chapter VI, one would come to the conclusion that the territorial scope of consumer 
protection legislation is also primarily a matter for Rome I.
3
  These various effects of 
federalisation of PIL are further examples of what HARTLEY labelled ‘systematic 
dismantling’ of the common law of conflict of laws.4 
The reason for the changes introduced in the Member States’ traditional rules 
and perceptions by European PIL of employment is that the role of this field of law is 
different to that of national PIL regimes.  European PIL of employment is concerned 
with supra-national interests.  It performs a regulatory function, one of allocating and 
protecting regulatory authority of states in the field of labour law, thus maintaining and 
managing the diversity of European national labour law systems and safeguarding the 
objectives of uniform and harmonised EU employment legislation.  This is a facet of 
European PIL’s (quasi-)constitutionalisation. 
As the analysis of the objective of employee protection in Chapter II shows, the 
distribution of adjudicatory authority should be performed through jurisdictional rules 
that guarantee employees the right to pursue their claims in favourable forums, and not 
to defend their cases in unfamiliar and inaccessible forums.  Jurisdictional preference 
accorded to employees, however, should be proportionate and take into account the 
states’ legitimate interests.5  The distribution of legislative authority should be 
performed through choice-of-law rules that safeguard the application of the law of the 
state that is sufficiently closely connected with the employment contract in question, 
legitimately interested in regulating it, with which law the parties to the contract are 
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sufficiently closely connected and presumably familiar, and whose application they 
reasonably expect.  In addition, party autonomy should be allowed as long as it benefits 
the employee by building upon the mandatory minimum standard of protection set by 
the objectively applicable law.
6
  Chapters IV and V demonstrate that the rules 
concerning employment of Brussels I and Rome I largely accord with the mentioned 
considerations.  Nevertheless, it is suggested that Brussels I would be improved if the 
rule of the engaging place of business were abolished, and two new jurisdictional rules 
were introduced, one in favour of claimant employees (the ‘seeking out’ rule), the other 
in favour of claimant employers (the rule of the habitual place of work).  Furthermore, it 
is suggested that Rome I would be improved by the abolition of the rule of the engaging 
place of business.  The effective amalgamation of the three types of employment claim 
in English law into one category for choice-of-law purposes is a manifestation of the 
regulatory function of ‘European’ choice-of-law rules, which endeavour to pinpoint one 
country to which an international employment relation objectively ‘belongs’, which 
therefore has legislative authority with regard to that relation which should be 
safeguarded.  But, as suggested in Chapter VII, the escape clause of Rome II needs to be 
amended if it is to adequately channel legislative authority over an international 
employment relation to one country, and cater for the situations where the employment 
contract is governed by two laws (the chosen law and the objectively applicable law).  
Finally, Chapter III shows that the respect for diversity of national labour law systems is 
achieved through wide and inclusive personal scope of the special jurisdictional and 
choice-of-law rules of Brussels I and Rome I.  This can be seen as an attempt to allocate 
and protect regulatory authority of states that have intermediate legal categories of 
dependent self-employed workers or ascribe employer responsibilities to multiple 
employing entities. 
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But the effective amalgamation of the three types of employment claim and the 
channelling of regulatory, in particular legislative, authority over an international 
employment relation to one country creates significant problems in cases of interaction 
between European PIL of employment and EU primary law.  According to Rome I and 
Brussels I, the law of the country of an employee’s ‘origin’ remains applicable, and the 
courts of that country retain competence, when the employee is temporarily posted 
abroad.  Service providers from Member States with relatively low levels of terms and 
conditions of employment who provide services in affluent Member States can undercut 
local competitors.  Indeed, EU law, namely the Treaty and the Posted Workers 
Directive, gives those service providers the freedom to provide services within the EU, 
and allows host Member States to impose only a limited range and type of local 
employment standards on out-of-state service providers.  Furthermore, as Chapter VIII 
demonstrates, all ways of enforcing the relevant host country standards, namely public, 
collective and private enforcement, are largely ineffective.  This shows that the interests 
of the internal market take precedence over those of host Member States.  Calls have 
been made, from various quarters (including most of the academia, trade unions, 
politicians, many national governments and the EU bodies), to reform the regime of the 
posting of workers in Europe by increasing the effectiveness of public and collective 
enforcement of the relevant standards.  Another measure, suggested in this dissertation, 
could be to increase the effectiveness of private enforcement, thus making European 
PIL a part of the solution to posting of workers in Europe. 
Finally, the methodological pluralisation of EU PIL is reflected in the fact that 
the determination of the territorial scope of EU-law derived employment rights is based 
on specific EU-law reasoning.  Although it is argued in Chapter VI that the territorial 
scope of British employment legislation is primarily a matter for Rome I, EU-law 
derived employment rights must remain an exception, since the unilateralist approach to 
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determining the territorial reach of those rights is mandated by EU law.
7
  In cases of 
conflicts with third countries (i.e. situations involving connections with one or more EU 
and non-EU countries), Member State courts must safeguard the objectives of uniform 
and harmonised EU employment legislation in appropriate cases, regardless of the law 
applicable pursuant to the choice-of-law rules of Rome I.  It remains yet to be clarified 
what the appropriate cases are. 
If European PIL of employment indeed performs a regulatory function, 
primarily in the European context, there are further questions that should be addressed, 
which could not have been done in the space of this dissertation.  In national labour law 
systems, employment law is but one aspect of legal regulation of employment relations.  
Other aspects include collective bargaining, social security and taxation.  In national 
laws, these various aspects complement each other in achieving the national regulatory 
objectives.  European PIL of employment is traditionally considered in isolation of 
fields of law such as European and international law of collective bargaining, social 
security and taxation.  A further step in determining whether European PIL of 
employment adequately performs its regulatory function is to consider its interaction 
with other elements of the system of regulation of international employment relations 
and how the system as a whole contributes to the achievement of supra-national 
regulatory objectives. 
Finally, further research, either solely of European PIL of employment or of the 
system of the EU regulation of international employment relations as a whole, should 
take greater account of the comparative perspective.  For example, as mentioned in 
section 3.2 of Chapter II, the choice-of-law rules for determining the objectively 
applicable law of Rome I are an attempt to achieve the desired flexibility and take into 
account the various public and private interests involved.  Another attempt is the 
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solution of the Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws and its progeny.  Unlike 
European PIL of employment, which channels legislative authority over an international 
employment relation to one country, the Second Restatement allows various aspects of 
an international employment relation (i.e. various issues) to be governed by various 
laws.  To determine the law applicable to an issue, the US courts are required to 
consider, among other things, governmental interests.
8
  As discussed in Chapter VIII, 
European PIL of employment is at the centre of the problem of posting of workers in 
Europe.  The employment contracts that a service provider from a Member State with 
relatively low levels of terms and conditions of employment has with its employees who 
it employs in that country remain subject to that country’s law when those employees 
are posted abroad for the purpose of performing services there.  In the US, an analogous 
problem with posted workers does not arise.  One explanation lies in the specificities of 
the US Constitution.
9
  But another possible explanation is that the PIL rules concerning 
employment in the US are different.  Because the legislative authority over an 
international employment relation is not channelled to one country, but rather various 
issues can be governed by various laws, service providers from less affluent US states 
are not in a position to benefit from their comparative advantage, since the issue of 
which employment standards are posted workers entitled to during the period of posting 
can be subject to the law of the host state.  Of course, research is needed to test this 
hypothesis, and, furthermore, whether it is realistic for European PIL law to adopt a 
solution similar to that of the Second Restatement.  The fate of Art.7(1) of the Rome 
Convention suggests that it is not. 
This dissertation has endeavoured to show that European PIL of employment is 
endowed with a regulatory function, that it has brought about significant changes in the 
                                                 
8
 Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, §§6, 187, 188. 
9
 C. Barnard, ‘Restricting Restrictions: Lessons for the EU from the US?’ (2009) 68 CLJ 575. 
306 
 
traditional English rules and perceptions, and that certain PIL rules should be amended 
in order for this field of law to adequately perform its task.  This dissertation has also 
aimed to demonstrate that European PIL is not only concerned with resolving individual 
private disputes and achieving private justice and fairness in individual cases, but that it 
has an important systemic function.  This, in turn, reveals something about PIL as a 
whole.  If European PIL of employment has such a ‘federalised’, ‘(quasi-)constitutional’ 
role, that is a piece of evidence for the proposition that the concept of ‘private’, 
expressed in its very name, is obscuring the true nature of the discipline. 
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